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In several ways, the European Union interacts with international law. Not only 
is the EU’s existence based on a treaty concluded by its Member States, the 
latter have also endowed it with a legal personality and several competences 
to act on the global stage, particularly by way of concluding international 
agreements.
The Treaty on European Union, as modified by the Treaty of Lisbon of 2009, 
emphasizes that in its relations with the wider world, the EU shall uphold 
and promote its values and interests, but it shall also contribute ‘to the strict 
observance and the development of international law, including respect for 
the principles of the United Nations’.
In this report, produced in the framework of the SIEPS research project 
entitled The EU external action and the Treaty of Lisbon, Professor Ramses 
Wessel analyses the manifold encounters between the EU and international 
law, in particular since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
Anna Stellinger
Director
SIEPS carries out multidisciplinary research in current European affairs. 
As an independent governmental agency, we connect academic analysis 
and policy-making at Swedish and European levels.
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7Executive summary
Although written from a legal perspective, this report aims to offer an acces-
sible way into understanding the various ‘encounters’ between the EU and 
international law in the current, ‘post-Lisbon’ situation. The European Union 
is usually considered a special, or sui generis, organisation. Yet, without in-
ternational law, the EU would not exist and would not be able to exercise its 
external actions. The 2009 Treaty of Lisbon further strengthened the position 
of the European Union in the global legal and political order. But the Union 
is not the sole international actor in Europe. Despite their EU membership, 
the Member States do not cease to be states.
The dynamic shift of external competences from the Member States to the 
EU frequently results in Member States facing diverging EU and interna-
tional law obligations. It has been perfectly legitimate to conclude invest-
ment treaties with third states, but what if the competence in that area shifts 
from the Member States to the European Union – either because of a treaty 
modification or on the basis of a sudden exercise by the EU of an already 
existing competence? Obviously, third states are less interested in complex 
competence divisions within the EU, but Member States are confronted with 
a new situation.
In the post-Lisbon era in particular, the emerging picture reflects a struggle 
of the European Union to further develop its ‘international actorness’, while 
being restrained both by the principle of the conferral of competences (on 
the basis of which the Union only has those competences which have been 
conferred upon it) and by the necessity to follow the rules of international 
law. We are witnessing the further development of what could be called the 
third dimension of legal relations. Before the establishment of the European 
Communities at the end of the 1950s the (Member) States were in charge of 
their own external relations. They were fully (and exclusively) competent 
to conclude international agreements with other states. The creation of the 
European Communities brought about a second type of legal relation: part 
of the external relations became internal, in the sense that relations between 
Member States and with the Communities became subject to the rules in the 
Community (now Union) Treaties. In the area of external relations Member 
States had to share competences with the Community/Union or even lose 
former sovereign competences (for instance in the important area of interna-
tional trade). The title of this report refers to the third kind of relationship: 
that between the European Union and the international legal order. This re-
port highlights the variety of encounters of the EU with international law.
8These encounters take place in relation to different issues. It is argued that 
the European Union can and should be assessed in terms of an international 
organisation. As an international organisation, the European Union is subject 
to international law in its relations with third states and other international 
organisations. There we would need to start from the presumption that the EU 
is bound by the international agreements to which it is a party as well as to the 
customary parts of international law. This points to the core difficulty of EU 
external relations: who represents the ‘European interest’ on the international 
scene – the EU or its Member States, and how do these actions relate to each 
other – are they coherent, mutually supportive, or perhaps contradictory? The 
European Union ‘as an international actor’ is often used as an umbrella term 
for a set of external policies, instruments and actors across a vast range of 
substantive domains. It also illustrates the ambiguity as to who is acting: the 
European Union alone, the EU Member States, or both simultaneously.
The report further revisits the alleged ‘autonomy’ of the EU in the light of 
classic and recent case law (including Kadi) on the effects of international 
law in the EU legal order. Given the global ambitions of the EU – in particu-
lar as reflected in the post-Lisbon Treaties – the question of the hierarchy of 
international and EU norms has become more relevant.
In order to act legally internationally, the Union needs instruments. Interna-
tional agreements are the EU’s international law tools par excellence. They 
form the key legal instrument that allow the Union to play along in the global 
legal order and to establish legal relationships with third states and other 
international organisations. The revised treaties provide new procedures on 
how to negotiate and conclude international agreements, with roles for new 
actors such as the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy. The procedures as well as the practice reflect the tension that still 
exists between the institutions, but also between the Union and its Member 
States. The latter is particularly clear in the case of mixed agreements, in 
areas where both the EU and the Member States have competences. In these 
areas, the ‘duty of cooperation’ is to guide the actions of both the Union 
and its Member States. Other types of agreements which result in encoun-
ters between the EU and international law include association, accession and 
withdrawal agreements or the accession to international organisations. At the 
same time, international law continues to play a role in the case of interna-
tional agreements concluded by the Member States only.
In addition, three themes deserve special attention as they have gained in im-
portance over the last few years: the international responsibility of the Union, 
9its extra-territorial immunity in case of law-suits in third states and the EU’s 
new ambitions in the field of international diplomacy. These themes relate to 
the more visible position of the EU in the international legal order and the 
related ambitions in the post-Lisbon treaties.
By now it has become widely accepted that the EU as such may bear inter-
national responsibility for an internationally wrongful act. Yet, the EU is not 
a normal international organisation and the division of external competences 
is both complex and dynamic. One of the key questions is therefore how to 
divide the responsibility between the EU and its Member States. This ques-
tion is relevant in relation to the international responsibility in the case of 
mixed agreements, but also when considering the responsibilities of the EU 
as a global security actor. Although most missions launched by the Union so 
far have been relatively modest in their size and objectives, even small-scale 
operations may give rise to a breach of international law or cause damage and 
injury to private parties. Yet holding EU missions accountable for their activi-
ties is hampered by a range of legal and practical difficulties.
The EU’s increasing external activities also trigger the question of the organi-
sation’s immunity before international and foreign courts. While this issue is 
clearly under-researched, it is claimed here that the question will arise more 
frequently, given the current scope of the Union’s external action.
The Lisbon Treaty also reveals the EU’s new diplomatic ambitions through 
the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which 
has been called ‘the first structure of a common European diplomacy’. Here 
we run into the question of the extent to which international law allows the 
EU to act as a diplomatic actor alongside states, given the fact that most 
international rules on diplomatic and consular law are based on inter-state 
relations. The question whether the EU can replace its Member States in dip-
lomatic and consular relations should currently be answered in the negative, 
but it is clear that recent developments are rapidly changing things. It will be 
up to both the EU Member States and third states to accept a new role for the 
Union in this area.
The primary aim of the present report is not to contribute to the legal doctri-
nal discussion between lawyers on the many elements that make up the rela-
tionship between the EU and international law. This discussion takes place 
in the specialist journals and edited volumes in the field. Rather, this report 
opens up the relevant issues to a wider audience of academics and practition-
ers, who are not necessarily specialists in the subject. In that respect this 
10
report mainly reflects the law as it stands. A key perspective is formed by the 
changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty and the conclusion reveals how 
the Lisbon Treaty affects the relationship between the EU and international 
law, arguing that this treaty potentially contributes to a more coherent EU ap-
proach to international norms, albeit in an embryonic fashion.
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[T]he Court affirmed the autonomy of the Union’s legal order. […] This does not 
mean, however, that the Union’s municipal legal order and the international legal 
order pass by each other like ships in the night
EU Advocate General Miguel Poiares Maduro in his Opinion in the Kadi case.1
1 Introduction
The European Union is usually considered a special, or sui generis, organisa-
tion. This special status flows not only from the relationship with its Member 
States (which indeed differentiates it from other international organisations), 
but also from its position in relation to international law. In the early days 
in particular, the European Court of Justice tended to underline this special 
position by referring to the ‘autonomous’ legal order that was created, in 
which the relationship between the Member States was no longer primarily 
regulated by international law but by EU law. Indeed, the states were first and 
foremost Member States. Yet, without international law, the EU would not 
exist. It is based on a treaty concluded within the framework of international 
treaty law. At the same time, and keeping in mind the rule of pacta tertiis nec 
nocent nec prosunt, third states are in principle not bound by the EU treaty 
as to them it is an agreement between others.2 This implies that in its external 
legal relations the EU will have to act under international law and will also 
have to respect its basic rules. Internally, however, this may lead to conflict-
ing norms and over the years the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) has had quite a task in finding solutions for these conflicts.
The 2009 Treaty of Lisbon further strengthened the separate position of the 
European Union in the global legal and political order. The current Treaties 
— the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU) — reflect the ambitions of the Union to be an 
active global player.3 Article 21(1) TEU, for instance, provides:
The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the 
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and en-
1 Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat Interna-
tional Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities [2008] ECR I-6351. In this quote, ‘Community’ has been replaced by ‘Union’. 
All ECJ case law can be found through http://curia.europa.eu/.
2 This rule is laid down in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
adopted in Vienna on 22 May 1969 (hereinafter: VLCT): ‘A treaty does not create either 
obligations or rights for a third State without its consent’.
3 See also B. van Vooren, S. Blockmans and J. Wouters (Eds.), The EU’s Role in Global Gov-
ernance: The Legal Dimension, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
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largement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democ-
racy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles 
of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter and international law.
The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with 
third countries, and international, regional or global organisations 
which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall 
promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in 
the framework of the United Nations.
Similar wording can be found in Article 3(5) TEU, again underlining that 
the EU has moved well beyond being an organisation with a primarily inter-
nal focus. The EU has set itself the objective of contributing actively to key 
global problems.
In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and pro-
mote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its 
citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable devel-
opment of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, 
free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human 
rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict ob-
servance and the development of international law, including respect 
for the principles of the United Nations Charter.
Other provisions reveal the Union’s ambitions to consolidate its different for-
eign policy dimensions through the new European External Action Service 
(EEAS) and to further develop its own diplomatic network. Moreover, the at-
tention accorded to the United Nations and its principles in the new EU trea-
ties is overwhelming. In fact the United Nations is referred to not less than 19 
times in the current EU treaties (including the Protocols and Declarations). Ir-
respective of the CJEU’s judgment in the 2008 Kadi case (see below), the EU 
obviously regards many of its actions as being part of the global governance 
programme. The United Nations and its Charter are presented as the guiding 
legal framework for the EU in its external relations. Article 3(5) TEU men-
tions ‘respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter’ which are to be 
pursued by the EU as part of ‘the strict observance and the development of in-
ternational law’. As indicated above, similar wordings reappear in Article 21 
TEU of the general provisions on the Union’s external action: the promotion 
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of ‘multilateral solutions to common problems’ should be done ‘in particular 
in the framework of the United Nations’. Finally, as reflected in the Preamble 
to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), UN law not 
only guides the external relations of the Union, but also its association with 
its overseas countries and territories (compare Articles 198–204 TFEU). The 
Member States announced their intention to ‘confirm the solidarity which 
binds Europe and the overseas countries and desir[e] to ensure the develop-
ment of their prosperity, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations.’
The Union is not the sole international actor in Europe, however. Having be-
come members of the EU, the Member States do not cease to be states. They 
have continued to conclude international agreements; not only with third 
states, but also among themselves (‘inter se’). The dynamic shift of external 
competences frequently results in Member States facing diverging EU and 
international law obligations. It has been perfectly legitimate for Member 
States to conclude investment treaties with third states, but what if the com-
petence in that area shifts from the Member State to the European Union; 
either because of a treaty modification or on the basis of a sudden exercise by 
the EU of an already existing competence? Obviously, third states are less in-
terested in complex competence divisions within the EU, but Member States 
are confronted with a new situation.
In the post-Lisbon era in particular, the emerging picture reflects a struggle 
of the European Union to further develop its ‘international actorness’, while 
being restrained both by the principle of the conferral of competences (on 
the basis of which the Union only has those competences which have been 
conferred upon it) and by the necessity to follow the rules of international 
law. We are witnessing the further development of what could be called the 
third dimension of legal relations. Before the establishment of the European 
Communities at the end of the 1950s the (Member) States were in charge of 
their own external relations. They were fully (and exclusively) competent 
to conclude international agreements with other states. The creation of the 
European Communities brought about a second type of legal relation: part 
of the external relations became internal, in the sense that relations between 
Member States and with the Communities became subject to the rules in the 
Community (now Union) Treaties. In the area of external relations Mem-
ber States had to share competences with the Community/Union or even 




international trade). The title of this report refers to the third kind of relation-
ship: that between the European Union and the international legal order.4
The main aim of this report is to highlight the variety of encounters of the 
EU with international law. Its aim is not to contribute to the legal doctri-
nal discussion between lawyers on the many elements that make up these 
encounters. This discussion takes place in the specialist journals and edited 
volumes in the field. Rather, this report aims to open up the relevant issues 
to a wider audience of academics and practitioners, who are not necessarily 
specialists in the subject. In that respect this report primarily reflects the law 
as it stands.5 A key perspective is formed by the changes brought about by the 
Lisbon Treaty and in the conclusion we will try and answer the question how 
the Lisbon Treaty affects the relationship between the EU and international 
law and to what extent this treaty contributes to a more coherent EU approach 
to international norms.
4 Close Encounters of the Third Kind is the title of the famous Steven Spielberg movie on 
encounters with a world outside our ‘autonomous’ planet which seems to be capable of 
controlling and defining our actions. See http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0075860/
5 Earlier as well as forthcoming publications of the present author have been used as a source 
for parts of this report, in particular B. Van Vooren and R.A. Wessel, EU External Relations 
Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014 (forthcom-
ing) and E. Cannizzaro, P. Palchetti and R.A. Wessel (Eds.), International Law as Law of the 
European Union, Boston and Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011. References may be 
found throughout the text. Credits are due to the co-authors of some of the publications: Bart 
Van Vooren, Steven Blockmans, Christophe Hillion, and Aurel Sari. 
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2 The nature of the European Union as an  
 international actor
2.1 An international organisation or something else?
Any report on the interface between the EU and international law is founded 
on the underlying premise that the European Union can have legal relations 
with third states (non-Member States) and other international organisations. 
Hence, that the EU is an international actor with a distinct legal existence 
just like the Member States, or international organisations such as the United 
Nations. What does it mean then to say that the European Union is an inter-
national actor?
When the 1957 Rome Treaty founded the European Economic Community, 
this new international organisation was explicitly given competence to con-
duct international trade relations through its common commercial policy, and 
to conclude international agreements through which it could associate itself 
with third countries. As European integration progressed, the EEC, later Eu-
ropean Community and now European Union, acquired powers in other areas 
such as foreign and security policy, environmental policy, energy policy, and 
so on. How does this amalgam of international policies render the European 
Union an international actor? In political science literature there is a variety 
of definitions of the nature of the EU in the world, which commonly seek 
to categorise the ‘kind’ of power the Union exerts in its external relations: 
civilian power, soft power, normative power, and so on.6 All these concepts 
usually argue that there is something distinctive about EU action in the world, 
an ‘EU way’ of conducting its international relations which is connected to 
the way post-World War II European integration itself has progressed: avoid-
ing inter-state conflicts through integration on the basis of multilateral legally 
binding instruments. Other scholars do not seek to classify the EU norma-
tively, and are content with the classification of the EU as quite simply being 
an entity which stands as a category of its own, e.g. a sui generis international 
actor which cannot be defined with any pre-existing terminology:
The EU is not an intergovernmental organization as traditionally un-
derstood, nor is it a partially formed state. While it is clearly a regional 
organization, its degree of integration, and the range of policy com-
6 See respectively H. Bull, ‘Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, No. 2, 1982, pp. 149-164; J. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Suc-
cess in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs, 2005, 191 p.; and I. Manners, ‘Normative 
Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, No. 2, 
2002, pp. 235-258.
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petences and instruments it possesses, render comparison with other 
regional organizations such as the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) meaningless.7 
In this report on a legal relationship, we are primarily concerned with the 
rules and principles that govern the legal existence and functioning of this 
international actor. Consequently we define the EU as an international actor 
in abstract terms as an entity which interacts with third countries and inter-
national organisations (and even its own Member States) in ways that are 
legally and politically distinguishable from its constitutive Member States. 
In the global context, this entity thus has a independent identity composed of 
values, interests and policies which it seeks to define and promote interna-
tionally as its own.8 
The term ‘entity’ may nevertheless not be too helpful to explain the nature of 
this ‘beast’ and the question emerges whether we can see the EU as an inter-
national organisation. To lawyers, being an international actor at least means 
being an international legal actor. This in turn means that, although the EU is 
not a state, it is subject to the rules of international law when it wishes to act 
on the global stage. International law, on the other hand, is still quite tradi-
tional. Created as ‘inter-state’ law, it continues to struggle with the presence 
of non-state actors in the international order.9 Yet, international organisations 
obviously have found their place as international legal actors, and other fora 
and networks are also increasingly recognised as legally relevant.10 It is a tru-
ism that the EU is not a regular international organisation. From the outset, 
Member States have been willing (or were forced) to transfer competences to 
the Community and later the Union. The current treaties again herald a new 
phase in which the EU’s role as an international actor in the global legal order 
will be further developed.11
This is exactly why it is important to classify the EU under international law. 
Most international rules apply to states, some (also) to international organisa-
7 C. Bretherton and J. Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, New York: Routledge, 
2006, at 2.
8 Cf. M. Cremona, ‘The Union as a Global Actor: Roles, Models and Identity’, Common 
Market Law Review, 2004, pp. 553-573.
9 Cf. M. Noortmann and C. Ryngaert (Eds.), Non-State Actor Dynamics in International Law: 
From Law-Takers to Law-Makers, Burlington VT: Ashgate, 2012.
10 A. Berman and R.A. Wessel, ‘The International Legal Status of Informal International 
Lawmaking Bodies: Consequences for Accountability’, in J. Pauwelyn, R.A. Wessel and J. 
Wouters (Eds.), Informal International Lawmaking, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 
pp. 35-62.
11 Van Vooren, Blockmans and Wouters, op.cit.
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tions and a limited set also to other internationally active entities (such as lib-
eration movements or multinational corporations). Few would argue that the 
EU is a state;12 many would say that it is an international entity sui generis. 
International law, however, only works when it is applied across the board for 
certain categories of international actors. While it may be possible to create 
special rules for sui generis entities (compare the clauses on Regional Eco-
nomic Integration Organisations (REIOs) in some multilateral agreements13), 
the rationale behind a legal system is that its rules should allow for a smooth 
cooperation between the different subjects.
Unfortunately, the Treaty of Lisbon is not very helpful in this respect. Article 
1 TEU merely refers to the fact that ‘[…] the High Contracting Parties estab-
lish among themselves a European Union’ and that this Union ‘shall replace 
and succeed the European Community’. Thus, it still does not give an answer 
to the classic question of whether the EU is an international organisation or 
something else. This may be the reason also why text books are still uncer-
tain about the legal nature of the EU and seem to have a preference for more 
political notions. Chalmers et al. refer to the EU as ‘amongst other things, a 
legal system established to deal with a series of contemporary problems and 
realise a set of goals that individual states felt unable to manage alone’.14 The 
‘nature of the Union’s international presence’ is related to its international le-
gal personality only, whereas the nature of the entity as such is left open.15 In 
its famous ruling on the Lisbon Treaty, the German Constitutional Court held 
that the EU was ‘designed as an association of sovereign states (Staatenver-
12 Although it can been argued that there are close resemblances with federations such as 
Canada. Cf. the contributions to ‘L’Union européenne comme fédération’, chapter 2 in M. 
Benlolo-Carabot, U. Candas and E. Cujo, Union européenne et droit international, Paris: 
Editions Pedone, 2012, pp. 139-230.
13 An REIO is commonly defined in UN protocols and conventions as ‘an organization con-
stituted by sovereign states of a given region to which its Member States have transferred 
competence in respect of matters governed by […] convention or its protocols and [which] 
has been duly authorised, in accordance with its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, 
approve or accede to it [the instruments concerned].’ See for example the 2004 Energy 
Charter Treaty (Art. 3). See also E. Paasivirta and P.J. Kuijper, ‘Does One Size Fit All?: The 
European Community and the Responsibility of International Organisations’, Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law, 2005, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007, pp. 169-226 
at 205. In the new Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities the REIO clause 
seems to have evolved to a RIO (Regional Integration Organization) clause, which does 
justice to the large scope of activities of the EU at the present time (see Art. 44: ‘‘Regional 
integration organization’ shall mean an organization constituted by sovereign States of a 
given region, to which its member States have transferred competence in respect of matters 
governed by this Convention.’)
14 D. Chalmers, G. Davies and G. Monti, European Union Law, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2010 (2nd ed.) at 3.
15 Ibid. at 632.
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bund) to which sovereign powers are transferred’. Yet, the further description 
by the Court comes close to generally accepted definitions of an international 
organisation: 
The concept of Verbund covers a close long-term association of states 
which remain sovereign, an association which exercises public au-
thority on the basis of a treaty, whose fundamental order, however, is 
subject to the disposal of the Member States alone and in which the 
peoples of their Member States, ie the citizens of the states, remain the 
subjects of democratic legitimisation.16
Indeed, the nature of the EU is mostly defined on the basis of internal con-
siderations – not so much has been written on how it would be perceived 
by third states. A possible reason for this was presented by Tsagourias: ‘By 
appropriating the instruments of its creation, the Union liberated itself from 
external – international – contingencies and also moved the source of its vali-
dation from the international legal order to the Union.’17 Yet, irrespective of 
the inward-looking basis for its creation and its ‘liberation’ from international 
contingencies, the current ambitions of the EU reveal the need to exist and be 
recognised as an international legal entity that somehow fits the fundamental 
starting points of the international legal order.
Can the EU then be qualified as an international organisation? Well, when it 
looks like a banana and smells like a banana, it may very well be a banana. 
Indeed, many would agree with Curtin and Dekker ‘that the legal system of 
the European Union is most accurately analysed in terms of the institutional 
legal concept of an international organization […]’.18 But even this quote 




16 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht, 30 June 2009; available at www.bundes-
verfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen. See also A. Steinbach, ‘The Lisbon Judgment of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court – New Guidance on the Limits of European Integra-
tion’, German Law Journal, 2010, p. 367.
17 N. Tsagourias, ‘Conceptualizing the Autonomy of the European Union’, in R. Collins and 
N.D. White (Eds.), International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy: Institutional 
Independence in the International Legal Order, London and New York: Routledge, 2011, 
pp. 339-352 at 340.
18 D.M. Curtin and I.F. Dekker, ‘The European Union from Maastricht to Lisbon: Institutional 
and Legal Unity out of the Shadow’, in P. Craig and G. De Búrca (Eds.), The Evolution of 
EU Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 155-185 at 163. 
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organisation (albeit a very special one).19 Throughout their handbook on the 
law of international organisations, Schermers and Blokker nevertheless take 
the EU along as an international organisation, while noting of course its ‘far-
reaching forms of cooperation’ and the ‘supranational features’.20 The EU is 
indeed ‘considered special not because of its identity problems but because of 
the high degree of “constitutional” development, supranational components 
and the rule of law features within this organization making it look almost 
like a federation of states […]’, as argued by Bengoetxea in one of the few 
publications focussing on this question.21
As an international organisation, the European Union is subject to internation-
al law in its relations with third states and other international organisations. 
There we would need to start from the presumption that the EU is bound by 
the international agreements to which it is a party as well as to the customary 
parts of international law. As more recent developments show, international 
law is capable of taking the differences between states and international or-
ganisations into account (see for instance the 1986 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between 
International Organizations; or the 2011 Articles on the Responsibility of In-
ternational Organizations).22 Yet, third states (sometimes annoyingly) experi-
ence that the EU remains special. It may be an international organisation, 
but the fact that it is exclusively competent to act in certain areas is unprec-
edented, as is the rule that EU Member States feel that, in the end, they should 
give priority to EU law in cases of a conflict with international law.23 Indeed, 
as also more recent case law underlines, the Gemeinschaftstreue is believed 
19 Compare the qualification as ‘eine internationale Organisation eigener Art’, by W. Schroed-
er, ‘Die Europäische Union als Völkerrechtssubject’, Europarecht, Beiheft 2, 2012, pp. 9-23 
at 18. More in general, the status of the EU as an ‘international organization’ seems to be 
accepted implicitly by many authors. Cf. P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011 (2nd ed.), who does not at all address the external legal nature 
of the EU, but merely refers to the fact that ‘[t]he EU is also a member of a number of other 
international organizations […]’ (at 3, emphasis added).
20 H.G. Schermers and N.M. Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity in Diversity, 
Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011, at 55 and 57. 
21 J. Bengoetxea, ‘The EU as (More Than) an International Organization’, in J. Klabbers and 
Å. Wallendahl, Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations, Cheltenham 
UK and Northampton MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, pp. 448-465 at 449. The author 
argues that it is above all the ‘transitional’ status of the EU (from international organization 
to federation) that justifies its ‘specialness’ (at 450).
22 Respectively to be found at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conven-
tions/1_2_1986.pdf; and http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20arti-
cles/9_11_2011.pdf. Obviously, the extent to which these instruments successfully take the 
complex position of international organisations into account may be subject to debate.
23 See more generally J. Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and the European Union, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2009.
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to take precedence over international law obligations.24 While for EU Mem-
ber States (and most EU lawyers) these may be logical consequences of a 
dynamic division of competences, third states (and most public international 
lawyers) would remind us of the rule of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt; 
third states are in principle not bound by the EU treaty as to them it is an 
agreement between others. From a legal (and most certainly also a political) 
perspective they should not be bothered with the complex division of com-
petences that was part of a deal between the EU and its own Member States.
2.2 The EU and its Member States in the international   
 legal order
Whereas the above discussion may seem like a purely semantic exercise, 
it points to the core difficulty of EU external relations: who represents the 
‘European interest’ on the international scene – the EU or its Member States? 
And how do these actions relate to each other – are they coherent, mutually 
supportive, or perhaps contradictory? The EU ‘as an international actor’ is 
often used as an umbrella term for a set of external policies, instruments 
and actors across a vast range of substantive domains. It also illustrates the 
ambiguity as to who is acting: the EU alone, the EU Member States, or both 
simultaneously.
As we will see, the Treaty of Lisbon has certainly strengthened the EU’s ‘in-
ternational actorness’. Article 47 TEU now confirms the separate legal status 
of the EU by confirming that ‘The Union shall have legal personality’. From 
a legal perspective it indeed makes sense to continue distinguishing between 
the EU as an international organisation of which states can be members, and 
the (member) states themselves. In that sense the EU is clearly something 
different from the collection of 28 states. It has a distinct legal status, both in 
relation to its own members and towards third states. The EU as an interna-
tional actor then refers to the entity which has express legal personality and 
capacity to act in the international legal order. What is then characteristic of 
this international actor, and what makes some define it a ‘sui generis’ interna-
tional actor, is that the EU is neither a state with ‘full international powers’, 
nor is it a traditional international organisation whose powers are subject to 
24 Examples include the Open Skies cases (e.g. Case C-469/98, Commission v. Finland), BITs 
cases (Cases C-205/06, Commission v. Austria; C-249/06, Commission v. Sweden; C-118/07, 
Commission v. Finland), or the PFOS case (Case 246/07, Commission v. Sweden). From a 
more constitutional point of view, similar arguments that international law should be applied 
in a way that would not harm the constitutional principles of the EU legal order were made 
in the Kadi case (Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat Interna-
tional Foundation v. Council and Commission).
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the will of its members. Yet, like any other international organisation, the EU 
is based on the principle of conferred powers, e.g. it can only act where its 
Member States have given it the competence to do so. But, importantly, the 
Member States may no longer be allowed to act once competences have been 
transferred and have been placed ‘exclusively’ in the hands of the Union. 
As a consequence, depending on the legal existence, scope and nature of the 
EU’s external powers (a synonym for competence), the Member States have 
to a lesser or greater degree a prominent role in the formation and execution 
of international action in the relevant area. Conversely, the role of the EU (as 
the legal person) and its supranational institutions will then shift depending 
on the policy area at issue. This is why it possesses significant legal compe-
tences and political clout which is distinct from that of its Member States. 
However, it is not a state, and its Member States remain equally significant 
on the international scene. The relationship between the EU and international 
law is based on this phenomenon and the Treaty of Lisbon has maintained 
this ambiguity, which continues to make it difficult to live up to the demands 
of coherence and consistency in its external relations policy, which can be 
found throughout the treaties (e.g. Article 21(3) TEU).
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3 The relationship between EU law and 
 international law
3.1 An autonomous legal order…?
3.1.1 …or international law as an integral part of the EU legal  
 order?
Irrespective of the clarified international status of the EU on the basis of 
the Lisbon Treaty, the relationship between the EU legal order and interna-
tional law has been with us from the outset. A striking tension underlies the 
many judicial cases on the effects of international law in the EU legal order: 
the EU’s struggle to find solutions between autonomy and dependence.25 To 
make certain key principles of EU law (including ‘primacy’ and ‘direct ef-
fect’) work, the EU needs to stress its autonomous relation vis-à-vis interna-
tional law. At the same time, as an international actor, there is a need for the 
EU to live up to most of the rules that make up the international legal order.
More recently, in the Kadi cases both the CJEU and the General Court have felt 
obliged to stress the EU’s autonomous legal order on the question of whether 
the EU should be bound by UN Security Council resolutions: ‘the institu-
tions […] had no autonomous discretion [in relation to UNSC resolutions]’ 
(Case T-315/01) and ‘the validity of any Community measure […] must be 
considered to be the expression […] of a constitutional guarantee stemming 
from the EC Treaty as an autonomous legal system’ (Case C-402/05P). The 
notion of ‘autonomy’ was even a central element in the discussion between 
the CJEU and the General Court in the Kadi saga when the latter argued: ‘the 
Court of Justice thus seems to have regarded the constitutional framework 
created by the EC Treaty as a wholly autonomous legal order, not subject to 
the higher rules of international law […]’ (Case T-85/09).26
‘A wholly autonomous legal order, not subject to the higher rules of interna-
tional law.’ Phrases like these are meant to indicate that the EU as such is not 
automatically bound by international law. They seem to suggest the dualism 
that many Member States are familiar with: international law can only be part 
of a domestic legal order once it has been transformed or incorporated into 
that legal order. Yet, the legal order of the EU is widely identified as ‘monist’ 
25 R.A. Wessel and S. Blockmans (Eds.), Between Autonomy and Dependence: The EU Legal 
Order under the Influence of International Organisations, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press/
Springer, 2013.
26 Emphasis added in all sentences.
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in its relation to public international law (see below).27 Indeed, in practice 
the EU does not seem to have a problem with allowing binding international 
norms to become part of its legal order.
From the outset the novel and special nature of the European Union (then 
the European Economic Community) was stressed by the European Court. 
In Van Gend & Loos (Case 26/62) the Court held ‘that the Community con-
stitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the 
states have limited their sovereign rights […]’.28 In Costa v. ENEL (Case 
6/64) the Court further stressed the ‘special’ nature of the EU: ‘By contrast 
with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own legal 
system […]’.29 It can now been concluded that the phrase ‘a new legal order 
of international law’ is not without importance.
In the early case law the need to distinguish EU law from international law 
was above all triggered by the existence and development of the two notions 
that are so characteristic of EU law (and generally absent in international 
law): primacy and direct effect. Although over time the EU adopted a more 
relaxed attitude towards international law (see below), in more recent case 
law the Court has still frequently used the term ‘autonomy’ to indicate the 
need for the Union to live up to its own rules (and perhaps to preserve its own 
prerogatives). Thus, the ‘preservation of the autonomy of the Community 
legal order’ formed a crucial element in Opinion 1/00 on the possible estab-
lishment of a European Common Aviation Area. Similar references could al-
ready be found in Opinion 1/76 (on the possible establishment of a European 
laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels) and Opinion 1/91 (on the crea-
tion of the European Economic Area). The safeguarding of the EU’s judicial 
system was at stake in the Mox Plant (Case C-459/03) when the Court held 
that ‘[…] an international agreement cannot affect […] the autonomy of the 
Community legal system […].’ 
Indeed, after an initial period in which the European Court laid emphasis on 
a strengthening of the autonomous nature of the Community, beginning in 
the early 1970s, the Court indicated that this does not imply that international 
treaties are not to be considered a part of EU law. It was in the Haegeman 
27 See for example: P. Pescatore, ‘Die Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs zur 
gemeinschaftlichen Wirkung völkerrechtlicher Abkommen’, in Festschrift für H. Mosler, 
Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung, internationale Gerichtsbarkeit Menschenrechte, Berlin, 
1983, p. 661, at 680; H. Schermers, ‘Community Law and International Law’, Common 




case30 that the Court presented the famous phrase that international agree-
ments concluded by the EU form ‘an integral part of Union law’. As we will 
see, this status of international law is not restricted to international agree-
ments (including mixed agreements), but also holds true for customary law, 
and secondary international law deriving from international agreements such 
as Association Council decisions.31 
The Lisbon Treaty does not address the hierarchy between EU and inter-
national law as such. Accepting that international law forms part of the EU 
legal order raises the question of where to place it in the EU’s hierarchy of 
norms. The Court has frequently dealt with this question and concluded that 
international law ranks between primary and secondary law.32 This leads to 
the following hierarchy:
The EU Treaties
International law binding upon the EU
Decisions adopted by the EU.
Obviously, this hierarchy could work internally, but it raises problems in re-
lation to obligations both the Member States and the EU may have vis-à-vis 
third states. In the Kadi case the CJEU was challenged to square UN Security 
Council obligations with the protection of fundamental rights as part of the 
general principles of law to be ensured by the Court. In this case the Court 
held that the obligations imposed by an international agreement (in this case 
the UN Charter) could not have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional 
principles of the EU Treaty. Thus it followed the hierarchy presented above.
3.1.2 The Kadi case: hierarchy settled?
On 3 September 2008 the CJEU delivered its judgment in the so-called Kadi 
case.33 This judgment may be seen as having an impact on the traditional 
monist approach of the EU towards international law and hence on the way 
we look at hierarchy in the international legal order. With regard to the ques-
tion of whether or not UN Security Council Resolutions should enjoy im-
munity from jurisdiction as to their lawfulness in the Community legal order, 
the Court held
that the Community judicature must […] ensure the review, in princi-
ple the full review, of the lawfulness of all Community acts in the light 
30 Case 181/73, R. & V. Haegeman v. Belgian State.
31 See for instance: Case C-192/89 Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie.
32 See for instance: Case C-179/97 Spain v. Commission; Case C-162/96 Racke GmbH & Co. v. 
Hauptzollamt Mainz, para 45.
33 Case T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission 
(see also Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Commission), 21 September 2005.
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of the fundamental rights forming an integral part of the general prin-
ciples of Community law, including review of Community measures 
which, like the contested regulation, are designed to give effect to the 
resolutions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations.34
In this case the acts of the European Union and the European Community35 
were to be seen as a direct implementation of Security Council Resolution 
1267 (1999).36 Yassin Abdullah Kadi was one of the persons on the UN list 
of individuals and entities associated with Osama bin Laden or the Al-Qaeda 
network and hence appeared on the EU’s list as well. In 2001 Kadi, together 
with Ahmed Yusuf and the Al Barakaat Foundation, filed an action with the 
General Court (then the Court of First Instance of the European Communi-
ties (CFI)), claiming that the Court should annul the implementing EC and 
EU acts which brought them within the scope of the sanctions.37 While the 
CFI in its judgment in 2005 agreed with the applicants that in the current 
anti-terrorism cases there is ‘no judicial remedy available’ (para 340), it con-
cluded the following: 
276. It must therefore be considered that the resolutions of the Secu-
rity Council at issue fall, in principle, outside the ambit of the Court’s 
judicial review and that the Court has no authority to call in question, 
even indirectly, their lawfulness in the light of Community law. On the 
contrary, the Court is bound, so far as possible, to interpret and apply 
34 Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. 
Council and Commission, 3 September 2008, Para 327. See also S. Griller, ‘International 
Law, Human Rights and the European Community’s Autonomous Legal Order: Notes on the 
European Court of Justice Decision in Kadi’, European Constitutional Law Review, No. 3, 
2008, pp. 528-553.
35 Respectively EU Common Position 2002/402/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against 
Usama bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaeda organisation and the Taliban and other indi-
viduals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them, OJ L 139/4, 29.5.2002; and 
Regulation (EC) No. 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measurements directed 
against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network 
and the Taliban, OJ L 139/9, 29.5.2002.
36 Resolution 1267 (1999) provides that all the States must, in particular, ‘freeze funds and 
other financial resources, including funds derived or generated from property owned or con-
trolled directly or indirectly by the Taliban, or by any undertaking owned or controlled by 
the Taliban, as designated by the Committee established by paragraph 6 below, and ensure 
that neither they nor any other funds or financial resources so designated are made available, 
by their nationals or by any persons within their territory, to or for the benefit of the Taliban 
or any undertaking owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Taliban, except as may 
be authorised by the Committee on a case-by-case basis on the grounds of humanitarian 
need’ (para 4b).
37 Cases T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commis-
sion and T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Commission. 
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that law in a manner compatible with the obligations of the Member 
States under the Charter of the United Nations.
277. None the less, the Court is empowered to check, indirectly, the 
lawfulness of the resolutions of the Security Council in question with 
regard to jus cogens, understood as a body of higher rules of public 
international law binding on all subjects of international law, includ-
ing the bodies of the United Nations, and from which no derogation 
is possible.
While many lawyers pointed to a ‘legal protection deficit’ which thus became 
apparent (if both EU courts and domestic courts were unable to review the 
UN measures, where could plaintiffs go?), others were more worried about 
the part of the judgment in which the Court claimed to be competent to deter-
mine the lawfulness of the resolutions of the Security Council with regard to 
jus cogens (the notion describing those fundamental norms of international 
law which cannot be deviated from). Although the Court came to the conclu-
sion that none of the allegedly infringed rights formed part of jus cogens, the 
very idea of a regional Court checking the validity of UN Security Council 
resolutions proved to be a source of heated academic debate.
In that respect, the appeal judgment of the CJEU in the Kadi case38 could be 
seen as another step in this debate as it basically reversed several findings of 
the General Court. Most importantly, the CJEU found that the General Court 
(then the CFI) had erred in law when it held that a regulation designed to give 
effect to UN Security Council resolutions must enjoy immunity from juris-
diction as to its internal lawfulness save with regard to its compatibility with 
the norms of jus cogens. This case has become essential to understand the re-
lationship between EU law and international law. The Court held as follows:
283. In addition, according to settled case-law, fundamental rights 
form an integral part of the general principles of law whose obser-
vance the Court ensures. For that purpose, the Court draws inspira-
tion from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States 
and from the guidelines supplied by international instruments for the 
protection of human rights on which the Member States have collabo-
38 Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation 
v. Council and Commission. The cases have received abundant attention in the academic 
literature. See for instance G. De Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the Internation-
al Legal Order after Kadi’, Harvard International Law Journal, No. 1, 2010, pp. 1-49. Cf. 
also the special ‘Forum’ on the Kadi judgment, in International Organizations Law Review, 
2008.
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rated or to which they are signatories. In that regard, the ECHR has 
special significance (see, inter alia, Case C305/05 Ordre des barreaux 
francophones et germanophone and Others [2007] ECR I5305, para-
graph 29 and case-law cited).
284. It is also clear from the case-law that respect for human rights 
is a condition of the lawfulness of Community acts (Opinion 2/94, 
paragraph 34) and that measures incompatible with respect for human 
rights are not acceptable in the Community (Case C112/00 Schmid-
berger [2003] ECR I5659, paragraph 73 and case-law cited).
285. It follows from all those considerations that the obligations im-
posed by an international agreement cannot have the effect of preju-
dicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, which include 
the principle that all Community acts must respect fundamental rights, 
that respect constituting a condition of their lawfulness which it is for 
the Court to review in the framework of the complete system of legal 
remedies established by the Treaty.
286. In this regard it must be emphasised that, in circumstances such 
as those of these cases, the review of lawfulness thus to be ensured by 
the Community judicature applies to the Community act intended to 
give effect to the international agreement at issue, and not to the latter 
as such.
To arrive at this conclusion without having to challenge the validity of norms 
flowing from UN Security Council resolutions, the Court pointed to the fact 
that the UN Charter leaves the members ‘the free choice among the various 
possible models for transposition of those resolutions into their domestic le-
gal order’ (para 298). This would allow for judicial review of the ‘internal 
lawfulness’ of the EU and EC acts, keeping in mind that fundamental rights 
form an integral part of the general principles of law, the observance of which 
is to be ensured by the Court.
Although the Court’s focus was on the implementation of the Security Coun-
cil resolutions by the Union and the Community, rather than on the validity 
of the international norms as such, the consequence of this exercise could 
very well be that any implementation of a Security Council resolution could 
entail the violation of fundamental EU rights. In this concrete case the Court 
annulled the contested acts (while maintaining the legal effects for three 
28
months).39 Rather than taking the formal hierarchical relationship between 
UN law and EU law as the basis for establishing the immunity from juris-
diction of Security Council resolutions (as was done by the CFI), the Court 
chose to look at this hierarchy in more substantive terms. Security Council 
resolutions remain ‘untouchable’, but the acts by which the EU implements 
the resolutions are not and are subject to the fundamental rights and princi-
ples that form the basis of the Union legal order. This certainly offered the 
Court a smart way out of the dilemma, but in the virtual absence of judicial 
remedies at the UN level, the consequence can (and perhaps should) be that 
the EU may not be able to fully implement Security Council resolutions that 
are in conflict with fundamental human rights obligations flowing not only 
from the EU legal order and the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, but also from the UN Charter 
itself. 
3.2 A monist or dualist relationship?
As noted above, the Treaty of Lisbon does not settle the relationship between 
EU law and international law and we have to rely on case law to understand 
this relationship better. The terms ‘monism’ and ‘dualism’ are generally used 
to characterise the relationship between domestic legal orders and interna-
tional law. Although in their extreme form both notions cannot be found in 
practice, a monist system regards international law as being part of the na-
tional legal order, whereas in a dualist system international rules need to be 
‘translated’ to national law before they can be recognised as valid law. Al-
though labelling the relationship between international and European law in 
terms of ‘monism’ may be helpful to indicate that international law forms 
part of the EU legal order from the moment an international norm is (law-
fully) concluded, it has been pointed out that it may raise questions as well. 
The above findings – and the Kadi case in particular − reveal the tension 
 
39 See para 375: ‘Having regard to those considerations, the effects of the contested regulation, 
insofar as it includes the names of the appellants in the list forming Annex I thereto, must, 
by virtue of Article 231 EC, be maintained for a brief period to be fixed in such a way as 
to allow the Council to remedy the infringements found, but which also takes due account 
of the considerable impact of the restrictive measures concerned on the appellants’ rights 
and freedoms.’ The only action taken was not by the Council itself, but by the Commis-
sion, which on 28 November 2008 (five days before the deadline) adopted Regulation (EC) 
1190/2008 (OJ L 322/25, published 2.12.2008, one day before the deadline). In this decision 
the Commission claims that it has communicated the narrative summaries of reasons pro-
vided by the UN Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, to Mr Kadi and to Al Barakaat 
International Foundation and given them the opportunity to comment on these grounds. The 
comments received from Mr Kadi and Al Barakaat formed a reason for the Commission to 
conclude the listing was justified.
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between the principles of ‘autonomy’ and ‘reception’40 that together form the 
cornerstones of the relation between European and international law.41 At the 
same time the analysis points to the limited explanatory power offered by an 
application of the notions of monism and dualism. If we wish to understand 
what it means for international law to form an integral part of Union law – in 
terms of validity, direct effect and supremacy (see below) – we may need 
more sophisticated theoretical tools. In times when the relationship between 
international law and Union law seems to be under construction, it is worth-
while to know where we stand.
A number of issues may be addressed in this respect. First of all, the com-
plexity of the Union’s legal order is related to the role of the Member States 
in this order. When the fact that international agreements are an ‘integral 
part’ of Community law is linked to the notion of primacy, the effects of 
international agreements reach the internal law of (both monist and dualist) 
Member States and would lead to a supremacy over this law. This has led one 
observer to point to European law as a ‘door opener’ for international law, 
‘In that event, the traditional approaches of the Member States for explaining 
the relationship between municipal law and public international law do not 
matter anymore.’42 At the same time the status as an ‘integral part’ of Union 
law does not settle the hierarchical position of international law in relation to 
other sources of Union law.
Secondly, ‘monism’ and ‘dualism’ are often used to describe the relationship 
between legal orders in far too general terms. Claims based on ‘monism’ 
often confuse the ‘validity’ of norms with their ‘direct applicability’, ‘direct 
effect’ or even their ‘supremacy’. Yet, at least at a theoretical level, it may still 
be helpful to differentiate between the different notions. ‘Monism’ and ‘dual-
ism’ would relate formally only to the status of international norms within the 
European or domestic legal orders. In that sense, ‘monism/dualism’ relates to 
the ‘validity’ (or existence) of international norms in those orders. In monist 
systems, international norms enjoy automatic validity, whereas in dualist sys-
tems, they need to be transferred into domestic law in order to become valid. 
The fact that international agreements are an ‘integral part’ of EU law seems 
40 See on this issue J.W. van Rossem, ‘The EU at Crossroads: A Constitutional Inquiry into 
the Way International Law Is Received within the EU Legal Order’, in E. Cannizzaro, P. 
Palchetti and R.A. Wessel (Eds.), International law as Law of the European Union, Leiden 
and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, pp. 59-92.
41 Ibid.
42 F.C. Mayer, ‘European Law as a Door Opener for Public International Law?’, in Droit 
international et diversité des cultures juridiques ─ International Law and Diversity of Legal 
Cultures, Paris: Pédone, 2008, pp. 241-255, at 253.
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to relate to this idea. Hence, the existence of international norms should not 
be equated with the question of whether they can be invoked by individuals 
before a court of law, let alone with the question of whether they would be 
of a hierarchical higher order in case of a conflict with a domestic or Euro-
pean norm. Article 216(2) TFEU provides that international agreements are 
‘binding’, but it does not offer a priority rule to solve a conflict with other 
’binding’ (Union) norms. In fact, the Court held that ‘the primacy of interna-
tional agreements concluded by the Community over provisions of secondary 
Community legislation means that such provisions must, so far as possible, 
be interpreted in an manner that is consistent with those agreements’.43 This 
shows that the validity (existence within the EU legal order) of international 
norms does not automatically lead to supremacy of those norms.
Thirdly, as will also be addressed below, this validity does not imply a direct 
effect, in the sense that the international norms (as part of the EU legal order) 
may be invoked to challenge existing, conflicting Union law. The classic ex-
ample is formed by WTO law, in which area the Court denied direct effect as 
a possibility of individuals to refer to WTO law, both before national courts 
and the European court. 
The much analysed cases of Yusuf and Kadi may have given some answers,44 
but at the same time, they left many fundamental theoretical questions unan-
swered. In addition, the judgments even raised new questions in relation to the 
monist nature of the EU legal order. The effects of international agreements 
and international decisions were all quite clearly confirmed by the General 
Court when it argued that ‘the Court is bound, so far as possible, to interpret 
and apply [Community] law in a manner compatible with the obligations of 
the Member States under the Charter of the United Nations’.45 The notion of 
the monism (or perhaps even unity) of EU and international law was even 
more strengthened by the claim of the General Court that it was ‘empowered 
to check, indirectly, the lawfulness of the resolutions of the Security Council 
in question with regard to jus cogens, understood as a body of higher rules of 
public international law binding on all subjects of international law, including 
43 Case C-61/94 Commission v. Germany, para 52.
44 See in particular the contributions by C. Eckes, ‘International Law as Law of the EU: The 
Role of the Court of Justice’ (pp. 353-377) and A. Gattini, ‘Effects of Decisions of the UN 
Security Council in the EU Legal Order’; and P. Palchetti, ‘Judicial Review of the Interna-
tional Validity of UN Security Council Resolutions by the European Court of Justice’ (pp. 
379-394), in Cannizzaro, Palchetti and Wessel, op.cit.
45 See para 276 in Case T-306/01 Ahmed Ali Yusuf v. Council and Commission and Case 
T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commission.
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the bodies of the United Nations, and from which no derogation is possible.’46 
The idea must have been that ‘monism’ works both ways.
As we have seen the CJEU came to a different view in its appeal judgment. 
The intention was to give priority to EU law and to limit the effect of bind-
ing international norms. In his Opinion, AG Poiares Maduro already started 
to highlight the good old (‘dualist’?) notion of the autonomous EU legal or-
der, by arguing that the relationship between international law and EC law 
‘is governed by the Community legal order itself, and international law can 
permeate that legal order only under the conditions set by the constitutional 
principles of the Community’.47 In turn, the CJEU held that ‘the obligations 
imposed by an international agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing 
the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, which include the principle 
that all Community acts must respect fundamental rights’ (para 285). Again, 
the Court did not clearly deny the legal nature (validity) of ‘an international 
agreement’.48 To arrive at this conclusion without having to challenge the 
validity of norms flowing from UN Security Council resolutions, the Court 
pointed to the fact that the UN Charter leaves its members ‘the free choice 
among the various possible models for transposition of those resolutions into 
their domestic legal order’ (para 298). This would allow for a judicial review 
of the ‘internal lawfulness’ of the EU acts, keeping in mind that fundamental 
rights form an integral part of the general principles of law, the observance of 
which is also to be ensured by the Court.
As a fourth problematic area in relation to monism/dualism, we point to the 
division between the TEU and the TFEU. While the convergence of the Com-
munity and the Union legal order49 reached an all-time high after the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the status of international law in relation to 
the Union’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) as well as the com-
mon security and defence policy (CSDP) may still differ from what has been 
established on the basis of the classic authorities in the case law on the policy 
fields that are now to be found in the TFEU.50 The potential impact of the 
46 Para 277.
47 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al 
Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, para 21.
48 But note the somewhat ambiguous reasoning in paras 305-308.
49 R.A. Wessel, ‘The Dynamics of the European Union Legal Order: An Increasingly Coherent 
Framework of Action and Interpretation’, European Constitutional Law Review, 2009, pp. 
117-142.
50 On these policy areas see also the contributions by F. Naert, ‘The Application of International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in CSDP Operations’ (pp. 189-214); P. Koutrakos, 
‘International Agreements in the Area of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy’ 
(pp. 157-188), in Cannizzaro, Palchetti and Wessel (Eds.), op.cit.; and P. Koutrakos, The EU 
Common Security and Defence Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
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loyalty principle on the freedom of the Member States, for instance under the 
Union’s CFSP, should not be underestimated.51 On the basis of the limited 
availability of case law related to CFSP no final conclusions can be drawn 
on the primacy, direct effect and justiciability of CFSP decisions and agree-
ments. While there are good reasons to argue that CFSP agreements are also 
to be regarded as forming ‘an integral part of Union law’ (a statement that 
is less controversial now that new Article 216 TFEU does not discriminate 
between CFSP and other EU agreements), there are still different parts of 
‘Union law’ and the monism/dualism approach may even be less helpful for 
understanding the internal effects of international agreements concluded by 
the EU because of the less developed nature of certain parts of the Union’s 
legal order.
The above findings reveal that the Court’s case law is not always very precise 
on the different elements of the relationship between international law and 
EU law. In this section we will revisit the relationship between international 
and EU law with respect to its three main dimensions: validity, direct ef-
fect and supremacy.52 From a pragmatic perspective, this is what we need to 
know when confronted with conflicts between international and European 
law. From a more theoretical point of view, this may give us some more in-
sight into the tool box that is, often implicitly, used to decide on the role of 
international norms in the Union’s legal order.
A legal theoretical approach has frequently been used to study and under-
stand the relationship between European and national law. As is well-known, 
the debate continues between those who view the domestic legal orders of 
the Member States as part of the EU legal order (and accept the overall su-
premacy of EU law) and those who cannot accept this view as it would deny 
the highest hierarchical position of the national constitution.53 Less often, 
a similar exercise has been undertaken with regard to the relation between 
international and European law. 
 
 
51 C. Hillion and R.A. Wessel, ‘Restraining External Competences of EU Member States under 
CFSP’, in M. Cremona and B. De Witte (Eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional 
Fundamentals, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008, pp. 79-121.
52 Cf. also B. de Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Supremacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order’, in P. 
Craig and G. de Búrca (Eds), The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999, pp. 177-183.
53 A. Tizzano, ‘Quelques réflexions sur la doctrine du droit de l’Union européenne: les ‘com-
munautaristes’ et les autres’, in Il diritto dell’Unione europea, 2008, pp. 225-235.
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3.2.1 The validity of international norms in the EU legal order
Validity refers to the existence of a norm in a particular legal order. It is 
difficult to leave the question of supremacy aside for a moment, but not im-
possible. Comparable to the position of national constitutional lawyers, who 
would perhaps opt for the model in which EU law is derived from national 
law and defines the relationship on the basis of constitutional choices (mon-
ism or dualism), many traditional EU lawyers would have a natural tendency 
to stress the autonomy of EU law and would only accept international law as 
valid once the Union itself decided that it is. From their point of view, Union 
law and the domestic law of Member States form an ‘integrated’ legal order 
(compare Costa-ENEL); at the same time, the ‘autonomy’ of the EU legal 
order makes it difficult to accept the same integration in relation to interna-
tional law.54 Nevertheless the notion of integrated legal orders seems to be at 
the basis of the recent judgments of the Court. Both in Intertanko and in Kadi 
– but also in the standing case law on the effects of WTO norms in the Com-
munity legal order – the Court faced a conflict of norms. From a theoretical 
perspective, it would be very difficult to accept a conflict without accepting 
the validity of both norms. Therefore, the notion that relevant (written and 
unwritten) international law forms an ‘integral part’ of Union law seems to be 
upheld by the recent cases, albeit that these cases equally make clear that it is 
EU law itself that sets the conditions for the validity of international norms 
within its legal order. Thus – as Intertanko for instance revealed in relation 
to the MARPOL treaty to which the EU is not a party – not all international 
norms can be an ‘integral’ part of the EU legal order.55 Whereas the EU de-
fines the status of its norms in the legal orders of its Member States, a similar 
system does not exist in the international legal order.
3.2.2 Direct effect of international norms
It is quite easy to combine validity with direct effect.56 Article 93 of the Con-
stitution of The Netherlands, for instance, even links the two notions explic-
itly: ‘Provisions of treaties and of resolutions by international institutions 
which may be binding on all persons by virtue of their contents shall become 
54 See already P. Pescatore, Le droit de l’intégration. Emergence d’un phénomène nouveau 
dans les relations internationales selon l’expérience des Communautés européennes, Dor-
drecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972.
55 This was in fact the main point of this case. See more extensively: J.W. van Rossem, ‘In-
teraction between EU Law and International Law in the Light of Intertanko and Kadi: The 
Dilemma of Norms Binding the Member States but not the Community’, in Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law, 2009, pp. 183-227; also published as CLEER Working Paper 
2009/4.
56 On the close link between the two see also J. Klabbers, ‘International Law and Community 
Law: The Law and Politics of Direct Effect’, in Yearbook of European Law, 2002, pp. 292-
295. 
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binding after they have been published.’ Although one may still argue that 
‘binding on all persons’ does not by definition imply a right of these persons 
to actually invoke international provisions, practice reveals the close link be-
tween the two aspects. The Intertanko judgment in particular comes quite 
close to this idea by bringing in the argument that the international agree-
ment ‘does not establish rules intended to apply directly and immediately 
to individuals and to confer upon them rights or freedoms capable of being 
relied upon against States […]’ (para 64). However, in both cases (the Dutch 
and the European legal order), it would be difficult to argue on this basis that 
the absence of direct effect denies the ‘binding force’ of international agree-
ments in the international legal order. This would imply that Member State 
and Union institutions would have a duty under international law to live up 
to their obligations, irrespective of the status of the agreements in their own 
legal order. The question of hierarchy may thus also emerge in the absence 
of direct effect.
3.2.3 Supremacy of international norms
The supremacy rule is nothing more (or less) than a rule to establish which 
norm takes precedence in case of a collision. With regard to a possible con-
flict between European law and international law, this rule is not articulated 
in the Lisbon Treaty. Article 216(2) TFEU does indeed refer to the fact that 
international agreements concluded by the EU are binding in the EU legal 
order, but remains silent on the hierarchy in relation to all other ‘binding’ 
norms within that order. One may argue that a hierarchy between legal orders 
can only be established once one legal order forms a part of the other. The 
hierarchy then implies that all norms in the higher (overarching) legal order 
take precedence over all norms in the lower (or sub) legal order. Exceptions 
to this rule can only be made through norms in the higher legal order.
The question of the subordination of the EU legal order to the international 
legal order has been raised ever since the CJEU held that the European Com-
munity was to be seen as ‘a new legal order of international law’.57 In this 
new international legal order, legal norms may collide with other norms. One 
way to solve this collision may be by denying the direct effect of the inter-
national norms (as has traditionally been the approach with regard to WTO 
norms). The problem the CJEU faced in Kadi was that the norms set by the 
UN Security Council clearly had an effect on individuals. This left the Court 
with a conflict of norms. The Court seemed to conclude (although indeed not 
quite clearly) that international agreements (such as the UN Charter) form 
an ‘integral part’ of EU law, but also noted that ‘fundamental rights form an 
57 ECJ, Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL.
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integral part of the general principles of law whose observance the Court 
ensures’.58 The fact that both norms were part of the EU legal order allowed 
the Court to solve the supremacy question in an ‘internal’ setting, in which it 
gave priority the constitutional principles related to the protection of funda-
mental rights.59
This underlines the complexity of the relationship between international and 
European law and the difficulty of analysing this relationship in terms of 
monism and dualism. In the end neither notion are is very useful in under-
standing the (absence of) hierarchy between international and European law. 
In various legal analyses in reaction to the Kadi judgment, some of the argu-
ments that are traditionally used by the ‘communautaristes’ (or ‘neocoms’) 
to stress the supremacy of EU law in relation to national law are now used 
to point to the need to accept the supremacy of international law over Union 
law. So, where EU law enjoys primacy over national law because without a 
uniform application it would lose its relevance, at least with respect to the 
nature and function of the Charter of the United Nations, it is argued that 
without the supremacy of the Charter and the decisions based on it (cf. Article 
103 of the Charter), the United Nations system of collective security would 
not be able to function. So far, the controversy between the ‘international-
ists’ (stressing the values of a coherent legal world order) and the ‘European 
constitutionalists’ (pointing to higher ranking constitutional values) could not 
be overcome on the basis of legal theoretical arguments. This seems to have 
triggered new approaches to make sense of the relationship between the dif-
ferent legal orders.60 
58 Para 283; emphasis added.
59 More in general, the ‘internalisation’ of international law has been referred to as a ‘Euro-
peanisation’ of international law: ‘To the extent that it is binding upon the EU institutions, 
international law become part of the EU legal order and is therefore “Europeanised”’: J. 
Wouters, A. Nollkaemper and E. de Wet, ‘Introduction: The “Europeanisation” of Interna-
tional Law’, in their edited volume, The Europeanisation of International Law: The Status of 
International Law in the EU and its Member States, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008, 
pp. 1-13, at 3.
60 See for instance E. Cannizzaro, ‘The Neo-Monism of the European Legal Order’, in Canniz-
zaro, Palchetti and Wessel (Eds.), op.cit., pp. 35-58; and as an example of the ‘pluralist’ turn: 
N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010.
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4 The European Union as a party to 
 international agreements
4.1 The competence to conclude international agreements
International agreements are the EU’s international law tools par excellence 
and the Lisbon Treaty streamlined the procedures to conclude them (see be-
low, section 4.2). International agreements form the key legal instrument that 
allows the EU to have a place in the global legal order and to establish legal 
relationships with third states and other international organisations. If the EU 
lacked the competence to conclude international agreements, its external re-
lations would be the object of study of political scientists and international 
relations experts only, and not so much of lawyers.
The Treaties have not always been very clear on the competence of the EU 
to conclude international agreements in certain areas, as they have also been 
less explicit on the division of competences between the Union and its Mem-
ber States. Yet, as Eeckhout has rightfully claimed, international agreements 
may often be seen as a source of new legislation: ‘Policy areas such as trade, 
development co-operation and environmental protection are obvious exam-
ples of areas of EU activity where much law-making effectively takes place 
by way of participation in international negotiations.’61 International agree-
ments, thus, are not only based on the EU Treaties, their content also contrib-
utes to the further substantive development of the EU legal order. This has, no 
doubt, been one of the reasons to extend the role of the European Parliament 
in the procedure for concluding international agreements. These days, inter-
national agreements are as much part of the ‘European constitution’ as other 
types of legislation.
The EU is a party to some 250 multilateral treaties, and even more bilateral 
agreements.62 With increasing internal competences the scope of the Union’s 
legal dealings with third states was extended to almost all areas covered by 
the Treaties. The EU’s Treaties Database thus lists international agreements 
in the areas of Agriculture, Coal and Steel, Commercial Policy, Competi-
tion, Consumers, Culture, Customs, Development, Economic and Monetary 
Affairs, Education, Training, Youth, Energy, Enlargement, Enterprise, En-
vironment, External Relations, Fisheries, Food Safety, Foreign and Secu-
61 P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011 (2nd ed.), at 
193.
62 See the Treaties Office Database of the European External Action Service
  http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/default.home.do
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rity Policy, Fraud, Information Society, Internal Market, Justice, Freedom 
and Security, Public Health, Research and Innovation, Taxation, Trade, and 
Transport. Numbers differ from 134 agreements in the trade area to one on 
culture.
4.1.1 The legal nature of international agreements
International agreements are not defined by the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 216 
TFEU merely provides the following:
The Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third coun-
tries or international organisations where the Treaties so provide or 
where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, 
within the framework of the Union’s policies, one of the objectives 
referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union 
act or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope.
Notwithstanding the absence of a definition (or perhaps exactly because of 
this), it is obvious that the term should be read in its international context and 
thus the international law definitions apply. The difficulty lies in the fact that 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 2 (1(a)) does 
not define international agreements either. Instead, it defines the concept of 
‘treaty’ as follows:
‘Treaty’ means an international agreement concluded between States 
in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied 
in a single instrument or in two or more instruments and whatever its 
particular designation.
As we will see, the international agreements concluded by the EU can be 
said to follow this description and are therefore ‘treaties’ in the sense of the 
Vienna Convention. The same may hold true for international contractual 
obligations that have not been given the heading of ‘international agreement’, 
but bear labels such as ‘Convention’ or ‘Memorandum of Understanding’. 
Agreements may also be concluded in the form of an exchange of letters. As 
long as parties agree that they enter into a legal commitment, both EU pro-
cedures and international rules apply. This seems to have been confirmed by 
the CJEU when it described an international agreement as any undertaking 
entered into by entities subject to international law which has binding force, 
whatever its formal designation.63 The fact that the 1969 Vienna Conven-
63 See Opinion 1/75, [1975] ECR 1355. See also Case C-327/91, France v. Commission, 
[1994] ECR I-3641, para 27.
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tion refers to states only is solved by the 1986 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations and between 
International Organizations, which contains a similar definition, taking into 
account the fact that international organisations may also conclude treaties.64 
Although the concluding procedure is ‘governed by EU law’ (as the conclu-
sion of treaties is usually regulated in domestic law), there is no doubt that the 
final agreement between the EU and a third state or international organisation 
is governed by international law. 
The use of the term ‘international agreement’ rather than ‘treaty’ therefore 
has no specific legal meaning, but at least it prevents confusion as in EU law 
the term ‘treaties’ is reserved for the TEU and the TFEU as well as for the 
accession Treaties. In other words, for primary EU law.
The internal binding nature of concluded international agreements is con-
firmed by Article 216(2) TFEU:
Agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions 
of the Union and on its Member States.
The first part of this sentence follows from the international law concept of 
pacta sunt servanda, which is codified in the Vienna Convention (Article 26). 
This principle holds that ‘Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it 
and must be performed by them in good faith’. This implies that the second part 
of Article 216(2) is not a reflection of that principle, as the Member States are 
not (necessarily) parties to agreements concluded by the EU. Member States 
are therefore bound on the basis of EU law, rather than on the basis of inter-
national law. Member States are bound by EU international agreements as in 
many cases the implementation of these agreements calls for Member State 
action. In a way, international agreements are similar to secondary legislation 
enacted by the EU and as an ‘integral part’ of the EU legal order they cannot be 
ignored by the Member States. Yet, as explained in the previous section, this 
does not automatically lead to supremacy and direct effect of all agreements 
concluded by the EU. While the status of international agreements within 
the EU legal order would perhaps lead to a de facto supremacy, the Court 
has not been willing to accept an automatic direct effect for all agreements. 
 
64 See more extensively J. Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law, The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1996.
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4.1.2 Express and implied competences
As we have seen, Article 216(1) TFEU provides for a competence of the EU 
to conclude international agreements in various circumstances:
- where the Treaties so provide 
- where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, with-
in the framework of the Union’s policies, one of the objectives referred to in 
the Treaties
- where the conclusion of an agreement is provided for in a legally binding 
Union act or
- where the conclusion of an agreement is likely to affect common rules or 
alter their scope.
Whereas the original Community Treaty did not include many explicit com-
petences to conclude international agreements, the current Treaties list a 
number of areas in which the EU has an express competence to conclude 
international agreements: the readmission of illegal immigrants (Art. 79(3) 
TFEU); cooperation in research and technological development (Art. 186 
TFEU); environmental policy (Art. 191(4) TFEU); common commercial 
policy (Art. 207 TFEU); development cooperation (Art. 209(2) TFEU; eco-
nomic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries (Art. 212(2) 
TFEU; humanitarian aid (Art. 214(4) TFEU; association agreements (Art. 
217 TFEU); the monetary union (Art. 219(1) and (3) TFEU); and common 
foreign, security and defence policy (Art. 37 TEU).
When the Treaties do not expressly provide for a competence, Article 216(1) 
TFEU points to the situations where conclusion of an agreement is neces-
sary in order to achieve one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties. The 
competence then follows from the parallelism between internal and external 
powers. Obviously, the discussion on whether or not an agreement is actually 
necessary becomes easier when the Treaties refer to the need for international 
cooperation in certain areas. This is for instance the case in relation to educa-
tion and sport (Art. 165(3) TFEU), vocational training (Art. 166(3) TFEU; 
culture (Art. 167(3) TFEU) and public health (Art. 168(3) TFEU), where 
it is provided that the Union and its Member States shall foster cooperation 
with third countries and international organisations. Similar references may 
be found elsewhere in the Treaties, such as in Article 220(1) TFEU:
The Union shall establish all appropriate forms of cooperation with the 
organs of the United Nations and its specialised agencies, the Council 
of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
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But the reference to the ‘objectives’ in the Treaties assures that in principle 
no area is excluded. As the need for an agreement may be subject to debate 
among institutions and Member States, it will finally be up to the Court to 
assess this issue.65
A third possible basis for competence to conclude international agreements 
may be found in ‘a legally binding Union act’, hence in the Directives, Regu-
lations and Decisions referred to in Article 288(1) TFEU, and arguably also 
in other international agreements.
4.2 Concluding international agreements
Obviously, whenever the EU enters into an international agreement with a 
non-EU country or another international organisation, it does so on the basis 
of and subject to the relevant rules of international treaty law. As an interna-
tional actor, the EU needs its Institutions (mainly the Commission and the 
Council) to negotiate and conclude international agreements with third states 
and other international organisations. Whereas the Vienna Convention uses 
the term ‘conclusion’ for the entire treaty-making process, which encom-
passes, inter alia, the phases of negotiation, initialling and signing, the EU 
Treaties clearly differentiate between the different phases. In the post-Lisbon 
Treaties the procedures are streamlined and a special role is foreseen for the 
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. While the 
procedures in principle apply to all Union areas, we will note that some spe-
cial rules have been created for international agreements concluded in the 
area of CFSP.
4.2.1 Negotiating an international agreement
According to Article 218 TFEU, which lists the entire procedure, the pro-
cess is very much in the hands of the Council (which ‘shall authorise the 
opening of negotiations, adopt negotiating directives, authorise the signing 
of agreements and conclude them’), although in practice it is above all the 
Commission that is the central actor in both the preparation and the nego-
tiations themselves. It all starts with a recommendation to the Council from 
the Commission, or the High Representative. Apart from the situation where 
an agreement ‘relates exclusively or principally’ to the common foreign and 
security policy (CFSP) – in which case the High Representative is in charge 
of a recommendation – the Commission shall submit recommendations to 
the Council. History has shown that the question of whether an agreement 
‘relates exclusively or principally’ to CFSP or CSDP may be difficult to an-
65 See also the Opinion of AG Tizzano, Case C-466/98 Commission v. United Kingdom, paras 
46-59 (Open Skies).
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swer.66 On the basis of the (unpublished) recommendation by either the Com-
mission or the High Representative, the Council adopts a decision which in 
turn forms the basis for the negotiations. Depending on the subject matter of 
the agreement this is done by qualified majority voting (QMV) or unanimity. 
The context suggests that the Commission will be appointed as the negotia-
tor, unless we are dealing with a CFSP agreement, in which case the High 
Representative will be appointed negotiator. This would also be in line with 
the general role of the Commission in the Union’s external representation 
(compare Art. 17 TEU). In case of a hybrid agreement which covers both 
CFSP and other matters, both the Commission and the High Representative 
may be part of the negotiating team. All of this reveals that the identifica-
tion of the negotiator is largely settled by primary law. It has rightfully been 
observed that, post-Lisbon, ‘the negotiator enjoys a significant margin of ma-
noeuvre because it is a representative of the Union and does not act merely 
on behalf of the Council’.67
The negotiator acts within the framework of special directives issued by the 
Council and a special committee (composed of national governmental ex-
perts) allows the Council to control the process (Article 218(4)). Special pro-
cedures are foreseen for the Union’s Common Commercial Policy (Article 
207(3) TFEU). 
In general, negotiations end by the initialling of the text. For the Union, this 
is done by the negotiator. Again, this nicely follows the international rules 
and is what the Vienna Convention refers to as ‘the adoption of the text’ (Art. 
9) and implies that parties are ready to take the text back home for approval.
4.2.2 Concluding an international agreement
The actual conclusion of an international agreement takes place in two stages 
on the basis of a decision by the Council: signature and conclusion. Although 
in practice it may not always be necessary to take these two steps, they fol-
low the logic presented in the international law rules laid down in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Even before a formal entry into force, 
signing the agreement already has legal consequences, in the sense that ‘A 
State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and pur-
pose of a treaty’ (Art. 18 Vienna Convention). Indeed, on the basis of interna-
tional treaty law, signature is one way for a state or international organisation 
66 Case 91/05, Commission v. Council (ECOWAS or Small Arms and Light Weapons case). See 
Hillion and Wessel, op.cit.
67 M. Gatti and P. Manzini ,’External Representation of the European Union In the Conclusion 
of International Agreements’, Common Market Law Review, 2012, pp. 1703-1734 at 1711.
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to express the necessary consent to be bound, albeit that failure to formally 
conclude/ratify the agreement (for instance because of domestic parliamen-
tary objection) may form a reason for a state to ‘un-sign’ in order to get rid of 
its obligations under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention. Article 218(5) also 
refers to the possibility of provisional application (compare Article 25 Vienna 
Convention), which allows the parties to apply the treaty provisionally, pend-
ing the entry into force of the agreement. Considering the long period that is 
usually needed for the ratification of mixed agreements (see below), this may 
offer a way out.
Actual conclusion of the agreement has both an external and an internal di-
mension. Externally, it finalises the expression of the consent to be bound and 
the Union becomes a party to the agreement (the entry into force of which is 
dependent on what the parties agreed on). This is usually done by notifying 
the other parties or the depositary by way of an instrument of ratification (a 
letter in which the ratification is expressed). Prior to that, internally, a deci-
sion has to be taken upon a proposal by the negotiator (Article 218(5)). This 
decision is comparable to other decisions taken by the Council and lists the 
consideration leading to the decision, the legal basis as well as further pro-
cedural points. 
Article 218(8) provides the voting rules and mentions qualified majority vot-
ing as the default procedure. Exceptions are issues which require unanimity 
for internal measures, association agreements (see below) and the accession 
to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms. Additional exceptions include CFSP/CSDP matters, or in-
direct taxation (Art. 113 TFEU), and certain trade agreements (Article 207(4) 
TFEU).
As we have seen, once concluded, international agreements form an integral 
part of the Union’s legal order and their substance and procedural content 
may directly affect EU citizens and companies. It should therefore not come 
as a surprise that the treaty drafters decided to extend the role the European 
Parliament enjoys under the regular legislative procedure to include the adop-
tion of international agreements. Article 218(6) therefore calls for the consent 
of the European Parliament in some specific cases. In other cases the Euro-
pean Parliament shall be ‘consulted’ only. 
Article 218 is quite clear about the fact that international agreements to which 
the European Union becomes a party are concluded by the Council. In the 
past, however, the Court agreed that in particular circumstances the Commis-
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sion has a competence to conclude ‘international administrative agreements’. 
In such cases the Commission would not act on behalf of the EU (and thus 
the EU itself would not be a party).68
4.2.3 Terminating or suspending an international agreement
The Treaty has a procedure for the termination of an international agreement. 
Article 218(9) TFEU provides the following:
The Council, on a proposal from the Commission or the High Repre-
sentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall 
adopt a decision suspending application of an agreement and estab-
lishing the positions to be adopted on the Union’s behalf in a body set 
up by an agreement, when that body is called upon to adopt acts hav-
ing legal effects, with the exception of acts supplementing or amend-
ing the institutional framework of the agreement.
Obviously, this is an internal rule only and any suspension of an international 
agreement should be in accordance with international treaty law. This may 
also be the reason why currently suspension clauses are included in agree-
ments with third states. Reasons for the EU to suspend an agreement may 
relate to human rights violations or war situations in third countries.69
Termination of international agreements should also be in line with interna-
tional treaty law. The EU Treaties lack a specific procedure for the termina-
tion of treaties, but one could argue that for any modification or termination 
of an agreement the same procedure should be followed as for the conclusion 
of an agreement, unless the agreement itself settles the question in a different 
fashion.
4.3 Types of international agreements
As we have seen, international agreements may be concluded in all areas of 
EU activity. The reason is that, whenever the Union exercises more compe-
tences internally, there is simply no possibility to leave the external relations 
in the hands of the Member States only. The friction that is caused by this is 
most apparent in the case of mixed agreements. Apart from this important 
category of agreements, we will also look at a number of specific situations 
that are regulated by the use of international agreements.
68 Case C-327/91 France v. Commission.




The notion of ‘mixity’ follows from the fact that in many cases both the 
EU and the Member States are competent to engage in external action, or 
that international agreements cover a variety of areas, all of which are sub-
ject to different divisions of competence. As we have seen the Lisbon Treaty 
strengthened the separate international legal position of the Union in relation 
to its Member States. Yet, only in very few cases would the EU be exclusively 
competent to conclude an agreement, which implies that in most cases the 
Member States will have to become a party as well. While for political rea-
sons this allows Member States to remain present and visible themselves on 
the international stage, the need to have a mixed agreements obviously com-
plicates as well as prolongs the process of concluding international agree-
ments. Mixed agreements can be both bilateral (between the EU/MS and a 
third state or international organisation)70 and multilateral (between the EU/
MS and a number of other states).
While for the EU the general procedure in Article 218 TFEU continues to 
apply, a number of issues render the conclusion of mixed agreements special. 
After all, at all stages of the process, account will have to be taken of the 
possibly different positions of the EU and its 28 Member States. It is es-
sential for the EU and its Member States to speak with one voice during the 
negotiations, also not to allow the third party to abuse a possible difference 
of opinion. The European Union (read: European Commission) therefore has 
a strong preference to act as the sole negotiator, and to so on behalf of the 
Member States also, but it depends on the sensitivity of the topic to which 
extent Member States will actually allow the Commission to act as their rep-
resentative. In any case, it is important to agree on a common position, but as 
negotiations by definition require some flexibility on both sides, any negotia-
tor would need a certain freedom to change its position.
The complexity is strengthened by the fact that it is virtually impossible to 
clearly distinguish between the areas falling under (exclusive) EU compe-
tence and areas in which the Member States still have a (perhaps large) role 
to play. Many agreements are a clear mix of issues, which calls for the need 
to accept a certain fuzziness both on the side of the EU and on the side of 
the Member States. A strict division of competence would call for separate 
roles for the EU and the Member States during the process, but obviously this 
could seriously harm the negotiating position and would make it very unat-
tractive for third states to enter into negotiations on mixed agreement. Indeed, 
70 M. Maresceau, ‘A Typology of Mixed Bilateral Agreements’, in C. Hillion and P. Koutrakos, 
Mixed Agreements Revisited, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010, pp. 11-29.
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one should bear in mind that for third states it is often far from clear where the 
competence lies; they rather deal with one (combined) party.
A clarification of the division of competences is nevertheless possible and 
may take the form of a ‘declaration of competence’,71 which lays down the re-
spective competences of the EU and its Member States in the different fields 
addressed by the agreement. The problem with these declarations is that the 
division of competences is dynamic: what can be a reasonable description 
for the division at the time of the conclusion of an agreement may very well 
change over the years. And, although from an internal point of view the exact 
delimitation of competences is not required (as confirmed by the Court in 
Ruling 1/7872), third states may demand it, also to have some clue whom to 
address in cases of conflicts on the interpretation or implementation.
Because of the fact that they become full parties, Member States need to 
sign and conclude mixed agreements as well. This implies that a ratification 
procedure is necessary in each Member State. Although swift ratification is 
possible even in very complex cases (as the case of the WTO agreement 
showed), the fact that each and every Member State may delay the process 
because of complex parliamentary or federal reasons usually creates a time-
consuming process.73 While in certain cases provisional application may be 
possible, practice reveals that the Council will await ratification by all Mem-
ber States before concluding the agreement on behalf of the EU.74 In case the 
process takes too much time, the Council can propose an interim agreement, 
to which the Member States are not parties, but which would at least allow 
the EU and the third party to proceed with their cooperation in an area within 
the competence of the EU.
Obviously, once they become parties, Member States are bound by the agree-
ment. The current Treaty provides the rule that ‘Agreements concluded by 
the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member 
71 See more extensively P.M. Olson, ‘Mixity from the Outside: The Perspective of a Treaty 
Partner’, in: C. Hillion and P. Koutrakos (eds.), Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU and its 
Member States in the World, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010, pp. 331-348.
72 Ruling 1/78 re Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Facilities and 
Transports [1978]. This judgment was delivered in the framework of the EAEC.
73 See A. Rosas, ‘The European Union and Mixed Agreements’, in A. Dashwood and C. Hil-
lion (Eds.), The General Law of EC External Relations, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, 
at 208; and J. Czuczai, ‘Mixity in Practice: Some Problems and Their (Real or Possible) 
Solution’, in Hillion and Koutrakos, op.cit., pp. 241-245.
74 See also F. Hoffmeister, ‘Curse or Blessing? Mixed Agreements in the Recent Practice of the 
European Union and its Member States’, in Hillion and Koutrakos, op.cit., pp. 249-268 at 
256.
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States’ (Art. 216(2) TFEU). Given the fact that mixed agreements are also 
to be considered an ‘integral part of EU law’,75 the question may arise why 
we have mixed agreements at all. The answer lies in the fact that the EU is 
simply not competent to claim all areas of Union law exclusively; the Trea-
ties foresee a division of competences which is also to be reflected in the 
external relations. Indeed, in both case the Member States are bound by the 
agreements. The difference is that in the case of agreements concluded by 
the EU they are bound on the basis of EU law as they do not have a direct 
legal relationship with the third party; and in the case of mixed agreements 
Member States are bound on the basis of international treaty law, and at the 
same time will have to abide by the relevant rule of EU law (for instance in 
relation to the duty of cooperation; see below). In some cases not all Member 
States become party to a mixed agreement (‘partial mixity’). When we fol-
low the above rules, this would imply that those Member States that have not 
themselves become a party are not bound on the basis of international law, 
but they are still bound on the basis of EU law (Art. 216(2)).
In areas of shared competence, the ‘duty of cooperation’ is to guide the ac-
tions of both the Union and its Member States. This ‘duty’ flows from the 
‘principle of sincere cooperation’ as laid down in Article 4(3) TEU:
Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the 
Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carry-
ing out tasks which flow from the Treaties.
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or 
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the 
Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union.
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s 
tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attain-
ment of the Union’s objectives.
Whereas the ‘duty’ is thus a general principle, applicable to all EU and Mem-
ber State activity, it has a special importance in the area of the external rela-
tions. Since the Treaties are often unclear about the exact division of compe-
tences, the Court has frequently used the duty of cooperation as a guideline 
to establish the EU’s competences and/or the Member States’ obligations in 
external relations law.76
 
75 Case C-431/05 Merck.
76 See C. Hillion, ‘Mixity and Coherence in EU External Relations: The Significance of the 
Duty of Cooperation’, in Hillion and Koutrakos, op.cit., pp. 87-115.
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Ruling 1/78 (see above) is generally seen as the ‘mother of all judgments on 
the duty of cooperation’. Indeed, in this judgment the CJEU used and further 
interpreted the duty of cooperation, which is phrased in Article 192 of the 
European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) Treaty in similar terms as in 
Article 4(3) TEU. As in many subsequent cases, the situation related to (col-
lective) Member State action, which negatively affected independent external 
action by the Community. Thus, the duty of cooperation proved to be a key 
principle in relation to shared external competences.
More recent case law in very different areas (ranging from Mox Plant77 to 
Kadi) has made clear the implications of the stronger international presence 
of the EU, in particular in relation to the existing external competences of the 
Member States. In PFOS, the question was raised to what extent Member 
States are constrained in their actions under international law by the fact that 
they are not only states, but also (or perhaps above all) Member States of the 
EU.78 In this case, Sweden unilaterally nominated a substance (PFOS; per-
fluoroctane sulfonates) for listing under the Stockholm Convention on Persis-
tent Organic Pollutants (POPs), a mixed agreement. Obviously, this question 
was not new and lies at the heart of almost all struggles in EU external rela-
tions law, but in this case no inter-institutional agreement was concluded and 
no formal EU decisions were taken which would prima facie restrain Mem-
ber States from exercising their own competences under international treaty 
law as we know from previous case law.79 One could argue that, by restricting 
the autonomous position of Sweden, the duty of cooperation was stretched a 
bit further.80 At the same time the case pointed clearly to the limits of ‘pro-
cedural and substantive obligations of the Member States as loyal members 
of the Union when acting as contracting parties in their own right’ when we 
do not want to undermine the very existence of separate competences of the 
 
77 Case 459/03 Commission v. Ireland (Mox Plant).
78 See also the case note by M. Cremona, Common Market Law Review, 2011, pp. 1639-1666.
79 Including Opinion 1/91; Opinion 1/94; Case 53/96, Hermes International v. FHT Marketing; 
Joined Cases C-300 & 392/98, Parfums Christian Dior SA; Case C-431/05, Merck Genéri-
cos v. Merck & Co. Inc and Merck Sharp & Dohme Lda. Case 459/03, Commission v. Ireland 
(‘Mox Plant’); and Case 25/94, Commission v. Council (‘FAO’).
80 On the many dimensions of the duty of cooperation see Hillion, ‘Mixity and Coherence in 
EU External Relations: The Significance of the Duty of Cooperation’, op.cit.; E. Neframi, 
‘The Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking its Scope through its Application in the Field of EU Exter-
nal Relations’, Common Market Law Review, 2010, pp. 323–359; M. Cremona, ‘Defending 
the Community Interest: The Duties of Cooperation and Compliance’, in M. Cremona and 
B. De Witte (Eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law – Constitutional Fundamentals, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, pp. 125-170.
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Member States.81 Mixity is the logical consequence of the existence of a 
shared competence, but cases such as PFOS underline that Member States 
cannot act on their own and have to take into account existing or planned EU 
action. In this case Sweden could not act unilaterally as that would dissociate 
it from a concerted common strategy within the Council and would deviate 
from a position submitted by the Commission.
In a way, the PFOS case built upon two other cases, in which the Commission 
claimed that Luxembourg and Germany violated the principle of sincere co-
operation by continuing negotiations and even ratifications of bilateral agree-
ments with a number of Central and Eastern European countries on transport 
by inland waterways, while the Commission had already been given a man-
date to negotiate a multilateral agreement.82 The outcome of the case was a 
clear statement, paraphrased by Eeckhout as: ‘unilateral treaty making action 
by a Member State coinciding with EU negotiation cannot be tolerated, un-
less that Member State consults and cooperates with the EU, and in particular 
with the Commission’.83 As we see below, this reasoning may also have con-
sequences for existing agreements concluded by the Member States.
These judgments did not come out of the blue and were in fact based on a 
line of argumentation that was gradually developed ever since Ruling 1/78. 
In Opinion 2/91 (ILO) the Court pointed to the need for the Union (then 
Community) and the Member States to cooperate. Whereas the subject matter 
partly falls within EU competence, the Union itself cannot become a party to 
the ILO Conventions. In this case, which concerned a shared competence that 
could not be exercised by the Union externally, Member States have to act 
on behalf of the Union. The Court also explicitly referred to the need for the 
Community and the Member States to act in harmony in their external legal 
relations. Whereas in the case of the ILO we were dealing with a shared com-
petence, but not with mixed agreements, Opinion 1/94 (WTO) drew attention 
to an actual mixed agreement (the WTO Agreement) and more particularly 
to the substantive trade agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement. It coun-
tered the Commission’s worries that the Member States would probably not 
be able to resist taking individual positions which would harm the required 
81 M. Cremona, PFOS Case Note, op.cit., p. 1665; A. Thies, ‘Shared Competence and the 
EU Member States’ Obligations to Refrain from Unilateral Action: PFOS and Beyond’, 
in J. Díez-Hochleitner, C. Martínez Capdevila, I. Blázquez Navarro, and J. Frutos Miran-
da (Eds.), Últimas tendencias en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión 
Europea (Recent trends in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union), 
Madrid: La Ley-Grupo Wolters Kluwer, 2012, pp. 703-728.
82 Cases C-519/03 Commission v. Luxembourg and C-433/03 Commission v. Germany.
83 Eeckhout, op.cit. at 248.
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unity. The duty of cooperation would also apply in this case and should also 
ensure that – for instance in dispute settlement situations – Member States 
would not take different positions (in fact, in practice the EU and its Member 
States do act in a unitary fashion in WTO dispute settlement). Finally, in 
Commission v. Council,84 the Court dealt with an unclear division of compe-
tence in relation to an agreement to promote compliance with international 
conservation and management measures by vessels on the high seas, which 
was to be concluded in the framework of the FAO (an organisation of which 
both the EU and the Member States are members). This case also revealed 
that the Institutions themselves may take different positions. Here the Com-
mission claimed an exclusive competence because of the subject matter (fish-
eries), the Council (not surprisingly) supported the Member State’s view that 
they would still have individual rights and competences. The Court finally 
agreed that the main thrust of the agreement lay in the area of exclusive com-
petence, but that the duty of cooperation was relevant for the areas of shared 
competence, which also reflected the institutional ‘arrangement’ that existed 
between the Commission and the Council. In fact, the duty of cooperation 
was reflected in that arrangement (section 2.3) and by allowing the Member 
States to act on their own the Council had violated that principle.
The developments reveal the extensive role of case law in determining the 
scope of EU and Member States’ external competences. The Lisbon Treaty 
itself shows that changes in primary law also directly influence that scope. 
Thus, for instance, the ‘commercial aspects of intellectual property’ have 
been brought under the heading of the EU’s Common Commercial Policy 
(CCP, Article 207(1) TFEU). When confronted with a question raised by a 
Greek court on whether the Member States are still competent to act in the 
area concerned by the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the CJEU answered that this area now falls 
under the CCP and that given the exclusive competence of the EU in that area 
(Article 3(1)(e) TFEU) the question on the delimitation of competences has 
become irrelevant.85 After all, we only have to worry about this issue in rela-
tion to a shared competence. This forms a good example of a clear change 
in primary law in the Lisbon Treaty with a direct effect on the division of 
external competences between the EU and its Member States. We will see a 
similar effect in relation to the changing nature of the competence in relation 
to international investments below.
84 Case C-25/94 Commission v. Council.
85 Case C-414/11 Daiichi Sankyo Co. Ltd, 18 July 2013.
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One particular situation concerns the representation by the Commission even 
for parts of areas where the Union has no competence. The need for unity in 
representation calls for the Commission to act upon a mandate by the Mem-
ber States. Obviously, in such cases the Commission’s mandate cannot be 
derived from the Treaty or from a Council Decision. Hence, a special ‘Deci-
sion of the representatives of the governments of the Member States, meeting 
within the Council’ is adopted, through which the representatives of Member 
States ‘authorize the Commission to negotiate, on behalf of Member States’ 
for the elements of the agreement that fall within the competences of the 
Member States. The need for a separate document also flows from the fact 
that a Council decision is normally adopted by qualified majority, whereas 
that of Member States is taken by unanimity.
The developments in relation to ‘mixity’ will have consequences for the re-
lationship between international law and EU law as Member States’ interna-
tional competences may be further restrained on the basis not only of ongoing 
but also of future EU action. One may regard this as a logical consequence of 
the (external) coming of age of the EU. Yet, new questions arise: 1. Internally: 
how far can the principle of sincere cooperation be stretched without turning 
existing shared competences into a mere theoretical notion? 2. Externally: to 
what extent is international law well enough developed to allow the EU to 
take over state-like functions? (E.g. in relation to the law of treaties, diplo-
matic law and the law on international responsibility – see section 6 below.) 
4.3.2 Association, accession and withdrawal
A number of international agreements are often considered to have more of a 
European law nature than to be part of international law. This is particularly 
true for association agreements (through which a special relationship with the 
EU is established) and agreements related to the accession to or withdrawal 
from the EU. Yet, even in these cases one should remain aware of the fact 
that the agreements are (also) subject to the general rules of international law.
The competence of the EU to conclude association agreements is to be found 
in Article 217 TFEU:
The Union may conclude with one or more third countries or interna-
tional organisations agreements establishing an association involving 
reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special proce-
dure.
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Although the notion of ‘association’ is not defined by the Treaties (apart from 
the fact that it would (obviously) involve ‘reciprocal rights and obligations, 
common action and special procedure’), practice has revealed that associa-
tion agreements are indeed a special type of agreement, used to establish 
a far-reaching relationship with a third country. Association agreements are 
characterised by a number of specific features:
– The legal basis for their conclusion is Article 217 TFEU;
– There is an intention to establish close economic and political coopera-
tion;
– So called ‘paritary bodies’ for the management of the cooperation are 
created, which are competent to take decisions that bind the contracting 
parties;
– A Most Favoured Nation treatment is included;
– A privileged relationship between the EU and its partner is provided for 
(in the words of the Court: ‘a special, privileged link’86);
– A clause on respect for human rights and democratic principles is system-
atically included and constitutes an essential element of the agreement.
Association agreements (albeit not always under that name) currently ex-
ist with Turkey (1963), Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein (1993), FYRoM 
(2001), Albania (2006), Montenegro (2007), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2008), 
Tunisia (1995), Israel (1995), Morocco (1996), Palestinian authority (1997 
Interim), Jordan (1997), Egypt (2001), Algeria (2002), Libya (2002), Chile 
(2002) and the countries in the former colonies in Asia, the Caribbean and the 
Pacific (‘ACP countries’) (2000/2005). 
The different associations have led to a complex web of relations between the 
EU, its Member States and a number of third countries. As one observer held, 
the different forms of ‘enhanced multilateralism and bilateralism’ thus lead to 
‘integration without membership’ and an ‘EU legal space’.87
Association agreements have often been used as a first step towards acces-
sion and, indeed, many of the current EU Member States first enjoyed as-
sociate status.88 In other cases, association agreements are the follow-ups of 
so called cooperation agreements, which may be concluded on the basis of 
86 Case 12/86 Demirel v. Stadt Schwabusch Gmünd.
87 A. Lazowski, ‘Enhanced Multilateralism and Enhanced Bilateralism: Integration without 
Membership in the European Union’, Common Market Law Review, 2008, pp. 1433-1458.
88 See for instance M. Maresceau and E. Montaguti, ‘The Relations between the European 
Union and Eastern Europe: A Legal Appraisal’, Common Market Law Review, 1995, pp. 
1327-1367.
52
Article 212 TFEU. Associations are far-reaching and may extend key internal 
market principles to third countries, as has been recognised also by the Court 
(see below).
Nevertheless, association agreements differ, even procedurally, from ac-
cession agreements. On the basis of Article 49 TEU, ‘The conditions of ad-
mission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded, 
which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement […]’. 
But, although the European Union (and in particular the Commission) is the 
key negotiator, the final agreement is concluded ‘between the Member States 
and the applicant State’ and, ‘[it] shall be submitted for ratification by all the 
contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional require-
ments’. Accession agreements are thus not concluded by the EU.
A similar situation would occur in the event of withdrawal of a Member State. 
The Lisbon Treaty brought an innovation in this respect and for the first time 
this situation has been regulated in a treaty provision. Article 50 TEU calls 
upon the Union to negotiate and conclude ‘an agreement with that State, set-
ting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework 
for its future relationship with the Union’. Yet, in this case a reference is made 
to Article 218(3) TFEU for the negation stage and the agreement ‘shall be 
concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified major-
ity, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament’. It is interesting to 
note that to join the Union a legal relationship with the current Member States 
needs to be established, but to leave the Union a state will have to settle the 
issue with the organisation of which it has become a member.89
4.3.3 Accession to international organisations
The Union may also become a member of other international organisations 
once a competence on the side of the EU can be established and the other or-
ganisation is (in statutory terms as well as politically) willing to welcome the 
EU as a member. Membership of international organisations typically implies 
joining the constituent treaty of the organisation which may include the need 
to become party to an accession treaty.
In Opinion 1/76, in relation to whether an agreement ‘establishing a Euro-
pean laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels’ is compatible with the pro-
visions of the Treaty , the Court argued: 
the Community is […] not only entitled to enter into contractual rela-
tions with a third country in this connexion but also has the power, 
89 A. Lazowski, ‘Withdrawal from the European Union and Alternatives to Membership’, 
European Law Journal, 2012, pp. 523-540.
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while observing the provisions of the Treaty, to cooperate with that 
country in setting up an appropriate organism such as the public inter-
national institution which it is proposed to establish under the name of 
the ‘European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels’.90
In subsequent situations, such as the establishment and joining of the EU (at 
the time the EC) of the WTO,91 the Court underlined this view. The current 
Treaties do not provide for a specific procedure for agreements to establish 
or join international organisations, which implies that the general rules of 
Article 28 TFEU apply.
4.3.4 (The future of) international agreements concluded by the  
  Member States only 
Obviously, the competence of the EU to conclude international agreements 
and the possibility of concluding mixed agreements does not deprive the 
Member States of their individual competence to conclude treaties under in-
ternational law. They remain international actors on their own account. Over 
the years, however, the extensions of the competences of the EU and its ex-
ternal activities have called for a careful assessment of the extent to which 
the agreements concluded by the Member States may be in conflict with EU 
law.92
As far as international agreements concluded prior to the establishment of 
the European Economic Community are concerned, the matter is regulated 
by Article 351 TFEU, which basically states that these agreements shall not 
be affected, but incompatibilities with EU law should be removed. This again 
reveals an uneasy relationship between international treaty law and the su-
premacy of EU law. After all, in case of conflicts between provisions in an 
international agreement and EU law, Member States may be obliged to give 
priority to EU law based on the general rules on supremacy, but whenever 
these arguments are not accepted by a third party (which is not required, on 
the basis of the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt rule – see above), they 
have every right to ask for a correct implementation of the agreement. From 
the EU side, the pressure on Member States at least to find an interpretation 
that would allow for EU law to work properly may be intense. In recent case 
law, the Court held that international agreements ‘may in no circumstances 
permit any challenge to the principles that form part of the very foundations 
90 Opinion 1/76 re draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland water-
way vessels, para 5.
91 Opinion 1/94 re WTO Agreement.
92 See (much) more extensively: J. Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and the European Union, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
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of the [EU] legal order’,93 and indeed, Article 351 is generally believed not to 
create an unlimited reason for Member States to evade EU law.94
Apart from pre-existing agreements with third states, international agree-
ments among the Member States (so-called agreements inter se) may also 
potentially challenge the principles and foundation of the EU legal order. 
After all, they run the risk of allowing Member States to by-pass EU law. 
These agreements are not covered by Article 351.95 Yet, ever since ERTA96 it 
is clear that Member States cannot freely choose the international or the EU 
route whenever the subject is covered by EU law, which implies that agree-
ments inter se should be limited to topics that are not (at all) covered by the 
EU Treaties. 
Considering the extensive legal relations Member States maintain with third 
states, the potential for conflict is real and is not solved by the current treaty 
regime. How to prevent conflicts with EU law? Several options have been 
developed in practice. 1. Ex ante: for new agreements the best solution seems 
to be to prevent Member States from negotiating and concluding agreements 
in areas which fall under EU competence. In case of an exclusive competence 
it is clear that the Member States are simply no longer allow to conclude the 
agreement, in case of a shared or a parallel competence the case law indicated 
that it would be strongly recommended to cooperate with the Commission in 
order to prevent conflicts with (planned) EU activities. As early as 1976, in 
Kramer97 the Court held that Member States are ‘not to enter into any com-
mitment within the framework of these [fisheries] conventions which could 
hinder the Community in carrying out the tasks entrusted to it’. 2. Ex post: the 
principle of supremacy implies that agreements concluded by the Member 
States are seen as national legislation. In contrast to agreements concluded 
by the EU, they do not rank above, but below secondary law. This means that 
they will simply have to be implemented in accordance with EU law and that 
Member States have an obligation to renegotiate possible conflicting provi-
sions with the respective third parties.
 
93 Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. 
Council and Commission, para 304.
94 F. Casolari, ‘The Principle of Loyal Co-operation: A “Master Key” for EU External Rep-
resentation?’, in S. Blockmans and R.A. Wessel (Eds.), Principles and Practices of EU 
External Representation, The Hague: CLEER Working Papers, No. 5, 2012 pp. 11-35, at 27.




That this may have serious consequences for a large number of existing in-
ternational agreements is exemplified by the so-called BITs (Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties) cases.98 The EU’s presence in the field of foreign investment 
not only forms an example of the new international ambitions expressed by 
the Lisbon Treaty, but ironically also triggered the traditional reflex: an ac-
ceptance of the authority of international law, but at the same time a preser-
vation of the autonomy of EU law. Although the cases differ from the above 
mentioned PFOS case, they seem to reflect a similar trend: exclusivity by 
stealth.99 The outcome of the BITs cases is that all (over 1000) BITs will 
have to be renegotiated in order to prevent incompatibilities with EU law. 
As indicated by Dimopoulos, the long-term objective of the EU is to replace 
Member State BITs with EU Investment Agreements. In the meantime an 
authorisation system should combine the validity of the BITs that were con-
cluded on the basis of international treaty law with the primacy of EU law.100
It is indeed the need for primacy of EU law that undermines existing com-
petences Member States enjoy both under EU law and under international 
law. Where, traditionally, Member States are not a priori pre-empted from 
rule-making in an area of shared competence, the BITs cases reveal a number 
of Member States obligations even when the EU itself has not legislated. The 
reason for this is the ‘hypothetical incompatibility’ of existing international 
agreements with EU law.101 The Court argued that even a perceived – but not 
yet materialised – conflict between the international agreements and EU law 
would lead to a violation of the capital movement provisions in Article 351 
TFEU (then Art. 307 EC). The incompatibilities could jeopardise the future 
exercise of EU competences. In that sense, the judgments indeed continue 
‘the trend set by the ECJ in its Mox Plant and Kadi judgments by first de-
coupling the international law obligations from the EU law obligations and 
subsequently subordinating the former from the latter.’102 As in earlier case 
law, in the BITs cases the Court does not simply deny the relevance of inter-
national law, but it claims that it cannot be used in this case. Indeed, the fact 
that the EU has powers 
98 Case C-205/06, Commission v. Austria; Case C-249/06, Commission v. Sweden; Case 
C-118/07, Commission v. Finland.
99 R.A. Wessel, ‘Integration by Stealth: On the Exclusivity of Community Competence’, in D. 
Obradovic and N. Lavranos (Eds.), Interface between EU Law and National Law, Gronin-
gen: Europa Law Publishing, 2007, pp. 43-52.
100 A. Dimopoulos, ‘The BITs Cases and their Practical and Doctrinal Implications’, in 
Díez-Hochleitner, Martínez Capdevila, Blázquez Navarro, and Frutos Miranda, op.cit., pp. 
737-758.




on a matter which is identical to or connected with that covered by 
an earlier agreement concluded between a Member State and a third 
country, reveals the incompatibility with that agreement where, first 
the agreements does not contain a provision allowing the member 
State concerned to exercise its rights and to fulfil its obligations a s 
a member of the [EU] and, second, there is also no international law 
mechanism which makes that possible.103
This is indeed the complex conflict we face. By arguing that international 
law itself does not offer solutions, the Court has no choice but to preserve the 
autonomy of EU law by limiting Member States’ traditional treaty-making 
competences under international law, and by doing so it also hinders the ex-
ercise of shared competences and thus also reinterprets primary EU law. Yet, 
it has been argued that a narrow reading of the judgments would render the 
outcome of the cases more comprehensible.104 In that interpretation Member 
States’ international agreements are incompatible with EU law only when 
they preclude the future exercise of EU competence, so that any measure 
taken by the EU under a relevant power-conferring provision conflicts with 
the Member States’ obligations. While there are certainly reasons to opt for 
this interpretation, the language used by the Court is more worrisome and 
could also be read as a hostile take-over by the EU of both Member states 
competences and international (treaty) law. After all, it is not at all clear that 
the BITs would in fact be incompatible with EU law, as long as EU compe-
tences have not been exercised. In these cases the Member States argue that 
an incompatibility could only exist after the EU had actually adopted the 
measures. Moreover, in case of an actual conflict, international treaty law 
offers mechanisms to deal with this situation (such as suspension, renegotia-
tion, or ultimately denouncement of the agreements, in line with the rebus 
sic stantibus doctrine whereby a fundamental change in circumstances is a 
legitimate reason to suspend an international agreement). The question in-
deed is whether a hypothetical conflict could be seen as an incompatibility, in 
particular taking into account the consequences Member States enjoy in an 
area of shared competence.
A particular ironic situation occurs in areas when the EU enjoys an exclusive 
competence, but lacks the possibility to use it, because it is not a party to a 
particular agreement or cannot be a member of an international organisa-
tion. For several reasons Member States may thus participate in international 
agreements falling (at least partly) within exclusive Union competence. Re-
103 Paras 37 and 31.
104 Dimopoulos, op.cit.
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cent case law of the CJEU illustrates the possibly complex situation. Inter-
tanko was about a request for a preliminary ruling on the compatibility be-
tween a Directive on ship-source pollution and the Marpol Convention. The 
Court argued that the Convention fell outside its jurisdiction as there was no 
transfer of powers: 
It is true that all the Member States are parties to Marpol 73/78. Nev-
ertheless, in the absence of a full transfer of the powers previously 
exercised by the Member States to the Community, the latter cannot, 
simply because all those states are parties to Marpol 73/78, be bound 
by the rules set out therein, which it has not itself approved. 105
The content of such agreements can become part of EU law through second-
ary legislation. Through ‘good faith’ and the principles of sincere coopera-
tion, conventions such as Marpol gain an interpretative function within EU 
law.
Open Skies deals with a situation where the EU has exclusively competence, 
but a large number of bilateral treaties exist. The solution offered by the Court 
was to try to remove inconsistencies, and accept a transition period until the 
EU can fully take over. Given the nature of the competence, Member State 
authorisation is required for amendments or renewal. 106
These situations illustrate the need for the Union occasionally to accept a role 
by the Member States even in areas of its exclusive competence.107
105 Case C-308/06 The Queen, on the application of International Association of Independent 
Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and Others v. Secretary of State for Transport.
106 See the Open Skies cases referred to above.
107 M. Cremona, ‘Member States Agreements as Union Law’, in Cannizzaro, Palcheti and 
Wessel, op.cit., pp. 291-324.
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5 The effects of international law within  
 the EU legal order
5.1 Internal effects of international law and external   
 effects of EU law
So far we have established that the EU is bound by international law. The cur-
rent section looks at the consequences of this assertion, in particular within 
the EU legal order. In other words, we look at the internal effects of inter-
national law. Again, it seems fair to conclude that traditionally not so much 
was regulated by the Treaties and that the Lisbon Treaty did not change this 
situation. Hence, we look at recent case law, and by way of an introduction to 
one particular case in which the Court not only nicely summarised some of 
the relevant issues, but also addressed the question of whether non-EU states 
can be bound by EU legislation.
In December 2010 the CJEU ruled in a case concerning the applicability of 
rules of written and unwritten international law in relation to a Directive to 
include aviation activities in the scheme for trading greenhouse-gas emission 
allowances within the Union.108 This directive does not only affect EU Mem-
ber States, but in fact all aircraft operators when their aircraft are in the terri-
tory of one of the Member States and, more specifically, at an airport situated 
therein. Obviously, third states are not too eager to pay for greenhouse-gas 
emissions for those miles they do not fly in EU airspace.
On 16 December 2009, the American Air Transport Association and others 
brought judicial review proceedings asking the referring court to quash the 
measures implementing the directive in the United Kingdom.109 In support of 
their action, they pleaded that that directive was unlawful in the light of inter-
national treaty law and customary international law. In its ruling, the CJEU 
nicely summarised the main principles related to the effect of international 
law in the EU legal order.
First of all, the Court confirmed that the EU is in principle bound by in-
ternational law. This has indeed been standard case law ever since the 
 
108 Directive 2008/101/EC to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emis-
sion allowance trading within the Community (OJ 2009 L 8, p. 3).
109 Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America, American Airlines Inc., Continental 
Airlines Inc., United Airlines Inc. v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change.
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International Fruit Company case in 1972.110 Second, the Court can examine 
the validity of an act of EU law in the light of an international treaty only 
where the nature and the broad logic of the latter do not preclude this.111 
Finally, where the nature and the broad logic of the treaty in question permit 
the validity of the act of EU law to be reviewed in the light of the provisions 
of that treaty, it is also necessary that the provisions of that treaty which are 
relied upon for the purpose of examining the validity of the act of EU law ap-
pear, as regards their content, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise.112 
Yet, the question is of course different when the EU is not a party to a par-
ticular international agreement. In that case, in order for the EU to be capable 
of being bound, it must have assumed, and thus had transferred to it, all the 
powers previously exercised by the Member States that fall within the inter-
national agreement in question. In this case, however, the question related to 
the Chicago Convention and the Court held that in that case the powers previ-
ously exercised by the Member States had not been assumed in their entirety 
by the EU, the latter is not bound by that convention. In other words: the EU 
was not bound because it was not itself a party to the agreement and it had 
not replaced the Member States. This led to the conclusion that the provisions 
of the Chicago Convention cannot be said to form part of the EU legal order.
But what if the EU is a party to an international agreement? In the same 
American Air Transport Association case the CJEU answered this question 
as follows. Here it concerned the Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement 
on CO
2
 emissions. Since the EU is a party, the provisions of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol form an integral part of the legal order of the EU as from its entry 
into force.113 A similar reasoning was followed in relation to the Open Skies 
Agreement, to which the EU is also a party. And, since the agreement 
establishes certain rules designed to apply directly and immediately to 
airlines and thereby to confer upon them rights and freedoms which 
are capable of being relied upon against the parties to that agreement, 
and the nature and the broad logic of the agreement do not so preclude, 
the conclusion can be drawn that the Court may assess the validity of 
110 Joined cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en 
Fruit.
111 See also Joined Cases C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P, FIAMM and Others v. Council and 
Commission, para 110.
112 Case C-344/04, Queen on the application of International Air Transport Association v. 
Department for Transport (IATA and ELFAA), para 39, and Intertanko (op.cit.), para 45.
113 See also Case 181/73 Haegeman, para 5.
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an act of European Union law […] in the light of the provisions of the 
agreement. (para 84).
Hence, in order to know whether international agreements can play a role 
within the EU (primarily to set aside internal EU legislation) the EU will 
have to be bound by the agreement and the agreement must allow for it to be 
directly applicable to individuals or companies. We will come back to this 
later, but at this point it is important to underline that international law is not 
only seen as an integral part of the Union’s legal order, but that it can also set 
aside internal EU legislation.
But what about unwritten international law, usually referred to as ‘customary 
law’? The Court referred to Article 3(5) TEU introduced by the Lisbon Treaty 
(see above), on the basis of which the EU is to contribute to the strict obser-
vance and the development of international law. The Court argued that this 
implies that the Union is bound to observe international law in its entirety, 
including customary international law, which is binding upon the institutions 
of the EU.114 However, since a principle of customary international law does 
not have the same degree of precision as a provision of an international agree-
ment, judicial review is necessarily limited to the question whether, in adopt-
ing internal legislation, the institutions of the EU made manifest errors of 
assessment concerning the conditions for applying those principles. In other 
words: because customary law is often less precise, it is more difficult to ap-
ply it in detail.
The main question the American airline companies were interested in, how-
ever, was whether they could be subjected to rules based on treaties (the EU 
Treaties) to which they were not a party. The Court held that EU legislation 
applies in the territory of the EU Member States and may thus be applied to 
an aircraft operator when its aircraft is in the territory of one of the Member 
States and, more specifically, at an airport situated in such territory, since, in 
such a case, that aircraft is subject to the unlimited jurisdiction of that Mem-
ber State and the EU.115 It follows that the EU has competence to apply its 
internal rules to external parties once they enter ‘EU territory’ and, since the 
emission rules in the Kyoto Protocol concern complete flights, the EU Direc-
tive could be applied to all flights which arrive at or depart from an airport 
situated in the territory of a Member State, even when for the most part they 
would not fly over EU territory.
114 See, to this effect, Case C-286/90 Poulsen and Diva Navigation, paras 9 and 10; and Case 
C-162/96 Racke, paras 45 and 46.
115 See, by analogy, Poulsen and Diva Navigation, para 28.
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International law is thus not only applicable in the EU, but international ac-
tors may also be subject to EU law.
5.2 Direct applicability of international agreements
As far as international agreements are concerned, we have seen that the Hae-
geman doctrine that international law forms an integral part of EU law im-
plies what is, post-Lisbon, laid down in Article 216(2) TFEU (‘Agreements 
concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and 
on its Member States.’). This means that there is no specific need to trans-
pose international agreements to EU law or to the domestic law of the Mem-
ber States (for instance by means of a special Regulation).116 Indeed, at first 
sight this would reflect a perfect ‘monist’ situation. In practice, however, the 
CJEU’s case law is not that uniform and reveals a need to take the nature of 
the agreement into consideration whenever the question of its ‘direct effect’ 
comes up.
Where ‘direct applicability’ refers to the validity of international norms with-
out having to be transposed into European law, ‘direct effect’ relates to the 
question of whether these norms can actually be invoked by individuals be-
fore a domestic or EU court (see also above). As we have seen, the basic rule 
is that this is the case. In the case of Bresciani,117 the CJEU established that 
Community [now: Union] association agreements could be used in national 
courts to challenge national law. In the landmark case Kupferberg,118 it con-
firmed the direct effect of an ‘ordinary’ bilateral trade agreement (not an ac-
cession agreement). In Sevince, the Court found that decisions adopted by an 
Association Council and created by an association agreement were capable 
of having direct effect, provided they fulfil the same criteria that determine 
whether an international agreement has direct effect.119 Similarly, it was con-
firmed that third-country nationals could rely on the provisions of agreements 
concluded with the European Union. Thus, the Russian football player Igor 
116 F.G. Jacobs, ‘Direct Effect and Interpretation of International Agreements in the Recent Case 
Law of the European Court of Justice’, in A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau (Eds.), Law and 
Practice of EU External Relations: Salient Features of a Changing Landscape, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 13-33.
117 Case 87/75 Conceria Daniele Bresciani v. Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato; see 
also: Case C-18/90 Office national de l’emploi v. Kziber (Association Agreement between 
the Community and Morocco) and Case C-268/99 Jany and Others v. Staatssecretaris van 
Justitie (Provisions of the Association Agreement between the Community and Poland and 
the Community and the Czech Republic have direct effect notwithstanding the fact that the 
authorities of that State remain competent to apply to those nationals their own national laws 
and regulations regarding entry, stay and establishment).
118 Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg & Cie.
119 Case C-192/89 Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie.
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Simutenkov, at the time employed by the Spanish club Deportivo Tenerife, 
could invoke relevant provisions of the Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ment (PCA) with Russia. Article 23(1) of that PCA provided the following: 
‘Subject to the laws, conditions and procedures applicable in each Member 
State, the Community and its Member States shall ensure that the treatment 
accorded to Russian nationals, legally employed in the territory of a Member 
State shall be free from any discrimination based on nationality, as regards 
working conditions, remuneration or dismissal, as compared to its own na-
tionals.’ In examining this provision, the CJEU found that they lay down ‘in 
clear, precise and unconditional terms, a prohibition precluding any Member 
State from discriminating on grounds of nationality, against Russian workers 
vis-à-vis their own nationals’. 120
Ten years after Haegeman, the Court was less clear in applying its doctrine. 
Starting with Kupferberg (Case 104/81) the Court put the pure monist start-
ing point into perspective, when it argued that ‘the effects within the Com-
munity of provisions of an agreement concluded by the Community with a 
non-member country may not be determined without taking account of the 
international origin of the provisions in question.’121 This idea was elaborated 
in further case law, starting with Demirel.122
14. A provision in an Agreement concluded by the Community with 
non-member countries must be regarded as being directly applicable 
when, regard being had to its wording and the purpose and nature of 
the Agreement itself, the provision contains a clear and precise obliga-
tion which is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adop-
tion of any subsequent measure.
Indeed, this implies that the original monistic starting points (international 
law as an integral part of EU law) do not automatically entail direct applica-
bility of all international agreements concluded by the Union.
Reasons for the CJEU to limit the domestic effects of international agree-
ments vary. A classic argument is reciprocity: third states also limit the direct 
effect of the same agreement. This argument prevailed in, for instance, Kup-
ferberg, and returned in Van Parys: ‘[...] having regard to their nature and 
120 Case C-265/03, Igor Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, Real Federación 
Española de Fútbol. See more extensively: C. Hillion, ‘Case C-265/03, Igor Simutenkov 
v. Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, Real Federación Española de Fútbol’, [2005] ECR 
I-2579, Common Market Law Review, 2008, pp. 815-833.
121 See also Cannizzaro, op.cit., at pp. 37-39.
122 Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd.
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structure, the WTO agreements are not in principle among the rules in the 
light of which the Court is to review the legality of measures adopted by the 
Community institutions’.123
The nature of WTO law thus prevents the Court from giving effect to these 
norms within the EU legal order. This may be referred to as a dualist excep-
tion in a mostly monist system, but is it really? There is perhaps no doubt 
that the norms of WTO agreements are valid within the EU legal order; the 
problem lies more in the possibilities to apply them in case of a conflict.
While WTO law had long been the odd one out, more recently the CJEU 
seems to have extended the idea to the Law of the Sea. Here, however, it was 
not so much reciprocity that triggered to Court to be careful with the domes-
tic application of an international agreement, but rather the effects on indi-
vidual rights.124 Earlier the Court had established that ‘when an agreement 
established cooperation between the parties, some of the provisions of that 
agreement may [...] directly govern the legal position of individuals’.125 Now, 
in Intertanko, the absence of individual rights and obligations, together with 
‘the nature and broad logic of UNCLOS’ prevented the Court from being able 
to assess the validity of a Community measure in the light of that Convention. 
It seems that the absence of direct effect causes the problem; the Court does 
not deny the legal status of the Convention within the EU legal order. The 
question may rightfully be posed whether the criterion of ‘the governance of 
the legal position of individuals’ – which seems to be relevant for the accept-
ance of direct effect126 – would not virtually rule out the legal effects of most 
international law within the EU legal order and hence de facto limit the so 
much applauded monist attitude of the Union.127
A third argument used by the Court to limit the internal effects of interna-
tional agreements relates to the possible existence of a dispute settlement 
mechanism in the agreement. However, the argument is not used in a consist-
123 Case C-377/02 NV Firma Léon Van Parys v. Belgisch Interventie – en Restitutiebureau, 
para 39, but established case law ever since International Fruit (see above). In Joined Cases 
C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P FIAMM, the Court confirmed its view.
124 Case C-308/06 The Queen, on the application of International Association of Independent 
Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and Others v Secretary of State for Transport.
125 Case C-265/03 Simutenkov.
126 Case T-174/00 Biret International SA v. Council; Case T-210/00 Etablissements Biret 
et Cie SA v. Council; Case C-93/02 P Biret International SA v. Council; Case C-94/02 P 
Établissements Biret et Cie SA v. Council; Case C-265/03 Simutenkov; C-344/04 IATA and 
ELFAA. See more extensively and eloquently Cannizzaro, op.cit.
127 Cannizzaro, op.cit.
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ent manner. It played a role in a number of classic cases128 before in Portugal 
v Council,129 the Court held the following:
40. To require [domestic] courts to refrain from applying rules of do-
mestic law which are inconsistent with the WTO agreements would 
have the consequence of depriving the legislative or executive organs 
of the contracting parties of the possibility afforded by Article 22 of 
that memorandum of reaching a negotiated settlement, even on a tem-
porary basis.
The idea was that the existence of a dispute settlement system in the WTO 
agreement was the proper forum for the Member States to settle conflicts 
related to the agreement.130
Again, however, one could argue that this does not affect the status of inter-
national agreements in the EU legal order. Yet, these exceptions seriously 
limit the effects of international law in concrete situations. In the words of 
AG Poiares Maduro: 
the fact that WTO law cannot be relied upon before a court does not 
mean that it does not form part of the Community legal system. From 
this point of view, the formulation used by the Court in Portugal v. 
Council is undoubtedly unfortunate. It nurtures a belief that an in-
ternational agreement does not form part of the body of Community 
legality, whereas it is merely a question of the provision’s enforceabil-
ity, of the jurisdiction of the courts to take cognisance of it.131
International law does not regulate its own status in the domestic legal orders 
of states or the legal orders of international organisations. Nevertheless, one 
may argue that the international principle of pacta sunt servanda may call for 
internal measures to allow the state or international organisation to live up 
to its international obligations. Whether this is done by accepting the inter-
national norms as valid norms in the domestic legal order or by transferring 
international norms into domestic law (or even by accepting a conflict be-
tween national and international obligations) is up to the state or international 
organisation.
128 Including Case C-469/93 Chiquita; Case 270/80 Polydor; and Case 24/72 International Fruit.
129 Case C-149/96 Portugal v. Council.
130 See also Case C-27/00 R. v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Re-
gions, ex parte Omega Air Limited.
131 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro of 20 February 2008, in Joined cases C-120/06 P and 
C-121/06 P FIAMM.
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5.3 International customary law and EU law
In the previous sub-section we focussed on the status and effect of interna-
tional agreements binding upon the EU. Yet, as we have seen, for instance, 
when the General Court in the Kadi case referred to jus cogens, the Court 
does take unwritten international law into account as well. The global ambi-
tions of the EU as reflected by the Lisbon Treaty, in combination with the fact 
that the Union is not a party to many fundamental international agreements, 
call for a reassessment of the effects of international customary law on the 
Union. The treaties are silent on the status of international customary law in 
the EU legal order, but in quite general terms Articles 3(5) and 21(1) TEU 
(see section 1 above) hint at the idea that the EU considers itself bound by in-
ternational law. Over the years, the Court has accepted the fact that the Com-
munity (and now the Union) was bound by international customary law. Yet, 
the hierarchical position of customary law was not regulated by the Lisbon 
Treaty and remains less clear.
In the landmark case Racke132 the Court for the first time shed some light on 
the effects of international customary law in the EU legal order and the pos-
sibilities for individuals to invoke customary law to challenge an EU Regu-
lation. This case was about the rule of rebus sic stantibus (a fundamental 
change in circumstances as a legitimate reason to suspend an international 
agreement) which is laid down in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. As the European Community was not a party to that Conven-
tion, the Court had to rely on the customary nature of that rule. Although in 
this particular case the Court held that there was no manifest violation of the 
law of treaties, it did not hesitate to state that ‘it is required to comply with 
the rules of customary international law’. In fact the last sentence of para 46 
strongly resembles the legal status of international agreements, laid down in 
current Article 216(2) TFEU: 
It follows that the rules of customary international law concerning the 
termination and the suspension of treaty relations by reason of a fun-
damental change of circumstances are binding upon the Community 
institutions and form part of the Community legal order.
132 Case C-162/96 Racke (op.cit.), para 45; CFI, Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v. Council; 
as well as Case C-84/95 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. Minister for Trans-
port, Energy and Communications and Others. See P.J. Kuijper, ‘Customary International 
Law, Decisions of International Organisations and other Techniques for Ensuring Respect 
for International Legal Rules in European Community Law’, in Wouters, Nollkaemper and 
De Wet, op.cit., pp. 87-106; as well as J. Wouters and D. Van Eeckhoute, ‘Giving Effect to 
Customary International Law through European Community law’, in J.N. Prinssen and A. 
Schrauwen, (Eds.), Direct Effect, Groningen: European Law Publishing, 2004, pp. 183-234.
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As one observer holds: ‘Based on these observations, one can proceed on the 
assumption that it is unlikely that the EU system should adopt a very differ-
ent approach in its relationship with international agreements and custom.’133
A similar reason can be found in Opel Austria.134 Obviously, the obligation 
to respect international customary law holds in particular with regard to rela-
tions with third states (compare also Art. 3(5) referred to above). Unless we 
are dealing with jus cogens norms, the EU – in both primary and secondary 
law – may deviate from international law to regulate its relationship with and 
those between its own Member States.135 This was the case, for example, with 
regard to the rule inadimplenti non est adimplendum,136 or to the freedom left 
by international law to States in choosing the criteria upon which to bestow 
and maintain their citizenship137 or to grant their nationality to ships.138
Recent case law on the one hand confirms the idea laid down in Racke that 
‘the rules of customary international law […] form part of the Union legal 
order’, but at the same time it is not completely consistent. The unambiguous 
statements in Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU indicating that the Union shall con-
tribute to the strict observance and development of international law lead to 
the presumption that in its relations with other international actors the EU is 
bound by international law, be it written or unwritten. The question, however, 
is how this can be squared with the statement in Kadi that in the end priority 
should be granted to the constitutional principles of the EU itself. One answer 
is that at the time of the first Kadi case Articles 3 and 21 TEU did not yet 
exist. Yet, post-Lisbon the conclusion remains the same: the duty to respect 
international law amounts today to a constitutional principle of the EU.139 In-
deed, as revealed by the 2013 Kadi case (see below), the Court still has a task 
to balance this constitutional principle against other constitutional principles 
(including the protection of fundamental rights).
133 A. Gianelli, ‘Customary International Law in the European Union’, in Cannizzaro, Palchetti 
and Wessel, op.cit., pp. 93-110, at 99.
134 Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v Council.
135 Ibid. 
136 Joined Cases 90-91/63 Commission v. Luxembourg and Belgium; Case 52/75 Commission v. 
Italy; Case 325/82 Commission v. Germany; Case C-5/94 The Queen v. Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd.; Opinion by AG Jacobs in 
Case C-228/00 Commission v. Germany.
137 Case 41/74 Yvonne Van Duyn v. Home Office; Case C-369/90 Micheletti v. Delegación del 
Gobierno Cantabria, para 10; Case C-192/99 The Queen v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department ex parte Kaur, para 19; Case C-200/02 Zhou and Chen v. Secretary of State for 
the Home Department; Case C-135/08 Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern.
138 Case C-221/89 R. v. Sectretary of State for Transport (ex parte Factortame), paras 15-17.
139 Gianelli, op.cit., at 105.
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A special kind of customary law is formed by jus cogens. While deviation 
from regular customary law is allowed between parties, this is not the case in 
relation to jus cogens, referred to by the General Court in the first Yusuf and 
Kadi cases (see above): 
276. It must therefore be considered that the resolutions of the Secu-
rity Council at issue fall, in principle, outside the ambit of the Court’s 
judicial review and that the Court has no authority to call in question, 
even indirectly, their lawfulness in the light of Community law. On the 
contrary, the Court is bound, so far as possible, to interpret and apply 
that law in a manner compatible with the obligations of the Member 
States under the Charter of the United Nations.
277. None the less, the Court is empowered to check, indirectly, the 
lawfulness of the resolutions of the Security Council in question with 
regard to jus cogens, understood as a body of higher rules of public 
international law binding on all subjects of international law, includ-
ing the bodies of the United Nations, and from which no derogation 
is possible.
The words ‘in principle’, however, formed a reason for many commentators 
to start raising their eyebrows. Linguistically one could argue that the Court 
purported to point to a principle precluding a role for itself in the judicial re-
view of Security Council resolutions. In fact, the subsequent sentence seems 
to support this view as the Court provides that it has ‘no authority to call in 
question, not even indirectly’ the lawfulness of Security Council resolutions. 
However, a few lines later the principle proves to be less firm than presented 
as the Court chooses not to have its own competences completely blocked by 
it. Upon its own initiative, it decided that it is ‘empowered to check, indirect-
ly, the lawfulness of the resolutions of the Security Council in question with 
regard to jus cogens […].’ And, in fact, this is exactly what the Court did. In 
assessing whether the freezing of funds provided for by the contested regula-
tion, and, indirectly, by the resolutions of the Security Council, infringes the 
applicants’ fundamental rights, the Court considered that such is not the case, 
measured by the standard of universal protection of the fundamental rights of 
the human person covered by jus cogens. It is only an arbitrary deprivation 
of the right to property that might, in any case, be regarded as contrary to jus 
cogens. Irrespective of the fact that the Court left some room in relation to 
the content of jus cogens (‘in so far as respect for the right to property must 
be regarded as forming part of the mandatory rules of general international 
law’), it showed no hesitation to judge the lawfulness of the relevant Security 
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Council resolutions. In similar terms, the argumentation was used in relation 
to the right to be heard.
What would have happened if the Court had established that the Security 
Council had, indeed, violated jus cogens? Would the relevant resolution be 
void (cf. Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention)? Would the Court have had no 
alternative but to annul the relevant Regulation or declare it inapplicable? 
How would this have related to the obligation of the EU Member States to 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council? Could parts of the Regula-
tion (i.e. the part of the Annex listing Yusuf and Kadi) be set aside? And, if 
so, could other (regional or national) courts or tribunals do the same? We can 
rest assured that the members of the Security Council would take their turn in 
raising their eyebrows. In the appeal cases, the CJEU agreed with the CFI that 
the Union would not be bound to give effect to norms violating jus cogens.140
Yet, as we have seen above, the CJEU argued that – apart from judging the 
compatibility with norms of jus cogens, it remains competent to assess the 
internal lawfulness of a regulation designed to give effect to UN Security 
Council resolutions: ‘the obligations imposed by an international agreement 
cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC 
Treaty, which include the principle that all Community acts must respect fun-
damental rights.’ (para 285). This way, the Court did not have to check the 
lawfulness of the Security Council resolutions against norms of jus cogens; it 
simply relied on the constitutional principles of the EU itself.
In 2013 the CJEU released a final judgment.141 The Court affirmed that it con-
tinues to review EU listings implementing strict Security Council obligations 
in the face of lack of equivalent control at UN level. It insisted on a rather 
strict standard of review of such listings, and it undertook – for the first time 
– substantive review of the reasons for listing offered by the EU. While this 
judgment certainly was a relief for those worrying about legal protection in 
the EU in the area of foreign policy and UN obligations, it will not put an end 
to the debate on how others will perceive the EU’s position as to its claim to 
make its own assessment in the light of binding Security Council resolutions.
140 See the Kadi case referred to above (Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al 
Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission).
141 Judgment in Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, Commission and Others 
v. Yassin Abdullah Kadi, 18 July 2013.
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5.4 The doctrine of consistent interpretation
The above analysis reveals the possibility of a direct effect of international 
law in the EU legal order. At the same time the case law of the European 
Court has introduced another possibility: indirect effect of international law. 
This mode of application is usually referred to as the doctrine of consistent 
interpretation.142 Given the notion that agreements concluded by the EU form 
an integral part of the EU legal order, the principle of consistent interpretation 
did not appear out of the blue;143 it is an elegant way of solving (potential) 
conflict between EU law and international obligations when international 
agreements lack direct effect (as is the case with the WTO agreements and, 
as we have seen, UNCLOS). The duty to interpret EU law in conformity 
with binding international law stems from the superior hierarchical status of 
international law within the EU legal order as discussed in section 3 above. 
The WTO agreements in particular have been a source of inspiration. The 
principle of consistent interpretation has been said to be relevant for the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, the Anti-Subsidy Agreements and for the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).144 In the 
Werner and Leifer judgments the Court argued that Article XI of the GATT 
was relevant for the interpretation of a Community Regulation establishing 
common rules for exports (Cases C-70/94 and C-83/94).
While these cases, just like Commission v. Germany, were about the lack of 
direct effect of the 1947 GATT and thus concerned the need to assess the in-
direct effect of provisions of an international agreement, in Poulsen the Court 
confirmed that this also holds true for international customary law.145
It is important to note that the principle of consistent interpretation not only 
applies in relation to the international agreements themselves, but equally 
to decisions flowing from those agreements. In general terms this was made 
clear by the Court in Sevince (Case C-192/89):
142 Case C-61/94, Commission v. Germany.
143 In fact, a more implicit reference could already be found in Case 92/71, Interfood GmbH: 
‘Since agreements regarding the Common Custom Tariff were reached between the Com-
munity and its partners in GATT the principles underlying those agreements may be of 
assistance in interpreting the rules of classification of it’ [emphasis added].
144 Cases C-61/94 Commission v. Germany, para 52; C-286/02 Bellio F.lli Srl v. Prefettura di 
Treviso, para 33; and C-49/02 Heidelberger Bauchemie GmbH, para 20.
145 Case C-286/90, Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp.
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in order to be recognized as having direct effect, the provisions of a 
decision of the council of association must satisfy the same conditions 
as those applicable to the provisions of the Agreements itself.146
EU law should be interpreted in the light of the provisions in international 
decisions that are binding upon the EU. The main area concerns WTO deci-
sions. Interpretation and application of WTO law is regularly influenced by 
the reports of the WTO Appellate Body and the Dispute Settlement Body. 
Although no case law is available as yet, it would make sense if not only 
the provisions of the WTO agreements themselves formed a source for in-
terpretation of EU law, but also the authoritative application of them by the 
WTO bodies.147 However, so far the Court has been hesitant to interpret EU 
secondary legislation in the light of WTO dispute decisions.148 Yet, in general, 
decisions by international organisations have an impact on the EU legal order 
and may be of interpretative assistance.149
The duty of consistent interpretation may also be applicable in the domestic 
legal order of the Member States in the case of an agreement to which the 
Member States are a party. In Commune de Mesquer (Case C-188/07) the 
Court pointed to the possible necessity for Member States to interpret EU law 
in the light of international obligations to allow EU law to function well.150 
Similarly, in Intertanko (see above) it became clear that there is a role for the 
Court to prevent a clash between Member States’ international agreements 
and EU obligations by way of a consistent interpretation.
The rationale behind the doctrine of consistent interpretation therefore seems 
to be the need to assure the principle of respect for international law.
146 See also Case 30/88 Greece v. Commission.
147 G. Gattinara, ‘Consistent Interpretation of WTO Rulings in the EU Legal Order?’, in Can-
nizzaro, Palcheti and Wessel, op.cit., pp. 269-287.
148 See for instance Case C-351/04 Ikea Wholesale v. Commissioners of Customs & Excise.
149 See Wessel and Blockmans, Between Autonomy and Dependence, op.cit.
150 Casolari, op.cit. at 401.
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6 The European Union in the international  
 legal order
So far we have mainly focused on the status and effects of international law 
in the EU legal order. However, as an international actor the EU will have to 
follow the international rules to be able and allowed to play along. Obviously, 
when concluding international agreements the EU will have to abide by the 
rules of international treaty law. In addition, three themes deserve special 
attention as they have gained in importance over the last few years, partly 
triggered by the EU’s global ambitions reflected in the Treaty of Lisbon: the 
international responsibility of the Union, its new ambitions in the field of 
international diplomacy, and the related question of the EU’s immunity under 
international law.
6.1 International responsibility
6.1.1 The separate responsibility of the European Union
In section 1 we argued that, as an international legal person, the EU occupies 
a separate position in the international legal order. As we have seen, this posi-
tion as an international actor implies that in its relations with third states and 
other international organisations the EU must adhere to the norms that make 
up that international legal order. This leads to the question of whether and to 
what extent the EU may be held responsible by its international partners in 
case of a violation of international law. This question may occur in relation to 
the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy, but is also more general.
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty we are left with one interna-
tional legal entity: the European Union. It is difficult not to regard this entity 
as an international organisation and hence within the scope of the Articles 
on the International Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO) as 
adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) of the UN in August 
2011 and endorsed by the UN General Assembly in December 2011.151 This 
latest version of the Articles is the latest stage in a development that started 
in 2002, when the ILC took up this project. Indeed, by now it has become 
widely accepted that the EU as such may bear international responsibility 
151 International Law Commission (ILC), ‘Draft Arts. on the responsibility of international or-
ganisations, with commentaries 2011’, Adopted by the ILC at its sixty-third session, in 2011, 
and submitted to the General Assembly as part of the Commission’s report covering the 
work of that session (A/66/10) (2011) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. 
II, Part Two, 5, see in particular pt. 6 where the Commentary refers to Art. 57 of the Arts. on 
responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.
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for an internationally wrongful act,152 and it seems to fit the definition of an 
international organisation used in the ARIO: ‘For the purposes of the present 
draft articles, the term “international organization” refers to an organization 
established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and 
possessing its own legal personality. International organizations may include 
as members, in addition to States, other entities.’ 
On the basis of Article 1, the Articles ‘apply to the international responsibil-
ity of an international organisation for an internationally wrongful act’; as 
well as ‘to the international responsibility of a State for an internationally 
wrongful act in connection with the conduct of an international organisation’. 
Not being dealt with in the Articles on the responsibility of states for inter-
nationally wrongful acts, the latter paragraph is meant to incorporate inter 
alia those cases of State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts by 
an international organisation where a State is a member of that organisation, 
such as the Member States of the Union.153 
The ARIO suggest as a point of departure that the EU is responsible for its 
own internationally wrongful acts. Article 3 states: ‘Every internationally 
wrongful act of an international organization entails the international respon-
sibility of that organization’. Article 4 lists the conditions for an international-
ly wrongful act by an international organisation that entails the international 
responsibility of that organisation:
There is an internationally wrongful act of an international organiza-
tion when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) Is attribut-
able to the international organization under international law; and (b) 
Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that organiza-
tion’. The next question is what conduct can be attributed to the Union.
According to Article 6(1):
The conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization in 
the performance of functions of that organ or agent shall be consid-
ered an act of that organization under international law, whatever posi-
tion the organ or agent holds in respect of the organization. 
152 Cf. F. Hoffmeister, ‘Litigating against the European Union and its Member States’, Europe-
an Journal of International Law, 2010, No. 3, pp. 723-747 at 724.
153 See in particular pt. 6 of the ARIO Commentaries where the Commentary refers to Art. 57 of 
the Arts. on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.
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This somewhat obvious rule indicates that conduct by organs and agents can 
establish the international responsibility of the EU. According to Article 6(2), 
the ‘rules of the organisation’ shall be applied when determining the ‘organs 
and agents’. In view of the EU rules on ‘internal’ responsibility, there are 
good reasons to interpret the term ‘organs and agents’ as ‘institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies and their servants’ as is used in the TFEU.154 In any case, 
as is suggested by the broad definitions of ‘organs and agents’ in Articles 2(c) 
and (d), the Articles do not envisage the attribution of conduct to ‘depend on 
the use of particular terminology in the internal law’ of the Union.155 
Yet, as we have seen, the EU is not a normal international organisation and 
the division of external competences is both complex and dynamic. One of 
the key questions therefore is how to divide the responsibility between the 
EU and its Member States. The responsibility of the Union in relation to the 
role of the Member States is dealt with in Draft Article 17.156 What, for in-
stance, happens if the Union adopts a decision which would force (or author-
ise) the Member States to commit an internationally wrongful act? The rules 
suggest that the EU itself could incur international responsibility both in the 
case of binding decisions addressed to the Member States and when the latter 
act because of an authorisation by the Union. It is important to realise that this 
Article applies to ‘circumvention’ by the Union and that hence the conduct of 
the ‘implementing’ Member State itself need not necessarily be unlawful; it is 
the binding or ‘authorising act’ of the Union that, if it were to implement that 
itself, should qualify as unlawful.157 At the same time, Member States may be 
responsible once they hide behind an international organisation (Article 61). 
154 Cf. Hoffmeister, op.cit., at 740, who refers to Arts. 340(2) and 263 TFEU as well as to Art. 
51(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Art. 10(2) confirms that also ‘the breach of 
any international obligation that may arise for an international organisation towards its mem-
bers under the rules of the organisation’ is included in the Draft Arts. Ahlborn argues that 
this second paragraph could have been deleted, see: C. Ahlborn, ‘The Rules of International 
Organizations and the Law of International Responsibility’, International Organizations 
Law Review, No. 2, 2011, pp. 397-482.
155 Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, 17. The commentary invokes also some case law on 
the point such as the ICJ Advisory Opinion, Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of 
the United Nations, ICJ Reports 1949, 177, where the Court held that an agent is ‘any person 
through whom it [the international organisation] acts’.
156 See NM Blokker, ‘Abuse of the Members: Questions concerning Draft Art. 16 of the Draft 
Arts. on Responsibility of International Organizations’ International Organizations Law Re-
view, 2010, p. 35; as well as J d’Aspremont, ‘Abuse of the Legal Personality of International 
Organizations and the Responsibility of Member States’, International Organizations Law 
Review, 2007, p. 91.
157 Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, 40-42.
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Irrespective of the notion that the EU itself can be responsible under interna-
tional law for internationally wrongful acts, it is worth keeping in mind that it 
is quite difficult actually to enforce the rules. The immunity of international 
organisations in general makes proceeding before domestic courts extremely 
difficult. At the same time, the International Court of Justice may only rule in 
conflicts between states. This means that the role of the ARIO in establishing 
an international responsibility of the EU may be limited to an argumentative 
function.158
6.1.2 International responsibility in the case of mixed agreements
In relation to mixed agreements the question of responsibility is even more 
complex. After all, on the basis of international treaty law, third parties have 
a right to address both the EU and its Member States in cases of (perceived) 
violations.159 When a declaration of competence (see above) has been drafted, 
this may guide third parties to the most appropriate addressee, but in other 
cases a general joint responsibility is to be assumed.160
Irrespective of the presumption of a joint responsibility it could therefore be 
argued that third states will have to take the division of competence between 
the EU and its Member States into consideration. After all, it is simply less 
practical to address Member States where the EU enjoys an exclusive compe-
tence. On the other hand – and this is the position we would take – third states 
cannot be expected to know and understand the ins and outs of the internal 
EU division of competences. In fact, demanding this from third parties could 
seriously hamper negotiations. Where the division of competences as well as 
the attribution of conduct can and should play a role internally once possible 
international responsibility arises, both the EU and its Member States should 
at least be willing to act as a ‘portal’ for international claims.
6.1.3 The responsibilities of the EU as a global security actor
Questions on responsibility may also emerge in relation to operations in the 
framework of the common security and defence policy (CSDP). The Lis-
bon Treaty described this policy area more extensively and it is presented 
as forming part of the Union’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP). 
Although most missions launched by the Union so far have been relatively 
modest in their size and objectives, even small-scale operations may give 
158 Hoffmeister, ‘Litigating Against the European Union and its Member States’, op.cit.
159 See also P.J. Kuyper, ‘International Responsibility for EU Mixed Agreements’, in Hillion 
and Koutrakos, op.cit., pp. 208-228.
160 Cf. G. Gaja, ‘The European Community’s Rights and Obligations under Mixed Agree-
ments’, in D. O’Keefe and H.G. Schermers (Eds.), Mixed Agreements, The Hague: Kluwer, 
1983, at 135. Cf. Case C-53/96 Hermès v. FHT and Case C-316/91 Parliament v. Council.
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rise to a breach of international law or cause damage and injury to private 
parties. Yet holding EU missions accountable for their activities is hampered 
by a range of legal and practical difficulties.161 One particularly thorny issue 
concerns the attribution of the wrongful acts committed by EU military op-
erations: since they are composed of personnel made available to the Union 
by its Member States and third States, it is not immediately obvious which 
party—the EU, the contributing States or both—should bear responsibility 
for their conduct. This question is of great practical significance, for account-
ability cannot be discharged effectively if it is unclear where responsibility 
lies.162
As we have seen, as an international legal person, the EU bears responsibility 
under international law for any violations of its international obligations.163 
The conduct of military operations by the EU raises an important question: 
taking account of the EU’s ambitions laid down in the current Treaties to 
contribute to global security governance, do the rules of attribution laid down 
in the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations (ARIO) 
provide an adequate system for allocating responsibility between the EU and 
contributing States? Whereas the European Commission played a visible role 
in the debate on the ARIO by pointing to the special nature of the Commu-
nity, its contribution did not extend to the complex questions emerging from 
the role of the EU as a global security actor. One could argue that the way in 
which the ARIO purports to apply the rules on the allocation of responsibility 
to peace operations is too narrow. The rules on international responsibility 
as laid down in the ARIO focus exclusively on factual control as a ground 
for attribution, and the Commentary to the ARIO disregards the institutional 
and legal ties that may exist between national contingents and international 
organisations. This approach is inappropriate in cases where an international 
organisation incorporates national contingents into its own institutional struc-
ture, since such an act of incorporation gives rise to a rebuttable presumption 
161 For example, it is not fully settled to what extent the EU is bound by the pertinent rules of 
international law, including those applicable during armed conflict. See F. Naert, Interna-
tional Law Aspects of the EU’s Security and Defence Policy, Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2010, 
at 463-540.
162 See more extensively A. Sari and R.A. Wessel, ‘International Responsibility for EU Military 
Operations: Finding the EU’s Place in the Global Accountability Regime’, in Van Vooren, 
Blockmans and Wouters (Eds.), op.cit., pp. 126-141; as well as R.A. Wessel and L. den 
Hertogh, ‘EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy: A Competence-Responsibility Gap?’, 
in M. Evans and P. Koutrakos (Eds.), International Responsibility: EU and International 
Perspectives, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013.
163 This also holds true for human rights law. A. Sari and R.A. Wessel (Eds.), Human Rights in 
EU Crisis Management Operations: A Duty to Respect and to Protect? The Hague: CLEER 
Working Papers, No. 6, 2012.
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that the conduct of national contingents is attributable to the international 
organisation rather than to the contributing States.
Whether or not such a presumption of attribution exists in the case of EU 
military operations depends on their status within the institutional and legal 
order of the EU. One may argue that the picture is a mixed one. The EU 
certainly enjoys the competence to incorporate military assets into its institu-
tional structure and the Council is competent to establish military operations 
as its subsidiary organs. However, none of the legal acts adopted in relation 
to EU military operations provide clear evidence of the Council’s intention to 
confer the status of a subsidiary organ on them. Since this intention cannot be 
presumed, we may be led to conclude that EU military operations are not de 
jure organs of the EU.164 However, they may still be classified as de facto or-
gans, provided that the Union exercises the necessary degree of control over 
them. Although EU operations do not satisfy the high threshold of complete 
dependence demanded by the International Court of Justice in its case-law, 
a strong argument can be made that they are subject to a particularly high 
degree of normative control by the EU and may be considered as its de facto 
organs on this basis. Accordingly, if our analysis is correct, a presumption ex-
ists in favour of attributing the conduct of EU military operations to the EU 
on the grounds that they constitute de facto organs of the Union.
A formal recognition by the Council that the conduct of EU military opera-
tions is attributable to the EU would signal to the international community 
that the EU is ready to accept that its growing global engagement as an in-
ternational security actor brings with it a duty to act in an accountable man-
ner.165 The EU cannot entrust the implementation of its security and defence 
policy to its Member States and other parties and disavow responsibility for 
its adverse effects166 or hide behind the effect control test set down in Article 
7 ARIO. Accepting that the wrongful conduct of its crisis management mis-
sions engages the Union’s international responsibility would not only bet-
ter reflect the spirit of the principles laid down in Article 21 TEU (which 
includes respect for international law), but it could also serve as an example 
164 Cf. N. Tsagourias, ‘EU Peacekeeping Operations: Legal and Theoretical Issues’, in M. Try-
bus and N. White (Eds.), European Security Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 
102, 122; Naert, op.cit. at 355-357.
165 See also Nigel D White, ‘The EU as a Regional Security Actor within the International 
Legal Order’, in Trybus and White, op.cit., 329, 348.
166 Cf. R. Wolfrum, ‘State Responsibility for Private Actors: An Old Problem of Renewed Rele-
vance’, in M. Ragazzi (Ed), International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar 
Schachter (Nijhoff 2005), 427–431, 431.
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for other international organisations, including NATO,167 and thereby make a 
broader contribution to the development of the law of international responsi-
bility in this particular field.
6.2 The European Union’s new diplomatic ambitions
Perhaps the most visible sign of the EU’s new diplomatic ambitions in the 
Lisbon Treaty is the establishment of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS),168 which has been called ‘the first structure of a common European 
diplomacy’.169 In the report of December 2011 evaluating the first year of the 
new Diplomatic Service, its foundation is viewed as an historic opportunity 
to rise above ‘internal debates pertaining to institutional and constitutional re-
form’, and instead to focus on ‘delivering new substance to the EU’s external 
action’.170 When the EEAS is to deliver this ‘new diplomatic substance’, the 
Treaties obviously provide binding guidance on the method and substance of 
EU action in the world. But at the same time, everything will have to fit into 
the existing international legal framework.171
6.2.1 International representation
International representation is a core element of international (diplomatic) 
law. The first indent of Article 3(1) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations (VCDR) lists as a task of Embassies: ‘Represent the sending state 
167 See U. Häußler, ‘Human Rights Accountability of International Organisations in the Lead 
of International Peace Missions’ in J. Wouters et l. (Eds), Accountability for Human Rights 
Violations by International Organisations, Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2010, pp. 243–251.
168 Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and function-
ing of the European External Action Service, OJ 2010, L 201/30, 3 August 2010 (‘EEAS 
Decision’). See also C. Hillion, The European External Action Service: Towards a Common 
Diplomacy?, Stockholm: Sieps Report 2010:6; and S. Blockmans, M. Cremona, D. Curtin, 
G. De Baere, S. Duke, C. Eckes, C. Hillion, B. Van Vooren, R. Wessel, and J. Wouters, EEAS 
2.0: A Legal Commentary on Council Decision 2010/427/EU Establishing the Organisation 
and Functioning of the European External Action Service, edited by S. Blockmans and C. 
Hillion, Brussels: CEPS / Stockholm: Sieps / Florence: EUI, 2013, 105 p.
169 Consular and Diplomatic Protection: Legal Framework in the EU Member States, Report of 
the EU CARE project, December 2010, at 31; available at http://www.careproject.eu/images/
stories/ConsularAndDiplomatic-Protection.pdf .
170 European External Action Service, Report by the High Representative to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission, 22 December 2011, 2. See also S. Blockmans, 
’The European External Action Service one year on: First signs of strengths and weaknes-
ses’, The Hague: CLEER Working Papers, No. 2, 2012.
171 See more extensively R.A. Wessel and B. Van Vooren, ‘The EEAS’ Diplomatic Dreams and 
the Reality of International and European Law’, Journal of European Public Policy, 2013; 
as well as G. De Baere and R.A. Wessel, ‘EU Law and the EEAS: Of Complex Competences 
and Constitutional Consequences’, in J. Bátora and D. Spence (Eds.), The EU’s Diplomatic 
System: post-Westphalia and the European External Action Service, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2014 (forthcoming).
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in the receiving state’.172 Several EU Treaty provisions provide a solid basis 
for the Union to establish a formal and substantive presence as a single, fully 
matured diplomatic actor represented in third countries and international or-
ganisations.173 International representation can be defined in many ways, but 
we use it to refer to the process whereby a Union organ or institution acts on 
behalf of the EU.174 As regards the physical presence through its delegations, 
EU activities are based on Article 221(1) TFEU, which was newly inserted 
with the Lisbon Treaty:
Union Delegations in third countries and at international organisations 
shall represent the Union. 
The ambition flowing from this new provision in the TFEU should be quite 
clear: the Union no longer wishes to have an international presence through 
delegations of only one of its institutions (e.g. Commission delegations), or 
through the diplomats of the Member State holding the rotating Presiden-
cy.175 The working group on external relations in the European Convention 
pointed out that too many spoke on behalf of the EU and that ‘in diplomacy a 
lot depended on trust and personal relationships’, which require a stable and 
coherent presence on the part of the Union.176 The purpose of this new treaty 
provision was to have ‘fewer Europeans and more EU’,177 e.g. a single diplo-
matic presence for the Union speaking on behalf of a single legal entity active 
globally. When Catherine Ashton took up her post as High Representative in 
December 2009, she said that the EU Delegations ‘should be a network that 
is the pride of Europe and the envy of the rest of the world’ and ‘a trusted and 
reliable ally on European issues’.178 Speaking on Europe Day 2011 she under-
lined this continued ambition, that the EEAS should be a ‘single platform to 
protect European values and interests around the world’, and ‘a one stop shop 
for our partners’.179 Implementing this ambition has meant that the former 
172 Article 3 (a) VCDR.
173 Articles 220 and 221 TFEU io Article 3 (5) and 21 (1) TEU.
174 Gatti and Manzini , op.cit, at 1704.
175 But see the EEAS document ‘EU Diplomatic Representation in Third Countries – First Half 
of 2012’, Council of the European Union, Doc. 18975/1/11, REV 1, 11 January 2012, which 
reveals that in some countries the EU is still represented by a Member State.
176 ‘The European Convention, Final report of Working Group VII on External Action’, CONV 
459/02, Brussels, 16 December 2002, 321.
177 A. Missiroli, ’The New EU Foreign Policy System After Lisbon: A Work in Progress’, Euro-
pean Foreign Affairs Review, 2010, pp. 427-452.
178 Catherine Ashton, ‘Quiet diplomacy will get our voice heard’, The Times, 17 December 
2009.
179 Catherine Ashton, ‘Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on Europe Day’, 
Brussels, 7 May 2011, A 177/11.
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‘Commission Delegations’ have been turned into ‘Union Delegations’180 and 
that for all practical diplomatic purposes they are seen as EU ‘embassies’.181 
In this respect, Heads of Delegations de facto act as ‘EU Ambassadors’,182 
with for example the letter of credence presented to President Obama by Mr 
Vale de Almeira opening with the words, ‘As I assume the role of the Europe-
an Union’s Ambassador and Head of Delegation to the United States [...]’.183 
The EU Heads of delegations representing the Union in third states and at 
international organisations are thus conferred the authority to perform func-
tions equivalent to those of national diplomats. In third states the EU aims at 
a status of the Heads of Delegation comparable to national Ambassadors and 
prefers to have them listed alongside the representatives of states rather than 
with the representatives of international organisations.184
Accreditation of EU Heads of Delegation largely follows the general rules 
of international diplomatic law. Yet, the presentation of the letters of cre-
dence reflects the complex and sensitive power sharing on the side of the 
EU: ‘on behalf of the European Council President Herman van Rompuy and 
Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, and under the authority of the 
High Representative Catherine Ashton […]’.185 In the reverse situation, the 
EU also continues the traditions of inter-state diplomacy: It is now President 
Van Rompuy who receives the letters of credence of the Heads of Missions 
 
 
180 European External Action Service, Report by the High Representative to the European Par-
liament, the Council and the Commission, 22 December 2011, 16 and see also F. Bergmüller, 
‘The EEAS: A Loss for the European Commission’s External Relations Capacities?’, in P. 
Quinn, (Ed.), ‘Making European Diplomacy Work: Can the EEAS Deliver?’, EU Diplomacy 
Papers 8/2011, Bruges/Natolin: College of Europe, 2011, pp. 14-18.
181 See also the view of the European Parliament: ‘The institutional aspects of setting up the 
European External Action Service’, European Parliament resolution of 22 October 2009 on 
the institutional aspects of setting up the European External Action Service (2009/2133(INI), 
Art. 6(e), OJ C-265 E/9, 30.9.2010; and J. Wouters and S. Duquet, ‘The EU and Interna-
tional Diplomatic Law: New Horizons?’, Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 2012, pp. 31-49.
182 J. Wouters and S. Duquet, op.cit., who point out that this is granted as a ‘courtesy title’ by 
receiving states.
183 See the introduction to the ‘Letter of Credentials from Ambassador Vale de Almeira to Pres-
ident of the United States Barack Obama’. An extract of the letter is available through the 
Press Release of the EU delegation to the United States, ‘New EU Ambassador presents his 
credentials’, EU/NR 35/10 (10 August 2012). See also F. Fenton, ‘EU Ambassadors: A New 
Creed?’, in Quinn (ed.), op.cit., pp. 26-30.
184 See K. Schmalenbach, ‘Die Delegationen der Europäischen Union in Drittländern und bei 
internationalen Organisationen’, Europarecht, Beiheft 2, 2012, pp. 205-215 at 212.
185 See the Statement of the Presentation of Credentials by Mr Gilles Hervio, Ambassador and 
Head of Delegation of the European Union to Zambia, 3.2.2011 (available at http://eeas.
europa.eu/delegations/zambia/press_corner/all_news/news/2011/20110128_02_en.htm) See 
more extensively: Schmalenbach, op.cit.
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to the European Union of third countries, accompanied with the usual (e.g. 
state-like) protocol and official photograph.186 
The transformation from Commission delegations into Embassies proper 
was not purely formal, but was in some cases accompanied by added powers 
to at least some of those representations abroad. While all 139 Commission 
delegations187 were transformed into EU delegations mere weeks after the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 54 were immediately transformed into 
‘EU embassies’ in all but name.188 This meant that these ‘super-missions’ 
were not merely given the new name, but also new powers in the form of an 
authorisation to speak for the entire Union (subject to approval from Brus-
sels); and the role to co-ordinate the work of the Member States’ bilateral 
missions. Prominent exclusions among those 54 delegations were those to 
international bodies, of which there are eight: New York (UN), Geneva (UN 
and WTO), Vienna (IAEA, UNODC, UNIDO, OSCE), Strasbourg (Council 
of Europe), Addis Abeba (African Union), Paris (UNESCO and OECD) and 
Rome (FAO, WFP, IFAD, Holy Sea, and Order of Malta). The Union still has 
to work out how to handle EU representation in multilateral forums under 
Lisbon.189 However, it is certainly the EU’s ambition to expand these pow-
ers ‘progressively’ to other EU delegations as well.190 This process can be 
followed in the regular reports on ‘EU Diplomatic Representation in Third 
Countries’ published by the Policy Coordination Division of the EEAS, and 
has been recently evaluated in the December 2011 report on one year of the 
186 European Council, the President, ‘Presentation of letters of credentials to President Van 
Rompuy’, EUCO 9/12 (Brussels, 18 January 2012). Here President Van Rompuy received 
the credentials of the Ambassadors of Saudi Arabia, Rwanda, FYROM, Malaysia, Colombia, 
Peru, Turkey and Afghanistan.
187 This is the latest number including the two newly opened delegations in Libya and South 
Sudan.
188 Andrew Rettman, ‘EU Commission “Embassies” Granted New Powers’, EU Observer, 21 
January 2010.
189 Ibid. Similarly, Andrew Rettman, ‘Ashton Designates Six New “Strategic Partners”’, EU 
Observer, 16 September 2010, quoting an EU official on the importance of the EEAS for the 
role of Catherine Ashton in external representation: ‘Lady Ashton has de facto 136 ambassa-
dors at her disposal’.
190 See for example: EEAS, ‘EU diplomatic representation in third countries – second half 
of 2011’, 11808/2/11 REV 2 (Brussels, 25 November 2011), and EEAS, ‘EU diplomatic 
representation in third countries – first half of 2012’, 18975/11 (Brussels, 22 December 
2011). These documents always start with two paragraphs quoting Article 221 TFEU and 
an excerpt from the Swedish Presidency report on the EEAS of 23 October 2009, which 
set out the Member States’ view on the scope of the EEAS in relation to the mandate of the 
High Representative. On that basis these reports continue by stating that the ‘responsibility 
of representation and coordination on behalf of the EU has been performed by a number of 
Union delegations as of 1 January 2010, or later’, and insofar as they have not taken over 
such functions, pre-Lisbon arrangements and the role of the Presidency continue to apply.
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EEAS. The latter report states that EU delegations ‘have progressively taken 
over the responsibilities held by the rotating presidency for the co-ordination 
of EU positions and demarches’.191 The report adds that this evolution has 
been a ‘mixed success’. It argues that the transition ‘has gone remarkably 
smoothly in bilateral delegations and has been welcomed by third countries’, 
though other reports are cautious.192 As regards EU representation in inter-
national organisations, the EEAS evaluation report states that ‘the situation 
has in general been more challenging in multilateral delegations … given the 
greater complexity of legal and competence issues’.193 
As far as the privileges and immunities of the delegation are concerned (see 
also below), Article 5(6) of the 2010 EEAS Decision provides:
The High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements 
with the host country, the international organisation, or the third coun-
try concerned. In particular, the High Representative shall take the 
necessary measures to ensure that host States grant the Union delega-
tions, their staff and their property, privileges and immunities equiva-
lent to those referred to in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
tions of 18 April 1961.
This implies that, again, the starting point is that the EU follows the rules for 
states, rather than the rules for international organisations. The ‘arrangement’ 
agreed on by the High Representative and the third state thus allows for a 
special position of the EU, which in most cases clearly differs from that of 
other international organisations.194
So far, the representation by the new EU delegations has largely followed the 
pre-Lisbon practice which was developed on the basis of the experience with 
the Commission delegations. Representation by the Union did not replace 
representation by the Member States. Indeed, as Article 5(9) of the EEAS 
Decision provides: ‘The Union delegations shall work in close cooperation 
and share information with the diplomatic services of the Member States.’
191 European External Action Service, ‘Report by the High Representative to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission’, 22 December 2011, 6.
192 Ibid., 7. Kaczynski reports that there have been problems there too: in Washington, some 
national ambassadors apparently did not show up for local coordination meetings for 
months: P.M. Kaczynski, ‘Swimming in Murky Waters: Challenges in Developing the EU’s 
External Representation’, FIIA Briefing Paper 88, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 
September 2011, 9.
193 European External Action Service, ‘Report by the High Representative to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission’, 22 December 2011, p. 8.
194 Cf. Schmalenbach, op.cit., at 213.
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Yet, ongoing budget cuts may trigger Member States to close some of their 
own representations and to rely more on the new ‘EU Embassies’. This may 
be unthinkable for most of the larger Member States at this moment, and the 
current EEAS legal regime does not yet include this option. Obviously, any 
transfer of powers will depend on the consent of the Member States, as they 
may have good reasons to continue a bilateral representation. After all, es-
sential elements of a relationship between a Member State and a third state 
may not be covered by the EU’s competences or a special relationship may 
exist between an EU state and a third country, either due to historical ties and/
or geographic location.195 Nevertheless, one medium-sized Member State has 
already openly discussed the possible benefits of a transfer of certain consular 
tasks and the collection of information to EU delegations.196
From the perspective of international law, ‘outsourcing’ of representation 
to an international organisation is not necessarily excluded. Apart from the 
internal division of competences, it remains difficult, however, to envisage 
the EU representing (one of) its Member States on bilateral issues. Strictly 
legally speaking, one may also wonder whether the EU delegations have been 
given the power to represent the Member States. Article 5(8) of the EEAS 
Decision merely allows the Head of Delegation ‘to represent the Union in 
the country where the delegation is accredited’. When we define the ‘Union’ 
as the organisation of which the Member States are members (and hence ex-
cluding the Member States themselves), representation would thus be limited 
to those issues falling within the EU’s competence.
6.2.2 Can the EU replace its Member States in diplomatic and  
  consular relations?
Traditionally, diplomatic relations are established between states and the 
legal framework is strongly state-oriented. As an international organisation 
enjoying international legal personality the EU may enter into legal relations 
with states and other international organisations. At the same time, as we 
have seen, its external competences are limited by the principle of conferral, 
and in many cases the EU is far from exclusively competent and shares its 
powers with the Member States. Indeed, the TEU mandates that ‘essential 
state functions’197 of the Member States are to be respected by the EU and it 
195 C. Cusens, ‘The EEAS vs. the National Embassies of EU Member States?’, in Quinn, op.cit., 
11-13 at 12.
196 See the report by the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs, ‘Nota modernisering Ned-
erlandse diplomatie’ (8 April 2011) at 10 and 18; available at http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/
documenten-en-publicaties/notas/2011/04/08/nota-modernisering-nederlandse-diplomatie.
html.
197 Cf. Art. 4(2) TEU.
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is in diplomatic relations in particular that one may come across these state 
functions.198 
An important role for diplomatic missions abroad, as described in Article 
3(1) VCDR, is to ‘Protect the interests of the sending state and its nationals 
in the receiving state – within the limits permitted by international law’.199 
There is a strong basis in the Treaties for EU ambitions on this front. Articles 
3(5) TEU and 23 TFEU together provide the basis for diplomatic protection 
and consular assistance to EU citizens.200 Article 3(5) TEU obliges the EU to 
protect the interests of its citizens abroad; and persons holding the nationality 
of a Member State are citizens of the Union (Article 20(1) TFEU). However, 
Member States are divided on how far the ambitions implementing these 
provisions would reach. In its most long-term version, if the Union were 
to achieve full diplomatic maturity, its most far-reaching implication might 
be that the EU would provide such protection as if they were ‘nationals of 
the EU’ for the purposes of international law. While Article 3(5) TEU could 
accommodate that interpretation, the role explicitly foreseen in the EEAS 
Decision for diplomatic protection and consular assistance by the EU does 
not, and, again, is merely supplementary:
The Union delegations shall, acting in accordance with the third para-
graph of Article 35 TEU, and upon request by Member States, support 
the Member States in their diplomatic relations and in their role of 
providing consular protection to citizens of the Union in third coun-
tries on a resource-neutral basis.201
Yet, in March 2011, the Commission published a ‘state-of-play’ document 
on this issue, asserting that ‘the need of EU citizens for consular protection 
is expected to increase in the coming years’.202 This does make sense, giv-
198 The EEAS Decision acknowledges this in Art. 5(9): ‘The Union delegations shall work in 
close cooperation and share information with the diplomatic services of the Member States’. 
See also B. Van Vooren, ‘A Legal-Institutional Perspective on the European External Actions 
Service’, Common Market Law Review, 2011, pp. 475-502, who points out that due to 
consistency obligations this should be read as a general obligation to cooperate between the 
EEAS and the national diplomatic services (at 497).
199 Article 3, (b) VCDR.
200 More specific rules as to the situations in which EDU citizens should be able to make use 
of this right were laid down in Decisions 95/533/EC, OJ EC L 314/73, 1995 and Decision 
96/409/CFSP, OJ EC L 168/4, 1996. A proposal for a new Council Directive replacing 
and updating these decisions was presented by the Commission on 14 December 2011 
(COM(2011) 881 final).
201 Art. 5(10) of the EEAS Decision.
202 ‘Consular protection for EU citizens in third countries: State of play and way forward’, 
Commission Communication, COM-2011, 23 March 2011, 149 final, section 2.3.
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en the fact that no less than 30 million EU citizens live in a third country 
and about 90 million foreign trips can be counted annually.203 It argued that 
‘[w]ith public budgets under pressure, the European Union and the Member 
States need to foster cooperation to optimise the effective use of resources.’204 
Some Member States have a strong interest in EU Delegations developing 
a capacity for consular support for EU citizens, whereas others are clearly 
opposed to the EU taking such a role, since they see this as a purely national 
competence.205 But even the Commission is ambiguous about the role of the 
EU delegations in this area. In a proposal for a new Council Directive on 
consular protection for citizens of the Union abroad,206 there is no clear dis-
tinct role for the Delegations and the focus remains on assistance by other 
Member States with a coordinating role for the EU Delegations, including in 
crisis situations.207
International law generally makes a distinction between consular assistance 
and diplomatic protection. Diplomatic protection ‘consists of the invocation 
by a State, through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement, 
of the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an internation-
ally wrongful act of that State to a natural or legal person that is a national 
of the former State with a view to the implementation of such responsibility.’ 
(Art. 1 of the 2006 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection). It is often con-
sidered to involve judicial proceedings, but protection of citizens may take 
different shapes, including the forceful protection by military missions.208 In-
terventions outside the judicial process on behalf of nationals (issuing pass-
ports, assisting in transnational marriages, etc.) are generally not regarded as 
constituting diplomatic protection but as falling under consular assistance.209 
It is consular assistance that EU citizens mostly seek when they are in a third 
country and in need of some administrative action, both in peace time and in 
203 E. Tichy-Fisslberger, ‘Der Schutz der EU-Bürger durch die diplomatischen und konsulari-
schen Vertretungsbehörden’, Europarecht, Beiheft 2, 2012, pp. 217-229 at 218.
204 ‘Consular protection for EU citizens in third countries: State of play and way forward’, 
op.cit.
205 European External Action Service, ‘Report by the High Representative to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission’, 22 December 2011, 7-8.
206 COM(2011) 881 final, 14 December 2011.
207 See also Tichy-Fisslberger, op.cit. at 228.
208 See for an example J. Larik, ‘Operation Atalanta and the Protection of EU Citizens: Civis 
Europaeus Unheeded?’, in J. Larik and M. Moraru (Eds.), Ever-Closer in Brussels – Ev-
er-Closer in the World? EU External Action after the Lisbon Treaty, EUI Working Paper 
LAW (2011/10), 129-144.
209 See A. Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection. The Fine Line between Litigation, 
Demarches and Consular Assistance’, Heidelberg Journal of International Law, 2006, pp. 
321-350.
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crisis situations.210 The need for diplomatic protection may arise when they 
run into legal troubles and a governmental intervention is requested. For the 
purpose of this paper it is not necessary to discuss the details of the distinc-
tion as we mainly aim to point to a general development, which indicates that 
the EU is increasingly involved in taking up these state functions.
Is it at all possible for the EU to play a state-like role in these matters? With 
the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, a European citizenship 
was created, and the ECJ even hinted at the idea of European citizenship be-
ing the primary identity of the nationals of the Member States.211 The Lisbon 
Treaty did not change this starting point. On the basis of Article 23 TFEU, EU 
citizens are entitled to protection by the diplomatic and consular authorities 
of all Member States if their own country has no representation.212 The expe-
riences since 1993 are somewhat mixed. ‘[…] some States consider that very 
little has changed since the adoption of this provision, while others are more 
enthusiastic about it’.213 This may be related to the somewhat ambiguous 
phrasing of Article 23, which regulates the protection of EU citizens by the 
diplomatic missions of other Member States. It has been noted that Article 23 
merely reflects a non-discrimination clause as it basically states that protec-
tion is to be provided ‘on the same conditions as the nationals of that state’. 
At the same time, the conclusion of international agreements is foreseen on 
the basis of which third states can accept protection and assistance by an 
EU Member State on behalf of nationals of another EU Member State. This 
practice has hardly been followed.214 The fact is that, apart from the treaty 
provisions, the EU itself seems to be well on its way to further developing 
its capacities in the area of consular assistance. As an answer to the differ-
ences between the 28 national legal frameworks on consular and diplomatic 
protection, a common EU legal framework may be developed.215 There are 
good reasons to believe that this development may have consequences for the 
210 M. Lindström, ‘EU Consular Protection in Crisis Situations’, in S. Olsen (Ed.), Crisis 
Management in the European Union: Cooperation in the Face of Emergencies, Berlin and 
Heidelberg: Springer, 2009, pp. 109-126.
211 Case 184/99, Grzelczyk. See more generally on European citizenship: J. Shaw, The Trans-
formation of Citizenship in the European Union. Electoral Rights and the Restructuring of 
Political Space, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
212 Cf. also Art. 46 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
213 See A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Where the Law Becomes Irrelevant: Consular Assistance and the 
European Union’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2011, pp. 965-995.
214 Ibid. at 970-971.
215 The Commission hinted at new legislative measures in ‘Consular Protection for EU 
Citizens in Third Countries: State of Play and Way Forward’, Commission Communica-
tion, COM(2011) 149 final, at 13, 23 March 2011. See also M. Moraru, ‘The Protection of 
Citizens in the World: A Legal Assessment of the EU Citizen’s Right to Protection Abroad’, 
in Larik and Moraru, op.cit., pp. 107-124, at 118.
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diplomatic services of the Member States and that traditional international 
law is being sidestepped.216 In that sense, Article 23 itself already forms a 
good example of a deviation from general international law, as it provides for 
the right of EU citizens to diplomatic and consular protection from Member 
States other than their State of nationality in the territory of a third country.217
One of the key problems is that the relevant international rules depart from 
the notion of ‘nationality’ defined as ‘the status of belonging to a state for 
certain purposes of international law’.218 Indeed, ‘the criterion of nationality 
helps to recognise the entity that is both competent and accountable to act in 
the name of individuals vis-à-vis third countries.’219 Diplomatic protection 
is closely related to nationality as, in principle, states can only protect their 
own nationals. In a classic case in 1937, the Permanent Court of International 
Justice argued: 
In taking up the case of one of its nationals […] a State is in reality 
exercising its own right […]. This right is necessarily limited to in-
tervention on behalf of its own nationals because, in the absence of a 
special agreement, it is the bond of nationality between the State and 
the individual which alone confers upon the State the right of diplo-
matic protection.220 
While, it may be easier for states to cooperate in consular matters, which are 
generally of a more administrative nature, Article 23 TFEU not only provides 
a right to EU citizens to consular protection, but also to diplomatic protec-
tion. Public international law academics would argue that it is in particular 
this dimension that cannot be established by the EU unilaterally, given the 
non-existence of the concept of ‘European nationality’. After all, the essential 
‘solid link’ between the intervening state and the protected citizen is miss-
ing. It has been argued, however, that the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection establish minimum standards under public international law which 
permit the States to go beyond these rules as long as they respect the condi-
tion of obtaining the express unanimous consent of all the States involved in 
216 Vermeer-Künzli, op.cit.
217 P. Vigni, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens: The Perspective of International Law’, in J. Larik 
and M. Moraru (Eds.), op.cit., at 92 and 101-102.
218 P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, Taylor & Francis, 2007, 
at 263. Cf. Art. 3 VCDR and Art. 5 VCCR.
219 Vigni, op.cit.
220 Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case, PCIJ Rep Series A/B No 76, 16 (1934). Also in the 
Nottebohm Case (Second Phase) International Court of Justice Rep 4, 22 (1955).
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the new model (both EU Member States and (at least implicitly also by) third 
states).221 It is true that the general international rules apply ‘in the absence of 
a special agreement’ and obviously third states can simply agree to allow for 
the protection by states or the EU of non-nationals. In any case, under inter-
national law, the consular protection of a citizen by another State requires the 
consent of the receiving State (Art. 8 of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (VCCR): ‘Upon appropriate notification to the receiving State, a 
consular post of the sending State may, unless the receiving State objects, 
exercise consular functions in the receiving State on behalf of a third State.’)
Allowing the European Union to protect the nationals of its Member States 
would thus be a new step. As third states are not bound by EU law they will 
have to recognise European citizenship to allow the EU to protect or assist 
its citizens abroad.222 The EU does not yet have competences in this area, but 
the Commission has been quite clear on its ambitions: ‘In the longer term, 
the Commission will also consider the possibility of obtaining the consent of 
third countries to allow the Union to exercise its protection through the Com-
mission delegations’.223 Article 23 TFEU, which now only allows Member 
States to protect EU citizens with the nationality of another Member State, 
would then be a first step in a development towards the recognition of a role 
of the EU itself.224 
It is difficult to envisage cases in which the EU itself would have a reason 
to protect EU citizens abroad. The Commission mentions the case in which 
EU citizens are not represented and may be in need of a ‘portal’ for further 
assistance.225 Another situation may be when the protection of an EU citizen 
is required on the basis of an agreement that was concluded between the EU 
and a third state.226 One may expect the EU Delegations to play a role in these 
situations in the future, but the extent to which the delegations can actually 
take up diplomatic and consular tasks ultimately depends on agreements that 
are to be concluded with the third countries. It has been noted that Member 
States will most probably not be too eager to hand over powers in this area to 
the EEAS and that a revised version of the 2010 EEAS Decision will not re-
221 See Moraru, op.cit., at 122.
222 Vigni, op.cit., at 92.
223 See ‘Effective Consular Protection in Third Countries: The Contribution of the European 
Union’, Commission Action Plan 2007–2009, COM(2007)767, 5 December 2007, final, at 
10.
224 A. Ianniello Saliccti, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens Abroad: Accountability, Rule of Law, 
Role of Consular and Diplomatic Services’, European Public Law, 2011, p. 91.
225 See ‘Effective Consular Protection in Third Countries’, op.cit., section 3.3.2.
226 A case in point was Case C-293/95 Odigitra AAE v. Council and Commission.
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veal any innovations in this respect. Yet, the European integration process has 
its own dynamic and Member States are also known to be pragmatic (in par-
ticular in times of (financial) crisis); coordination by the EU Delegations and 
a foreseen harmonisation of the diverging rules on the protection of nation-
als227 may gradually lead to an increased role for the delegations in practice.
A final note concerns nationals of third states seeking diplomatic asylum at 
an EU Delegation. Where diplomatic and consular protection is aimed at a 
states’ own nationals, diplomatic asylum may be requested by third country 
nationals in need of immediate protection. With the coming of age of the EU 
Delegations and their visible presence all around the world in crisis situa-
tions, the question of whether the EU is allowed to grant diplomatic asylum 
becomes more apparent. On the basis of the ‘arrangements’ between the High 
Representative and the third state, the premises of the mission shall be invio-
lable and the agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the 
consent of the head of the mission (Art. 22(1) VCDR). In practical terms this 
will allow the Head of the Delegation to provide physical protection to any-
one present at the premises. In the absence of special provisions in the agree-
ment with the third state the legal situation remains unclear, as domestic laws 
may conflict with the EU agreement as well as with other international legal 
instruments that may be applicable, such as human rights conventions.228
Despite its new ambitions, the EU will have a long way to go before it can ac-
tually take the place of its Member States in diplomatic and consular affairs. 
Internally, Member States will have to agree on a transfer of competences in 
this area, and it seems unlikely that many Member States would willingly 
outsource elements of the very fundamentals of being a state. Yet, they have 
been willing to do so in other areas and further developments in the EU (for 
instance related to a common asylum policy) may simply make it more prac-
tical for the EU to handle, for instance, some of the consular tasks.
However, it will be difficult to go beyond this in the short term. Whereas we 
have seen a pragmatic acceptance of a ‘contracting in’ strategy by the EU 
in the area of diplomatic representation (allowing for instance for Heads of 
Delegations to be accepted alongside states’ ambassadors), the diplomatic 
227 As was announced in Commission Communication (2011), op.cit. See also Moraru, op.cit.
228 For the United States this formed a reason to demand a special provision in the UN Head-
quarters Agreement (Art. III, Section 9(b)), on the basis of which the UN ‘shall prevent the 
headquarters district from becoming a refuge either for persons who are avoiding arrest 
under the federal, state, or local law of the United States or are required by the Government 
of the United States for extradition to another country, or for persons who are endeavouring 
to avoid service of legal process.’
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and consular protection of citizens is too much related to the notion of ‘na-
tionality’. As one author noted: 
EU citizenship has not yet acquired the status of nationality (or of a 
similarly solid link) at international level, so as to justify the inter-
vention of any Member State for the protection of any EU citizen, 
regardless of his/her nationality. One cannot deny that, in recent years, 
there seems to be a development of the idea that a solid link may also 
exist between an EU citizen and his/her Member State of residence. 
However, international law does not seem to have recognised the le-
gitimacy of these new developments occurring within the EU legal 
system.229
The practical implication is that third states will have to accept that the EU 
acts on behalf of its citizens. At the same time, the EU Member States do 
not seem to be willing to give up their traditional competences in this area: 
‘consular protection is an area of Member State competence and Member 
State competence solely’.230 As a consequence, ‘[r]ather than a zero-sum rela-
tionship, Member States and the EU as a collective foreign policy actor may 
operate along-side, across and in tandem with one another’.231 While this may 
offer a solution for the short term, the EU’s ambitions seem to go beyond a 
mere coordinating role. International law does not per se block a further de-
velopment of the EEAS (and its Delegations) in the area of diplomatic and 
consular protection, but further steps will not only have to be accepted by the 
EU Member States, but obviously also by third states (on the basis of bilat-
eral agreements). It may be assumed that in the years to come a pragmatic 
acceptance of a new role of the EU will have an impact on the interpretation 
and perhaps even on the nature of international (diplomatic) law as primarily 
inter-state law.
6.2.3 EU/Member State representation at international   
 institutions
Because of the succession of the European Community by the European Un-
ion, the Lisbon Treaty also changed the representation and participation of 
the EU and its Member States in other international institutions. Over the 
years the EU has obtained a formal position in some international institutions, 
229 Vignu, op.cit., at 102.
230 Lindsröm, op.cit. at 122.
231 J. Bátora and B. Hocking, ‘Bilateral Diplomacy in the European Union: Towards “Post-mod-
ern” Patterns?’, Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, The Hague: Clingendael Institute 2008, p. 
6. 
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either as a full member or as an observer. It is generally held that participation 
in a formal international organisation relates to the participation in its organs; 
i.e. the right to attend the meetings, being elected for functions in the organ 
and exercising voting and speaking rights. In that sense the term ‘position’ is 
related to a formal influence on the output of the international organisation: 
decisions (often recommendations, in some occasions binding decisions) and 
conventions (international agreements prepared and adopted by an organ of 
an international organisation). In addition the EU participates in less formal 
international institutions (or regimes). The Lisbon Treaty heralds an increase 
of the engagement of the EU in other international institutions, including 
the future membership of additional international organisations such as the 
Council of Europe (Art. 6 TEU). In all these cases, not only the EU’s own 
competences define its possibilities, but also the question of whether interna-
tional rules (mostly laid down in the constituent documents of international 
organisations or in other multilateral treaties) allow for the participation of 
the EU.
The EU is a full member of a limited number of international organisations 
only, including the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), the European Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment (EBRD), Eurocontrol, the Energy Commission, the Codex Ali-
mentarius Commission and the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law. In addition it is also a de facto member of the World Customs Organiza-
tion (WCO), and also its participation in the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) comes quite close to full membership. 
The OECD argues that ‘this participation goes well beyond that of a mere 
observer, and in fact gives the Commission quasi-Member status’ (www.
oecd.org), despite the more modest formal arrangement that the European 
Commission ‘shall take part in the work’ of the OECD (Art. 13 of the 1960 
Paris Convention in conjunction with Protocol 1). In 2013 the EU joined the 
Organization on International Carriage by Rail (OTIF).
Full participation is also possible in the case of treaty-regimes. Thus the EU 
(as such) has joined (or signed) a number of UN Conventions, including the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the UN Convention 
against Corruption, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. The North-
west Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) reveals that it is even possible 
for the EU to become a member of a treaty regime without its Member States 
themselves being members.
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Observer status implies that the EU can attend meetings of a body or an 
organisation, but without voting rights. Furthermore, the presence of an ob-
server can be limited to formal meetings only, after all formal and informal 
consultations haven been conducted with members and relevant parties. In 
addition, formal interventions may only be possible at the end of the inter-
ventions of formal participants, which may have an effect on the political 
weight of the EU.232 In areas where the EU does have formal competences, 
but where the statutes of the particular international institution do not allow 
for EU membership, this may lead to a complex form of EU involvement. A 
good example is formed by the International Labor Organization (ILO). The 
1919 ILO Constitution does not allow for the membership of international 
organizations. The existence of European Community competences in the 
area of social policy nevertheless called for its participation in ILO Confer-
ences. The Community was officially granted observer status in 1989. The 
observer status allows the EU (represented by the Commission) to speak and 
participate in ILO Conferences, to be present at the meeting of the Commit-
tees of the Conference and to participate in discussions there. The status also 
allows for presence at the ILO Governing Body, where the Commission may 
participate in the Plenary as well as in the committees. However, it cannot 
become a party to any of the ILO Conventions.233 This complex division of 
powers between the EU and its Member States in the ILO was addressed by 
the Court in Opinion 2/91. 
This complexity has become more general given the increased activities of 
the EU in international institutions. Third states are not always are pleased 
with the turf battles that may occur when the EU and its Member States fight 
for what they see as the politically correct way to present a Union position.
On the basis of Article 27(2) TEU, the EU High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy has been given a special role and ‘shall represent 
the Union for matters relating to the common foreign and security policy. 
He shall conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf 
and shall express the Union’s position in international organisations and at 
international conferences.’ As we have seen, however, in many areas Member 
States enjoy individual competences in international institutions. Yet, they 
do have an obligation to coordinate their positions (under the guidance of 
232 F. Hoffmeister and P.J. Kuijper, ‘The States of the European Union at the United Nations: 
Institutional Ambiguities and Political Realities’, in F. Hoffmeister, J. Wouters and T. Ruys 
(Eds), The United Nations and the European Union: an Ever Stronger Partnership, The 
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, pp. 9-34.
233 R. Delarue, ‘ILO-EU Cooperation on Employment and Social Affairs’, in Hoffmeister, 
Wouters and Ruys (eds.), op.cit., pp. 93-115 at 102.
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the High Representative) and once there is a Union position, the High Rep-
resentative or Member States present will have to uphold the Union position 
(Article 34(1)).
In fact, effective multilateralism to a large extent depends on the (coordinat-
ed) actions of the Member States. This explains, for instance, why the Treaty 
stresses the obligations of Member States to uphold the Union’s positions in 
international organisations and at international conferences where not all the 
Member States participate. The need for coordination between the EU and 
its Member States (and their diplomatic missions and delegations) in interna-
tional organisations returns in the obligation for the diplomatic missions of 
the Member States and the Union delegations to cooperate and to contribute 
to formulating and implementing a common approach (Articles 32 and 35 
TEU). Interestingly enough, the Treaty for the first time also mentions ‘Union 
delegations in third countries and at international organizations’ which shall 
represent the EU (Article 221 (1) TFEU).234 
Indeed, the unified diplomatic presence for the EU in multilateral fora post-
Lisbon has so far proven highly problematic, in spite of the TFEU’s specific 
legal obligation in its Article 220 (1) TFEU, which requires that the EU ‘shall 
establish all appropriate forms of cooperation’ with various international or-
ganisations including, but not limited to (Article 220 (2) TFEU), the UN, the 
Council of Europe, the OSCE and the OECD. On the basis of this provision, 
the EU has already begun to implement its ambitions in terms of presence in 
multilateral fora.
The saga of speaking rights at the UN General Assembly and EU participa-
tion in the UN concluded in May 2011 reflected the tensions between the 
need of the EU to be able to have a separate visibility and the unwillingness 
of many third states to accommodate this new situation. Over the years, em-
pirical political studies have revealed the difficulties of presenting a common 
EU position in the UN General Assembly. It has been noted that ‘national 
interest [drives] the policies of the EU countries and the processes within the 
234 However, Member States seem to be somewhat anxious about the developments in this area. 
In a special declaration to the Treaty (No. 13) they stated the following: ‘[…] the creation 
of the office of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
and the establishment of an External Action Service, do not affect the responsibilities of 
the Member States, as they currently exist, for the formulation and conduct of their foreign 
policy nor of their national representation in third countries and international organisations.’ 
This declaration underlies the tension between, on one hand, the need to coordinate positions 
in international organisations and where possible have these presented by an EU represen-
tative and, on the other hand, the wish of many member states to maintain their own visible 
presence in international institutions.
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CFSP at the UN. In New York, the CFSP-regime is simply an instrument for 
intergovernmental dealings between the EU MS […] There is little room for 
a single European voice on the East River, i.e. for a truly common foreign 
policy.’235 
The recent attempts to upgrade the position of the EU to a ‘full participant’ 
with full rights to speak and make proposals met with opposition in the UN 
General Assembly.236 The EU first sought to upgrade its observer status at the 
UN at the General Assembly meeting in September 2010, but after a much 
publicised failure only managed to do so by May 2011.237 Even more diffi-
cult would be to set national sentiments aside in the UN Security Council. 
Nevertheless, a specific provision aims to ensure that CFSP outcomes are 
also taken into account by EU members in the UN Security Council (Article 
32(2) TEU). Moreover, the Treaty allows for the possibility that the Union’s 
position is not presented by one of the EU Member States, but by the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy. In that case the 
Member States that sit on the Security Council shall forward a request to 
that end to the Security Council. Given the traditionally sensitive nature of 
the special position of (in particular the permanent) members of the Security 
Council, this provision can certainly be seen as a further step in facilitating 
the EU to speak with one voice. Obviously, the ultimate decision to accept 
a presentation by the High Representative lies in the hands of the Security 
Council.
One particular situation is pointed to by Article 218(9) TFEU, on the basis of 
which the Council may, inter alia, adopt a decision establishing the positions 
to be adopted on the Union’s behalf in an international organisation. In 2012 
this article was used by the Council as a basis for a Decision ‘establishing the 
position to be adopted on behalf of the European Union with regard to certain 
regulations to be voted in the framework of the International Organisations 
for Vine and Wine’ (IOVW).238 While the Council may indeed adopt a deci-
sion to establish the Union’s position in an international organisation, in the 
235 See for instance M.B. Rasch, The European Union at the United Nations: The Functioning 
and Coherence of EU External Representation in a State-centric Environment, Leiden/Bos-
ton: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008, p. 301
236 M. Emerson and J. Wouters (2010), ‘The EU’s Diplomatic Debacle at the UN: and Now 
What?’, European Voice, 23 September 2010.
237 See Catherine Ashton, ’Statement by the High Representative following her call with UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’, A 162/10 (Brussels 18 August 2010), and Catherine 
Ashton, ’Statement by the High Representative on the adoption of the UN General Assembly 
Resolution on the EU’s participation in the work of the UN’, A 172/11, Brussels, 3 May 
2011.
238 Council Document No 11436, 2012.
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case of the IOVW, the EU itself is not a member. Germany therefore argued 
that Article 218(9) TFEU was the incorrect legal basis for the adoption of the 
decision. Article 218(9) concerns in the first instance only the adoption of the 
positions of the EU in bodies, set up by international agreements, of which 
the EU is a member. According to Germany, Article 218(9) cannot however 
be applied in relation to the representation of the Member States in bodies of 
international organisations in which only the Member States participate by 
virtue of separate international treaties. Second, Article 218(9) covers only 
‘acts having legal effects’, meaning acts binding under international law. 
IOVW resolutions are however not acts in that sense.239
This case reflects the tension that may occur in relation to the question who 
may speak on behalf of the EU. With the EU wishing to establish its unified 
substantive diplomatic presence in multilateral fora, for some Member States 
– the UK notably – it has become problematic that the EU’s legal personality 
is now explicitly recognised by the Treaty (Article 47 TEU). While prior to 
the Lisbon Treaty the EU did already conclude many international agreements 
and could thus be argued to possess implicit legal personality, the ‘politically 
constructive ambiguity’ of ‘European Union’ allowed this label to function 
as a political umbrella term referring to the EC and its Member States. The 
fact that now Article 47 TEU explicitly gives legal personality to the EU 
has prompted the UK to deploy the argument that the terminology ‘EU’ can 
no longer be utilised to designate ‘EC and its Member States’ when deliv-
ering statements on behalf of the EU in multilateral fora.240 The UK argues 
that because the Union’s legal personality has explicitly been recognised, 
‘EU’ has become a purely legal concept. Therefore, it allegedly can no longer 
serve to represent areas covered both by EU and Member State competences 
as that might lead to a shift of competence to the Union. The Commission 
and several Member States strongly opposed this reasoning, which brought 
to a halt formal ‘EU’ representation in multilateral fora such as the OSCE 
and UN during the second half of 2011. During that time, several dozen EU 
statements and demarches were blocked over deep disagreement as to who 
delivers the statement: ‘the European Union’ or ‘the European Union and its 
Member States’. A temporary cease-fire, though not a permanent solution, 
was agreed on 24 October 2011 in the form of a document entitled ‘general 
arrangements for EU statements’.241 Through this document the EU wishes 
239 See Case C-399/12 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Council of the European Union (judg-
ment expected in 2013).
240 R.A. Wessel and B. Van Vooren, ‘The EEAS’ Diplomatic Dreams and the Reality of Interna-
tional and European Law’, op.cit, at 4.
241 Council of the European Union, ’General Arrangements for EU Statements in Multilateral 
Organisations’, 16901/11, Brussels, 24 October 2011.
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to keep competence battles ‘internal and consensual’242 so that the EU may 
achieve ‘coherent, comprehensive and unified external representation’ in 
multilateral organisations. However, the time and effort spent on minutiae 
in Council Conclusions no less (‘EU representation will be exercised from 
behind an EU nameplate’243) shows how difficult it still is to achieve the am-
bition of the EU to be a diplomatic actor exhibiting these three qualities. 
Notably, the arrangement expresses a rather rigid interpretation of ‘interna-
tional unity’ focusing on form rather than substance. This because it requires 
that each statement made in a multilateral organisation requires tracing who 
is competent for which area, and to ensure that the internal division of com-
petences is adequately reflected externally, namely on the statement’s cover 
page and in the body of the text. 
The point made by the UK – the EU is the name of the organisation of which 
the Member States are members and can therefore not include those Member 
States – seems legally correct. Yet, in practice the debates do not strengthen 
the diplomatic power of the EU as a cohesive force in multilateral diplomacy 
relations with the substance of the single message being of central impor-
tance. Time must now tell whether the EU, its own Member States, third 
states and other international organisations will be able to find ways to take 
the changing role of the EU as an independent international legal actor into 
account.
6.3 The European Union’s extra-territorial immunity
Although the ‘privileges and immunities’ form a classic theme in the law of 
international organisations,244 studies on the immunities of the EU are very 
hard to find.245 Yet, with the new post-Lisbon global ambitions of the EU, the 
classic institutional law theme of the immunities deserves to be addressed in 
the context of the EU as well.246 After all, the more active the EU becomes in 
relation to non-EU states, the higher the chance that legal disputes will arise.
242 Ibid., 2.
243 Ibid., 3.
244 See for instance P.H. Bekker, The Legal Position of International Governmental Organi-
zations – A Functional Necessity Analysis of their Legal Status and Immunities, Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994; A. Reinisch, International Organizations before National 
Courts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
245 With some exceptions in the francophone academic community, including M. Benlo-
lo-Carabot, ‘Les immunités de l’Union européenne dan les États tiers’, Annuaire français 
de droit international, 2009, pp. 783-818; and S. Barbier and M. Cuq, ‘Les immunités de 
l’Union européenne’, in Benlolo-Carabot, op.cit., pp. 407-427.
246 More extensively: R.A. Wessel, ‘The Immunities of the European Union’, International Or-
ganizations Law Review, 2013 (forthcoming). Parts of this section return in that publication.
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Article 343 TFEU provides for the regulation of privileges and immunities 
in the Member States. A similar provision can be found in Article 191 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Eur-
atom), an international organisation that is part of the EU family and shares 
its institutions. Yet, in this report we are more interested in the immunities 
the EU may enjoy under international law or in non-Member States. Rules on 
immunities allow international organisations to fulfil their objectives without 
running the risk of being tried before foreign courts. In the case of the EU, 
a special Protocol annexed to the Lisbon Treaty forms the backbone of the 
EU’s legal regime in this area.247 It inter alia deals with the inviolability of 
the premises and buildings of the Union, with tax issues, customs duties, 
and prohibitions and restrictions on imports and exports in respect of articles 
intended for its official use. In addition, rules are included on the treatment 
of diplomatic missions, with special privileges for members of the European 
Parliament, with the privileges, immunities and facilities of Representatives 
of Member States taking part in the work of the institutions of the Union, 
and with privileges for officials and other servants of the Union in the ter-
ritories of the Member States. In addition to the rules on the privileges and 
immunities, the EU Treaty contains quite extensive rules on contractual and 
non-contractual claims. Irrespective of the general rules on immunities, the 
Union thus a priori accepts that it can be confronted with claims. On the basis 
of Article 340 TFEU, the contractual liability of the EU shall be governed by 
the law applicable to the contract in question. 
The extensive rules on claims and in particular on the (exclusive) role of the 
CJEU in dealing with those claims underlines the special nature of the EU in 
this respect. Whereas most international organisations lack a judicial forum 
for individuals to bring claims, the EU’s well-developed legal order allows 
any natural or legal person (whatever his nationality or residence) to institute 
proceedings against a decision addressed to him or which is of direct and 
individual concern. On the basis of Articles 263 and 265 TFEU, the CJEU 
can decide on the legality of acts of the European institutions that produce 
legal effects (or can establish a failure to act). Whereas the Court thus serves 
as a judicial forum for both EU Member States and their citizens and legal 
persons, its jurisdiction is limited by the Treaties. With respect to the Union’s 
external relations, the most important exception concerns (most) acts adopted 




247 Protocol No. 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union.
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security and defence policy (CSDP) (Articles 24 (1) TEU and 275 TFEU; see 
supra).248 
More important perhaps, from the perspective of the current report, is the 
specific regulation of the EU’s immunities in the international agreements 
concluded between the EU and a third state or other international organi-
sation. The two most important types of agreements are agreements on the 
establishment of a Union Delegation in a third state or at an international 
organisation; and status of forces/mission agreements (SOFAs and SOMAs) 
in the area of the CSDP.
With regard to lawsuits in third countries, practice offers a variety of different 
situations ranging from traffic incidents involving EU delegation staff (where 
in each case the EU examines whether to lift immunity or not for the pur-
pose of local proceedings) to criminal proceedings against an international 
contracted staff member of an EU mission, where the local authorities put 
the person in question in prison, in clear violation of the relevant provisions 
of the Status of Mission Agreement (but where the host country reminded 
the EU that the SOMA also calls for mission staff to respect local laws and 
where the staff member could only be released after some diplomatic effort), 
or the question of whether an employment contract with local personnel was 
concluded by the Head of Delegation in his private or official capacity.249
Indeed, lawsuits are brought before foreign local jurisdictions against the 
organisation itself or against EU staff. Similarly, the addressees of judicial 
documents can vary: some are directed against the EU as an organisation and/
or against the European Commission as an institution, and/or against the EU 
delegation in a third country, or even against named Commission staff work-
ing in such delegations. In many instances the lawsuits relate to claims of pri-
vate parties concerning the execution of programmes of financial and techni-
cal assistance, which the EU provides to non-EU countries. In such cases the 
EU can often rely on express provisions regarding jurisdictional immunity 
laid down in agreements with the host state regarding the establishment of 
the EU Delegation and in the relevant framework agreement concluded by 
248 Cf. M. Brkan, ‘The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Field of Common Foreign 
and Security Policy after the Treaty of Lisbon: New Challenges for the Future’, in Cardwell, 
op.cit, at 97-115.
249 The analysis in this section is (admittedly sometimes literally) based on information pro-
vided by the European Commission in an informal note published in March 2010 (available 
online at http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/cahdi/Source/state_immunities/EU%20Immunities.
pdf) as well as on discussions with colleagues at the legal services of the EU Institutions and 
bodies.
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the EU with the beneficiary non-EU state regarding the provision of financial 
and technical assistance. 
An example is the ruling of an Israeli court related to ‘commercial activities’ 
of the European Commission. The Jerusalem Magistrate’s Court dismissed 
a civil complaint against the European Commission filed by two plaintiffs 
following a public tender for the supply of trucks, tractors and waste disposal 
equipment for an area in the Palestinian Authority. The court opined that un-
der Israeli law the European Commission is immune to the lawsuit because 
it is ‘an international organization’ [sic] recognised by Israel under a 1992 
Decree of the Israeli Foreign Minister. In relation to the commercial nature of 
the issue, the appeal court held that 
In this matter, publishing a public tender seeking bids to perform work 
does indeed contain elements of a contract, which is private law. How-
ever, we should remember that the petitioner [the European Commis-
sion] is not a sovereign state but an international organization with 
certain goals. Publishing the tender and the performance of the works 
constitute expression and materialization of these goals. Therefore, 
the acts of the petitioner must be regarded as being within the public-
governmental authority of the petitioner, and therefore it is entitled to 
immunity.
It has been argued that if the European Commission were a sovereign state, 
it is likely that the lawsuit would proceed to a hearing on its merit, because 
sovereign immunity in Israel excludes commercial transactions. However, 
on the basis of customary international law ‘recognized organizations’ were 
said to enjoy an almost absolute immunity, covering commercial activities.250
The general starting point is that the EU invokes immunity in cases where 
the organisation itself is being sued. This means that unless the Union has 
expressly waived its immunity, it should be exempted from the local jurisdic-
tion of municipal, judicial or administrative authorities and therefore should 
not be subject to suits, claims or enforcement proceedings in these domestic 
forums. Despite its frequent claim that it should not be equated with other 
international organisations, it is interesting to note that in these cases the EU 
often uses the argument that as an ‘international organisation’ its claim to 
250 See H. Carmon, ‘A Jerusalem Court Ruling: The European Commission Is Immune to a 
Commercial Lawsuit’, DIPLAW: Diplomatic / Consular Law and Sovereign Immunity in Is-
rael and World Wide, 2009, available at http://diplomaticlaw.com/blog/2009/03/a-jerusalem-
court-ruling-the-european-commission-is-immune-to-a-commercial-lawsuit/. The author 
acted as a representative of the European Commission in this matter.
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jurisdictional immunity is based on the rule of general (customary) interna-
tional law which recognises that, like States, international organisations are 
exempted from the local jurisdiction of municipal judicial or administrative 
authorities and therefore are not subject to suits, claims or enforcement pro-
ceedings in domestic forums. The immunity invoked is based on the principle 
of functionality: i.e., immunity encompasses all acts needed for the execution 
of the official functions and activities of the organisation. Therefore, the fore-
going applies, in the view of the European Commission, even in the absence 
of express provisions laid down in international treaties and even when not 
expressly provided for in municipal law.
It is interesting to note how readily the Commission relies on customary in-
ternational law as a basis for the immunities of the EU. Apart from the fact 
that in many other occasions the Union continues to stress its sui generis 
nature in comparison to other international organisations, there is simply no 
extensive practice on which the claim can easily be based.251 Practice reveals 
that in local court cases, the EU frequently refers to the 1961 Vienna Con-
vention on Diplomatic Relations in arguments to support the immunity of its 
diplomats and staff members, despite the fact that the EU itself is not a party 
to the Convention.252
No case is known in which non-EU courts have pronounced expressly on 
questions relating to the jurisdictional immunity of the EU. Put differently, 
there is no indication that there is a single instance in which a non-EU court 
has denied the jurisdictional immunity of the European Union (or its prede-
cessor, the European Community) from legal process. One reason may be 
that – as noted above – the EU’s legal system provides alternative remedies to 
which parties that have claims against it can have recourse. These alternative 
remedies are available irrespective of the nationality of the party concerned 
and irrespective of where the challenged EU activity took place.
251 See also Benlolo-Carabot, op.cit. at 802: ‘La pratique n’est évidemment pas suffisante pour 
conclure à une immunité de […] l’Union sur une base coutumière.’
252 Based on discussions with EU staff members and legal documents seen by the author.
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7 Conclusions
The primary aim of the present report was to analyse the ways in which 
the EU interacts with international law from the perspective of the changes 
brought about by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty and to make this analysis accessible 
to a wider audience of both lawyers and non-lawyers. It was argued that in 
the post-Lisbon era in particular, the emerging picture reflects a struggle by 
the EU to further develop its ‘international actorness’, while being restrained 
by both the principle of the conferral of competences (on the basis of which 
the Union only has those competences which have been conferred upon it) 
and by the necessity to follow the rules of international law. We referred to 
the relationship between the EU and the international legal order as ‘the third 
dimension’ of legal relations (after the classical relationships between the 
States and international law and between the Member States and the EU). 
This third dimension is characterised not only by many different ‘encounters’ 
between the EU and international law, but also by a complex division of 
competences between the Union and its Member States or even a loss of for-
mer sovereign international competences (for instance, in the important area 
of international trade and in the future, perhaps, of diplomatic and consular 
powers). 
It was claimed that the EU should be seen as an international organisation, 
albeit a very special one. The explicit codification of the Union’s legal per-
sonality by the Lisbon Treaty testifies to this. At the same time the classic 
notion of the ‘autonomy’ of the European legal order vis-à-vis international 
law proves to be ambiguous. The EU struggles with its wish to uphold its 
own constitutional values (as for instance reflected in the Kadi cases) and 
the global ambitions laid down more explicitly in the Lisbon Treaty. These 
ambitions call for a clearer and extended international role of the EU as such, 
which in turn confronts the organisation with an increasing number of ex-
isting international rules. As we have seen, the EU will have to abide by the 
international legal regimes on, inter alia, international treaty law, internation-
al (diplomatic) representation, international responsibilities and international 
immunities. Yet the many encounters between the EU and international law 
underline the special nature of this international organisation: in many cases 
the international rules that were made for states are more applicable to the EU 
than the rules on international organisations.
In a legal sense, the interaction between the EU and international law is per-
haps best reflected in the fact that the EU concludes international agreements. 
While the preparatory Intergovernmental Conference leading up to the Lis-
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bon Treaty made some attempts to draft a so-called ‘Kompetenz-Katalog’, 
the Treaty in the end merely refers to broad areas to delimit the competences 
of the Union and its Member States. At the same time, the Lisbon Treaty 
codified the ‘ERTA principle’, on the basis of which the internal division of 
competences mutatis mutandis applies to the external relations. Yet, the cur-
rent procedure to negotiate and conclude international agreements continues 
to reveal the different interests of the Union and the Member States: while 
for reasons of consistency (and perhaps political weight) it would make sense 
for the Union to take the lead, Member States are not fully ready to give up 
their own position in the international order. A prime example is the WTO, an 
organisation of which all EU Member States are also members, despite the 
fact that virtually all competences in that area have by now been transferred 
to the EU. Indeed, ‘mixed agreements’ are still a part of the everyday life 
of the EU and from an international law perspective the question has arisen 
of the extent to which non-EU states need to be aware of the complex and 
dynamic division of competences between the EU and its Member States. In 
that sense it can be seen as a missed opportunity that the Lisbon Treaty has 
not been able to create a ‘portal’ function for the EU, to allow third states and 
other international organisations to deal with one actor only – allowing the 
EU, in turn, to settle matters internally.
This is not to say that internally the EU is immune from international law. 
The moment the EU is bound by an international rule, this may have an ef-
fect not only on the way it handles matters internally, but also on the rights 
of individuals and companies. The Court of Justice has always been quite 
clear that international agreements form an integral part of EU law. In return, 
the EU rules may affect non-EU actors, as for instance reflected in the recent 
case on EU rules on CO
2
 emissions that are binding on foreign airlines fly-
ing to and from EU airports. While the CJEU in the Kadi cases (including its 
2013 final judgment) clarified the relationship between international law and 
(constitutional) EU law, the fact remains that the issue has not been settled 
well by the Treaty. This should not come as a surprise: from the perspective 
of international law, the EU should simply live up to the international rules to 
which it is bound; from the perspective of EU law, however, it is difficult to 
set aside principles of EU law (including fundamental rights or key principles 
of the internal market) which are sometimes considered to be based on higher 
standards.
The Lisbon Treaty does not seem to have solved the key problems in EU ex-
ternal relations: the need for coherence (both within the organisational struc-
ture and in relation to the Member States), the complex division of external 
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competences, and the hierarchy between EU and international law. Never-
theless, the treaty potentially contributes to a more coherent EU approach 
to international norms. The new procedures on the conclusion of interna-
tional agreements, the establishment of new institutional structures (such as 
the EEAS) and the new international orientation of the EU all form building 
blocks for a new and more unified structure. Yet, perhaps the best way to im-
prove things would be for non-EU states and other international organisations 
to take a clear stance on how they wish the EU to behave externally. It is no 
less than surprising that the entire world continues to accept being confronted 
with an unclear and constantly changing division of competences, with courts 
not in agreement on whether or not the EU should follow international rules 
and with EU and Member States’ delegations constantly quarrelling over 
speaking rights and representation in international organisations. A successor 
treaty to ‘Lisbon’ should take these issues into account and should allow the 
EU to function as a portal for external parties.
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8 Sammanfattning på svenska
Trots sitt juridiska perspektiv har den här rapporten som mål att på ett lät-
tillgängligt sätt göra det möjligt att förstå hur EU-rätt och internationell rätt 
”möts” i den situation som råder efter Lissabonfördragets ikraftträdande. EU 
anses ofta vara en unik (sui generis) organisation, men utan internationell 
rätt hade EU inte existerat och Europeiska utrikestjänsten (EEAS) hade inte 
kunnat genomföra de så kallade yttre åtgärderna. Lissabonfördraget, som 
trädde i kraft 2009, förstärkte ytterligare EU:s position i den globala rättsliga 
och politiska ordningen, men EU är  inte den enda internationella aktören i 
Europa och EU-medlemskapet till trots är medlemsländerna fortfarande en-
skilda stater.
Ofta står medlemsländerna inför EU-rättsliga och internationella rättsliga 
skyldigheter som skiljer sig åt på grund av att yttre befogenheter har över-
förts från medlemsländerna till EU. Det har exempelvis varit helt legitimt 
att sluta investeringsavtal med tredjeland, men vad händer om befogenheten 
inom det området flyttas från medlemsländerna till EU, antingen på grund 
av en fördragsändring eller därför att EU plötsligt utövar en befogenhet man 
redan har? Tredjeländerna  – det vill säga länder utanför EU, EFTA, EES och 
EU:s kandidatländer – är av naturliga skäl inte särskilt intresserade av hur 
det förhåller sig med befogenheterna inom EU, men medlemsländerna står 
tveklöst inför en ny situation.
Den bild som framträder – speciellt efter Lissabonfördragets ikraftträdande 
– återspeglar EU:s strävan att vidareutveckla  förmågan att vara en interna-
tionell aktör. Samtidigt begränsas EU både av principen om tilldelade befo-
genheter (enligt vilken EU endast har de befogenheter man har tilldelats av 
medlemsländerna) och av behovet att följa reglerna för internationell rätt. Det 
vi ser är en vidareutveckling av vad man skulle kunna kalla den tredje dimen-
sionen i rättsliga relationer. Innan den Europeiska gemenskapen (EG) grun-
dades i slutet av femtiotalet hade medlemsländerna kontroll över sina yttre 
förbindelser, vilket innebar fulla (och exklusiva) befogenheter att ingå inter-
nationella avtal med andra stater. När EG grundades medförde det en annan 
typ av rättslig relation: delar av de yttre förbindelserna blev inre angelägen-
heter och relationerna mellan medlemsländerna och med EG blev underställ-
da reglerna i EG:s (numera EU:s) fördrag. Vad gäller de yttre förbindelserna 
var medlemsländerna tvungna att dela befogenheter med EG/EU eller till och 
med förlora vad som dittills hade varit suveräna befogenheter (till exempel 
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inom det viktiga området  utrikeshandel). Titeln på den här rapporten – Close 
Encounters of the Third Kind – syftar på denna tredje typ av relation: den 
mellan  Europeiska unionen och den internationella rättsordningen. Rap-
porten lyfter fram de  olika situationer där EU möter internationell rätt.
Det hävdas att EU kan och bör ses som en internationell organisation, och 
som internationell organisation är EU också underkastad internationell rätt i 
sina relationer med tredje land och andra internationella organisationer. Där-
för bör vi utgå ifrån antagandet att EU är bunden av såväl de internationella 
avtal  man har ingått som den sedvanliga internationella rätten, vilket i sig 
berör själva kärnan i problemet med EU:s yttre förbindelser: vem företräder 
egentligen ”Europas intressen” på den internationella scenen – EU eller dess 
medlemsländer? Och hur förhåller sig de  åtgärder man vidtar till varandra – 
är de sammanhängande, ömsesidigt stödjande, eller rentav oförenliga? Talet 
om EU som  ”internationell aktör” används ofta som ett övergripande be-
grepp för en uppsättning doktriner, instrument och aktörer som täcker en rad 
områden. Något som i sin tur visar hur svårt det är att slå fast vem som agerar: 
EU, EU:s medlemsländer, eller båda samtidigt.
Rapporten granskar också frågan om EU:s påstådda ’autonomi’ i ljuset av 
praxis (inklusive fallet Kadi*) när det gäller hur internationell rätt påverkar 
EU:s rättsliga ordning. Med tanke på EU:s globala ambitioner – särskilt så 
som de har formulerats i de fördrag som har tillkommit efter Lissabon-fördra-
get – har frågan om den internationella hierarkin och EU:s normer blivit än 
mer relevant.
EU behöver instrument för att verka rättsligt på det internationella planet och 
där är internationella avtal EU:s i särklass främsta verktyg. Avtalen gör det 
möjligt för EU att spela med i den globala rättsordningen och etablera rätt-
sliga relationer med tredje land och andra internationella organisationer. De 
reviderade fördragen föreskriver nya rutiner för hur man ska förhandla och 
ingå internationella avtal, med roller för nya aktörer som EU:s höga repre-
sentant för utrikesfrågor och säkerhetspolitik. Såväl rutiner som praxis visar 
dock på de spänningar som fortfarande finns mellan EU:s institutioner, men 
också mellan EU och medlemsländerna. Det senare är särskilt tydligt när det 
gäller avtal inom områden där både EU och medlemsländerna innehar befo-
genheter. Inom dessa områden handlar ”skyldigheten att samarbeta” om att 
vägleda såväl EU som dess medlemsländer när det gäller åtgärder man har 
fattat beslut om. Andra typer av avtal som leder till ”möten” mellan EU och 
internationell rätt är associerings- och anslutningsavtal samt avtal om utträde 
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ur eller medlemskap i internationella organisationer. Samtidigt fortsätter in-
ternationell rätt att spela en roll vad gäller internationella avtal som ingås 
endast av medlemsländer.
Till det ska läggas tre områden som förtjänar särskild uppmärksamhet eft-
ersom de har blivit viktigare under senare år. Det handlar om EU:s interna-
tionella ansvar, exterritoriella immunitet när det gäller rättsprocesser i tredje 
land och unionens ambitioner inom internationell diplomati. Alla tre område-
na speglar den allt tydligare  position som EU har intagit i den internationella 
rättsordningen och de ambitioner som återfinns i de fördrag som har tillkom-
mit efter Lissabon-fördraget.
Vid det här laget är det allmänt accepterat att EU kan få ta ansvar för ett 
felaktigt internationellt agerande. Men EU är  inte en internationell organi-
sation som alla andra och uppdelningen av yttre befogenheter är en kom-
plex företeelse. En av de viktigaste frågorna är därför hur man ska dela upp 
ansvaret mellan EU och dess medlemsländer.  Frågan är relevant när det 
gäller det internationella ansvaret i samband med så kallade blandade avtal, 
men också när det handlar om vilket ansvar EU har som global säkerhetsak-
tör. Även om flertalet av de internationella insatser som EU hittills har initi-
erat har varit relativt blygsamma, kan även småskaliga operationer leda till att 
man bryter mot internationell rätt, orsakar skada eller skadar enskilda parter. 
Att hålla EU ansvarig för felaktigheter i samband insatser  stöter visserligen 
på en rad juridiska och praktiska svårigheter, men i och med att EU:s yttre 
åtgärder ökar måste   unionens immunitet inför internationella och utländska 
domstolar ifrågasättas. Det är uppenbart att frågan inte har analyserats till-
räckligt och i rapporten hävdas också att den framöver kommer att diskuteras 
mer frekvent.
EU:s nya diplomatiska ambitioner återfinns i Lissabonfördraget där man fast-
slår grundandet av  Europeiska utrikestjänsten (EEAS), något som har kallats 
för ’den första strukturen för en gemensam europeisk diplomati’. Här stöter vi 
dock på frågan om i vilken utsträckning internationell rätt tillåter EU att agera 
som  diplomatisk aktör jämsides med nationalstater, med tanke på att de flesta 
internationella regler inom diplomatisk och konsulär rätt grundar sig på mel-
lanstatliga relationer. Frågan om huruvida EU ska ersätta medlemsländerna 
när det gäller diplomatiska och konsulära relationer bör för närvarande vis-
serligen besvaras med nej, men det är uppenbart att utvecklingen på det här 
området går snabbt. Det kommer att vara upp till såväl EU:s medlemsländer 
som tredje land att acceptera att EU på det här området har en ny roll.
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Det huvudsakliga syftet med den här rapporten är inte att bidra till den in-
omvetenskapliga diskussionen mellan jurister om detaljerna i förhållandet 
mellan EU-rätt och internationell rätt. Den diskussionen förs i facktidskrifter 
och i vetenskapliga publikationer.  I stället tar rapporten upp frågor som är 
relevanta för en bredare publik som inte nödvändigtvis är experter på om-
rådet och i det avseendet speglar den i huvudsak det faktiska rättsläget. En 
central del handlar om de ändringar som Lissabonfördraget innebär och hur 
de påverkar relationen mellan EU och internationell rätt. Slutsatsen är att 
Lissabonfördraget har potential att bidra till en mer sammanhållen inställning 
från EU:s sida när det gäller internationella normer, även om  utvecklingen 
bara befinner sig i sin linda.
*Fallet Kadi syftar på EU-domstolens beslut 2008 att ogiltigförklara ministerrådets 
förordning om frysning av Yassin Abdullah Kadis och Al Barakaat Foundations till-
gångar. 
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